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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There was a time in the not too distant past, when it was 
a relatively simple matter to serve as a member of a board of 
education. The task of making policy for a school system, while 
subject to certain community pressures, was manageable, partly 
because the public school district, being a creature of the 
state, enjoyed some legal privileges. The oldest of these 
privileges was the principle of immunity from certain tort 
liability actions, an immunity shared with other government 
bodies. 
This doctrine, like many other traditional prerogatives 
of a board of education, has been subject to review by the 
courts in the past few years, so that now, in order to know 
what their legal position may be, the study of school district 
tort liability is essential to everyone who would act as a 
board member or a school administrator. 
A. PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY 
The primary emphasis of this study revolves around the 
modification of immunity of school districts from tort lia-
bility for negligence. School districts are sometimes found 
1 
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liable for some torts, such as the maintenance of a nuisance 
or for the trespass to property. However, in this study only 
the tort of negligence on the part of employees of a school 
district, which resulted in property damage or personal injury 
to pupils or others, received treatment. Injuries to persons 
which are covered by Workmen's Compensation were also outside 
the scope of this study. 
Related subordinates of this problem are: govemmental 
vs. proprietary functions, "safe place" statutes, "save harm-
less" statutes, the effect of carrying liability insurance, and 
bars to recovery. All of these come into focus as the study 
progresses. More specifically, the investigation sought to 
answer the following questions: 
1. What is the rationale behind the immunity doctrine? 
What are the reasons advanced for its growth and 
perpetuation in the United States? What is its 
current status? 
2. What is the rationale behind the trend toward 
nonimmunity? What is the present status of non-
immunity of &ci1ool districts in the United States? 
3. Does this trend seem to be increasing or decreasing? 
What is the future probability of nonimmunity? 
What guide lines for educational administration 
can be noted? What steps can be taken by the 
administration so as to prevent litigation? What 
steps can be taken so as to mitigate the awarding 
of damages? How can public confidence be main-
tained? 
4. Is there a conflict between the role of the courts 
and the legislature in this area? How does this 
affect modification? 
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5. !low do the courts interpret the legislative attempts 
to limit the liability of the school districts? 
6.. Does the purchase of liability insurance remove the 
immunity of the district? If so, to what extent? 
If the district is immune from suit, is the purchase 
of liability insurance an authorized legal expendi-
ture? 
It is the aim of this inquiry to examine primary auth-
orities, such as the cases and statutes, in relation to the 
above questions so that the answers will be accurate statements 
of the law in a given jurisdict1.on. 
B. DEFINITIO!l OF TERMS 
Since the field of law utilizes a technical vocabulary 
unfamiliar to the average lay reader, an attempt is made at 
this point to define these terms in an appended glossary. It 
was with the avere,ge reader in mind that the definitions are 
given so that one not familiar with the legal terminology can 
still reasonably well understand the meaning thereof •1 
C. DATA GA.THBRD'G AHD PROCESS IHG 
In general it can be said that the procedure used in 
tllis study is the typical system :folloV1ed in legal research. 
Various research books such as the American Di;est System. 
American .!!!, Reports and Shef!rd's C1tator were used to compile 
a bibliography of cases. The Beader•s Guide to Periodical 
--------
Literature and the Index !!. Leel Periodicals were used to 
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iocate 0ther pertinent information. Various legal encyclopedia 
were studied for cases and major subdivisions of the larger 
area of negligence and tort liability of the school district. 
In the field of school law several textbooks were available 
which touch upon the subject at hand. Garber's Yearbook of 
-
School Law which is published every year was an excellent source 
----
of recent cases of import. The National School Law Reporter 
- -
was also another reliable and current source of cases and 
statutes. 
After compi U.ng a bibliography of cases and statutes, 
note cards were prepared for each, and after carefully reading 
them, a brief was prepared on each case. Bach brief contained 
the citation, the date of the case, and the identity of the 
court hearing the case. The following items were subject for 
examination in each case: who the plaintiff and defendant 
where, if the case was being appealed, from what court did it 
originate, the facts of the case, the points of law, the points 
of fact, the congruity or discongruity with past decisions, 
the dissenting opinion and other related dicta. 
D. P..EVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH 
.& number of studies were found, which in some cases 
related to the problem at hand. The bulk of the studies dealt 
with the larger and less clearly defined area of immunity as 
a whole. In some material.$ a chapter or section was devoted 
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to the modification of the immunity doctrine. 
In 1~58 Davis studied the status of governmental immunity 
in the area of tort liability of school districts for negligence 
as it related to pupil injuries. 2 Davis pointed out the in-
creasing amount of litigation and a general relaxation of the 
harsh rule of immunity. The writer defined torts, negligence 
and attractive nuisance in their legal usage. Later Davis 
traced the origin and development of governmental immunity 
from liability for negligence on all levels. One chapter was 
devoted to reasons for allowing recovery. In oue chapter the 
various states that permit recovery were discussed with their 
applicable statutes. In a summary of the states allowing re-
covery, five-sixths of the allowable cases were found in Cali-
fornia, New York and Washington. Davis discussed the liability 
of certain states under special statutes dealing with trans-
portation, "safe places,'' courts o1 claims, and other similar 
state agencies. At the time ot the research, in fourteen of 
the c 0111mon law states which denied liability, only twenty-two 
caaes were decided in favor of the injured party. Of these 
twenty-two cases, sixteen were based upon a statute of some 
type (such as authorization for the purchase of insurance), 
guarantee of a "safe place," small tort claiu act, special 
recovery allowed by the legislature, and an e~ployee's liability 
act. A distribution of the cases granting recovery against 
school districts was made. This chart showed that, of the 126 
cases studied, thirty-two were in California, forty-seven were 
in New York, and seventeen were in Washington. The remainder 
of the cases were in the states which had provisions for special 
applications of liability as outlined abo'\·e. In another chart 
showing the reasons tor granting recovery, the abrogation of 
immunity by statute accounted for eighty-five of the 105 cases 
reported. Other reasons, which were mentioned frequently by 
the courts, were: failure to supervise properly, sufficient 
knowledge of the defect, improper use of certain equipment, and 
the mai11 tena nee of a nuisance. lu tbe suiumary, New York was 
noted as the most liberal of the states in granting recovery, 
although there was no express statutory provision for such 
liability. Washington was one of the first states to pass an 
act abrogating i:nmuni ty in 1869, but this was somewhat re-
stricted by a later amendment. California in 1923 passed a 
statute which abolished immunity and by future enactments the 
schools now occupy the same position as that of a private 
corporation in the field of tort liability. In only these 
three states had the immunity doctrine been changed to any 
degree. In some of the states various means of circumventing 
the immunity principle have been devised, but the principle 
still remains largely intact. 
A dissertation by Moss in 1960 compared the status of 
school district liability for torts in Oklahoma, California, 
and NeW York.3 His purpose was to identify the principles of 
law affecting the tort liability of school districts in the 
above states and to compare the status of these three states. 
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He categorized these principles into four groups: statutory 
enactments, court interpretations, court determination of the 
essential elements of liability, and the reasons for voiding 
immunity. In his findings he noted that New York has had the 
so-called New York rule since 1906 which holds districts liable 
for their own torts. California has abolished its immunity by 
statutory enactments. Both New York and California have classi-
fied the functions of a school as being either governmental or 
proprietary. If the function is governmental, immunity results; 
if the function is proprietary, liability attaches. The courts 
have held that substantial compliance with the statute is all 
that is required. If construction of a statute is required by 
the courts, they will attempt to determine the intent of the 
legislature. If the decision is in keeping with common law 
holdings, the courts are prone to liberal findings. Oklahoma 
was holdi.ng firmly to the immunity rule, although there was a 
permissive statute allowing the purchase of insurance. This 
statute allowed direct suit against the insurer without first 
securing a judgment against the insured. Although this is 
contrary to general insurance law, it was followed in Oklahoma, 
since the insurance companies were presu~ed to have full 
knowledge of the law. Since there was no statutory authority 
to the contrary, the Oklahoma. courts felt no right to change 
this ruling. 
Schaerer in a doctoral dissertation completed in 1959 
studied the status of Indiana. school district liability and 
compared this with the insurance practices of the Indiana 
schools.4 He analyzed the statutes and court decisions in 
Indiana, the standard type liability insurance policy, and 
surveyed the school corporations having a superintendent and 
a board of education. He found that there were three cate-
gories of liability as far as the other states were concerned. 
The liberal states, such as California, New York, Washington, 
and, to a lesser extent, Connecticut, Colorado, New Jersey, and 
Wiscousin, were so called because of their waiver of immunity. 
The conservative states, such as Alaba~ua, Arizona, and West 
Virginia, were so called because they upheld immunity and did 
not authorize the purchase of insurance. The compromise states, 
such as Indiana, were so known because they retained the immunity 
doctrine but permitted the purchase of insurance. The Indiana 
school districts were immune unless expressly stipulated by 
statutes (such as Workman Compensation Laws). The schools 
purchased eleven types of policies and twelve different types 
of liability insurance coverages. Seventy-two per cent of the 
policies named either the board of educati.on or the school 
district as the sole insured. Although the reviewing court 
:.ield i;o the immunity doctrine, the lower courts were permitting 
1~ecovery if the board of education did not inject the defense 
of Jover:muental imr1uni ty. Schaerer also found that insuranca 
companies were making out-of-court settlements even though the 
school districts were immune from liability. An increase in 
the frequency of suits filed and in the nuaber of out-of-court 
settlements was noted. He concluded that school districts 
pul"'Cl1ased liability insurance for the following reasons: moral 
obligation, the protection of school off icc:rs, appointees, 
agents, and employees against catastrophic judgments, and public 
.relations. 
It should be pointed out that the use ·-:.>f an agent presents 
some special considerations. Unlike some employees, an agent 
does not share in any immu11ities that tile employer may have, 
lJut the principal or employer may be liable :f 01" torts committed 
by his agent. 
In 1949 Satterfield. investigated the legal aspects <.'f 
tort liability in school districts as evidenced by recent court 
Jecisions. 5 He discussed the nullification of ir.imunity by 
statutory enactments and he found that while no state consti-
tution mentioned the tort liability of school districts, many 
cases held the school district responsible for the acts of its 
teacher employees under the rule of respondeant superior. 
It is: interesting to notf' a ls e>, that alt hough the majority of 
American states enjoy iM;iitmity, Er.;~land and Germany, frocii whom 
we modeled so much of our school system, did not extend this 
0 
right to school districts. 
!n 1930 Weltzin studied the snbject of tort liability 
of scho.,l districts, of the off ice rs, and of the members of 
the instructional staft.7 Among the questions that were stated 
was: When is the school district responsible in suits for 
1all'.aG°es? Sources of materials were the statutes, reports of 
cases, and other related data. In the chapter dealing with 
the tort liability of the school as a quasi corporation, it 
was stated that the general rule in New York and some other 
states was that a school district would be liable for torts 
such as trespass or nuisance, but would not be liable for the 
actions of its servants. The disti.nction seems to be in that 
a school district might rass rules or star1 activities which 
result in a tort, (such as trespass) in which case it could 
be held liable, while an employee is liable tor hie own torte 
and if it is for negligence and results in in.jury to another, 
the employee cannot share in the school district immunity from 
such act ion. The statutes of a few states such a.s California, 
Minnesota, oregon, and Washington explicitly provided tor action 
against the school district. However, in Minnesota, Oregon, 
and Washington, the constructton of these statutes has been 
severely restricted. 
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A study of the liability for accidents occurring in 
£._hzsica;,1 education activities was made b)' Leibee in 1952.8 He 
discussed the role of negligence in such liability and the 
essential ingredients of a charge of negligence. Be enumerated 
the principal defenses to negligence as being contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk or volenti !2.'2. fit inJuria, 
and tlle g;overnmeutal immunity of school districts. In order 
to avoid the barrier of 1maunit7, actions a~inat the school 
district were sometimes broU&ht on the charge of maintaining a 
nuisance. The courts were divided on this cha.J:'ge but the 
majoritJ extended the cloak of immunity to the area of nuisance. 
The abrogation of tam.unity in the states of California and 
New York waa noted, and various statutes and cases were cited. 
The llew York Court of Claims Act abolished the imaunity of the 
state to the degree that the state may be aued in tha~ court 
for the acts of its offio~u·s or employees. Thia act. passed 
!!!, 1937 • ns !!,. addition l2. the liability of school districts 
under the New York rule. 
Hindle inquired into the realm of the f inaneial respon-
sibilit7 for inJuriea to fUfils of the public achoola.9 Be 
concluded that there .... a strong trend toward the assumption 
by the school district of liabil.ity for personal injuries 
occurring under the responsibility of the school. He stated 
that this assumption would not be a :tinancial burden to the 
schools. Be reconunendecl that the stat• paas lecialative 
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enactments 11 "oviding for the asaumptio11 of this re$pon&:l.billt1. 
and that the cost of aucb be conei<krcd ;t;.Q int~gral expenae 
o.f r.-ublic educution. 
A par1phlet by Scha-.tftr av.d McGhebey on the tort ltabil:l.t1 
of school ditJtricta • school otf1ciala• and s~ool tnaplo1eea 
nas published in 1960.16 Amons tbei ~ny Quntiona tbis stud7 
a.slied. was one which tried to diat 1ncu:t.ah between acte of 
t!egli&once on the part of the aehool district itself (auch u 
trespass). and acts of negltgence of thei.'r' employees for Which 
the school districts might also be held liable. After a 
general diacUMion ot the problem, the "tudy took up tbe 
exceptions to the rule ot liabil1t7. Tile Mhoola have beeu 
held liable for nu!aancee, but thia na an unclear area with 
div!ded opinions. 8011e atates peJ."Mltted reeov~ry u•4-~ 'V&Jl"ious 
statutes such aa "safe placea," ''save baralesa" and &!&'all tort 
claims acts. At ti- tho court •de a diatin4·tion betwHn 
governmentl'.l a.ad proprietar, 1'unct1ona oi the sehool d1st1•icta. 
Such a diatiDGtion was difficult to •ke and ne not trecuontl.7 
uaed. In e:a.ld.niag liability 1n the var1oua stat.a, five 
states he.d bJ exp..._. atatutee iapoaed l1ab:Ll.it1 on the achool 
far personal injuries. Theae atatea were l'ew York, California, 
l'lashiqt on, Orecon, anti IU.naeaota. There wre three atatn 
(Alaba•, Arlau•aa and Wat Vtrgini.'I.) wtich bad clauses in 
their constitut10Wil which forbade the the bringing of autt 
against the atate. m.ac. the aohools were conaiden4 uteawlou 
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of the state, this coverage was automatically extended to them. 
The remainder of the states fall into a compromise category 
where immunity was held, but liability insurance could be 
purchased. The carrying of liability insurance did not waive 
the immunity of the school district in most cases. At the time 
of writing only three states (Illinois, Kentucky, and Tenn-
essee) had deviated from the general rule and had allowed 
recovery to the extent of coverage. 
A pamphlet published by the Research Division of the 
National Education Association in 1950 dealt with the subject 
of who is liable for pupil injuries. 11 The pamphlet stated 
the legal philosophy behind tort liability and negligence. 
The second part of the publication dealt with the school board's 
responsibility for personal injuries to students. It docu-
mented the common-law immunity of school districts and gave 
reasons for this rule. The states of New York, California, 
Washington, Oregon, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
had enacted statutes which imposed liability upon the school 
district. Wisconsin had a "safe place" statute but this rule 
was confused and subject to different interpretations by the 
courts. 
An annual compilation of cases relative to school law 
was published by the Research Division of National Education 
Association.12 Of the seventy-six cases reported in the year 
1961, pupil injuries gave rise to twenty-two of these actions. 
------------------------------~--------------~--------------~--
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CHAPTER II 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 'roRT 
LIABILITY IN GENERAL AND NEGLIGENCE IN PARTICULAR 
A. THE LEG.AL STATUS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
In order to comprehend intelligently the problem of 
this investigation, it is necessary to understand where a 
school district is situated in the legal scheme. It is 
axiomatic that school districts are creatures of the state, 
but what type of creatures are they? Upon this classification 
rests the courts• and legislatures' manner of dealing with 
the school district. 
It is generally held that a school district is a corpora-
tion. Chief Justice Marshall in the famous Dartmouth case 
defines a corporation as follows: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, in-
tangible, and existing only in the contemplation of law. 
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the character of its creation confers 
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very 
existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated 
to effect the object for which it was created. Among the 
most important are immortality, and, if the expression 
may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a 
perpetual succession of many persons are considered as 
the same, and may act as a single individual. 'lb.ey enable 
a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold 
property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous 
and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyance for the 
purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is 
chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in 
succession, with these qualities and capacities, that 
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corporations were invented, and are in use. By these 
means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable 
of acting for the promotion of the particular object, 
like one immortal being. 
Black's~ Dictionary defines a corporation as: 
An artificial person or legal entity created by or 
under the authority of a state or nation ••• ordinarily 
consisting of an association of numerous individuals, who 
subsist as a body politic ••• , which is regarded in 
law as having a personality and existence distinct from. 
that of its several members, and which is, by the same 
authority vested with the capacity of continuous succession, 
irrespective of changes in the membership, either in 
perpetuity or for a limited term of years, and of acting 
as a unit or single individual in matters relating to the 
common purpose of the association, within the scope of 
the powirs and authorities conferred upon such bodies 
by law. 
Courts have held the school district to be bodies 
corporate, 3 political subdivisions of the state,4 and as public 
or political corporations.5 Since this is the case the school 
district bas only the powers expressly granted it by the state. 
Now that it has been established that a school district 
is a corporation with the powers of a corporation, it is 
necessary to determine what type of corporation the school 
district is. Corporations are of many kinds and may be classi-
fied in different ways.a 
The courts of the majority of the states have held that 
strictly speaking, school districts are quasi corporations.7 
Quasi corporations are not full corporations in the eyes of 
the law but have a restricted being. They possess some of the 
powers of a corporation but they are primarily subdivisions 
of the state. Counties, townships, school districts, and 
irrigation districts are examples of this involuntary division 
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of the state. 'lb.e school corporation was created for the express 
purpose of education without regard to the wishes of those who 
become members of this corporation. 
B. THE THEORY OF TORT LIABILITY 
The word tort is of French origin derived from the Latin 
"torquere" which means to twist or bend. It is quite diffi-
cult to define the word tort in all of its ramifications. In 
its simplest form it is a civil wrong perpetrated upon another, 
exclusive of contract. Prosser defines tort aa: 
A civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for 
which the courts will provide a remedy in the form of an 
action for damages ••• It is not a crime, it is not 
a breach of contract, it is not necessarily concerned 
with property rights or problems of government, but 
it is the occupant of a large residuary field remaining 
if these are taken out of the law.8 
Another classification of torts if made by Prosser in 
which he sets up three basic grounds for tort liability. 
1. 'lbere must be an active intent to interfere with 
the plaintiff's interests. 'lbese are usually the 
basis for criminal action such as assault, battery, 
trespass, defamation, etc. 
2. Negligences, the act or the failure to act as the 
reasonably prudent man would act. 
3. Strict liability which is usually imposed as a 
manner of statute or policy such as with steam 
boilers, elevators, and automobiles. On this ground 
it is up to the defend.ant to prove that be has been 
careful in his conduct. The burden of proof is upon 
the defendant, since the Brincipal of res ipsa 
loquiter is here applied. ---
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Research done by Rindle indicated that school districts 
were rarely charged with intentional acts to interfere with 
a plaintiff's interest.10 One can certainly agree that the 
majority of injuries are not caused by any deliberate act of 
commission or omission. The natter of strict liability is 
beyond the scope of this investigation. Ergo, the acts of 
alleged negligence of the school district provide the focal 
point of this study. 
C. THE THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE 
Negligence is defined as any conduct that does not 
measure up to the standards established by law for the pro-
tection of others. Salmond defines negligence as follows: 
Negligence is the 0taission to do something which a 
reasonable man guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, 
or the doing of sy•ething which a prudent and reasonable 
man would not do. l 
The American Law Institute states that: 
Negligence is any conduct, except conduct recklessly 
disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below 
the standards established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm.12 
Negligence implies the unintentional omission or commission of 
an act which results in injury or damage. Such actions are 
not in agreement with the standards established by the law. 
In order to base a court claim upon the charge of 
negligence it is necessary to show the existence of four 
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elements necessary to a cause of action based upon negligence 
are: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
A legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risks. 
A failure to conform. to the standard. 
A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct 
and the resulting injury. 
Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of 
another.13 
The legal duty must be present and recognized by the 
courts. One cannot be negligent if he does not owe any care 
toward the injured party. 
If the duty is present, the actor is obligated to act 
in a manner so as not to cause any unreasonable risks to the 
other party. It is in this area where the legal fiction of the 
reasonable and prudent man reigns supreme. Prosser discusses 
the reasonable man at length. 
The standard required of an individual is that of the 
supposed conduct, under similar circumstances of a hypo-
thetical persQn, the reasonable man of ordinary prudence, 
who represents a community ideal of reasonable behavior. 
The characteristics of this imaginary person include: 
(1) the physical attributes of the actor himself, (2) normal 
intelligence and mental capacity, (3) normal perception and 
memory and a minimum of experience and information, common 
to all the community, and (4) such superior skills and 
knowledge as the actor has or holds himself out as having, 
when he undertakes to act. 
In the case of children and aged persons, a special 
standard of mental capacity is applied, based upon what it 
is reasonable to expect of one of the actor's age, intelli-
gence, and experience.14 
Related to the prudent man is the other test for negli-
gence and that is the test of foreseeability. When a reasonably 
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prudent person would have foreseen the possibility of injury, 
the failure to act in accordance with this danger is considered 
negligent behavior. Even if a third party enters into the act, 
although innocently, and causes the direct injury, the second 
party inay be liable for prior negligence if this was something 
that a reasonable and prudent person might have foreseen. 
Application of this principle is seen when a child does some-
thing that injures another child which a teacher might have 
fo~eseen and prevented. The DeBenedittis case involved a boy 
who was injured while P.xtricating a piece of metal from a 
machine when another boy started the achine •15 The teacher 
was only ntne feet away but the legal cause of the accident was 
the negligence of the teacher in failing to lock the machine 
and in not keeping other students away from the machine. 
In our judicial scheme the determination of what a 
reasonable and prudent man is and whether a given act is fore-
seeable is a point of fact to be determined by the trier of 
fact. Each case is relative to place, time, and the cir-
cumstances at hand. According to Bohlen the reasonable man is 
the personification of the social conscience of the court or 
jury, whichever it is which passes authoritatively upon his 
acts and omissions.16 
The proximate or legal cause is the leaven which pro-
duced the event. There must be an unbroken causal chain 
between the act or omission and the result, without which the 
aftermath would not have occurred. The factual cause of an 
injury is usually simple to ascertain but the proximate cause 
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is another matter. Many insignificant intervening acts may 
occur without breaking the chain. If a new, independent, and 
supersecing cause breaks the chain, the negligent actor is 
relieved of his legal responsibility. For example, a boy who 
was standing on the playground was knocked down by three other 
boys and injured his hand on a clinker on the playground. The 
plaintiff attempted to collect from the district, charging the 
maintenance of the playground in an unsafe condition. The court 
held that the proximate cause of the injury was the intervention 
of the three boys rather than the maintenance of the play-
ground in an unsafe condition. 17 Frequently, the courts use 
the "but for" test to determine the proximate cause of an injury. 
That is to say, that the injury would not have taken place "but 
for" the negligent act of the defendant. 
As previously stated the facts of negligence are specific 
and relative to each case; however, an abstract of some of the 
general principles of negligent behavior are as follows: 
1. It is not properly done; appropriate care is not employed 
by the actor. 
2. The circumstances under which it is done create risks, 
although it is done with due care and precaution. 
3. The actor is indulging in acts which involve an un-
reasonable risk of direct and immediate harm to others. 
4. The actor sets in motion a force, the continuous 
operation of which may be unreasonably hazardous to 
others. 
5. He creates a situation which is unreasonably dangerous 
to others because of the likelihood of the action of 
f e fore s 
6. 
7. 
s. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
He entrusts dangerous devices or instrumentalities to 
persons who are incompetent to use or care for such 
instruments properly. 
He neglects a duty of control over third persons who, 
by reason of some incapacity or abnormality, he knows 
to be likely to inflict intended harm upon others. 
He fails to employ due care to give adequate warning. 
He fails to exercise the proper care in looking out 
23 
for persons whom he has reason to believe may be in the 
danger zone. 
He fails to employ appropriate skill to perform acts 
undertaken. 
He fails to make adequate preparation to avoid harm to 
others before entering upon certain conduct where such 
preparation is reasonably necessary. 
He fails to inspect and repair instrumentalities or 
mechanical devices used by others. 
His conduct prevents a third person from assisting per-
sons imperiled through no fault of his own. 
His written o~ spoken word creates negligent misrep-
resentations. IS 
The school district is involved actively in many of these 
possibilities of negligent behavior, and it behooves the dis-
trict to be congnizant of these considerations. 
Assuming that the essential elements of negligence are 
present asset out on page 20, what defenses are available to 
the defendant school district? The following have been ad-
vocated as reasons in law for denial of recovery: 
1. The doctrine of immunity from tort liability in 
negligence of a governmental body while performing 
a governmental function. 
2. Statutory non-fulfillment of conditions precedent to 
liability, enacted by the legislature such as the 
date of filing the claim and form of the claim. 
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3. Contributory negligence means any causal want of 
care on the part of the injured party. The con-
currence of want of care on the part of the plaintiff, 
and the negligence on the part of the defendant, are 
essential elements in a defense utilizing contribu-
tory negligence. The courts are usually quite harsh 
on the defense of contributory negligence on the 
p~ rt of infants because of th.air tender years. That 
is, the court will not hold an infant to the same 
standard of care as it will hold an adult. 
4. Valenti non fit injuria or assumption of risk is 
sometimes utilized but rarely so in the case of 
schools. Either by express agreement or by impli-
cation the plaintiff takes his chances and thereby 
relieves the defendant of any responsibility. 
5. ~major, act of God, or pure and unavoidable 
accid£nt, is another defense used. These are the 
events such as an uncontrollable s.1owstorm or rain-
storm. In a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision it 
was suggested that it was time to abandon this de-
fense as being an example of loose usage of something 
that is beyond the comprehension of man.19 "The 
unavoidable accident is an unintentional occurrence 
which would not have been prevented by the exercise 
of reasonable care.20 If this is the case, no 
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liability usually attaches. 
All matters involve a certain amount of risk. So it is 
with negligence for the actors and the courts must balance the 
riskS against the benefits derived therefrom. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT'S IMMUNITY 
F~OM LIABILITY FOR THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
AND ITS SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION 
A. THE HISTORY OF SCHOOL DISTRICT IMMUNITY 
In order to comprehend fully the modification of tort 
liability of school districts for the ·tort o.f negligence, it 
is necessary to examine the historical development, rationale 
and philosophy behind the concept of governmental immunity. 
This approach will be a general discussion of this issue without 
any attempt to be exhaustive or comprehensive, but merely to 
set the stage for subsequeut discourse. There are many sources 
of inf ormationl on this subject if the reader wishes to pursue 
this vein of thought. 
Ample evidence is available at this moment to justify 
the statement that generally speaking, school districts, as 
quasi corporations, are immune from suits in the area of tort 
liability. More specifically, the districts are usually held 
immune from suits charging negligence. "Although there is 
authority to the contrary, it is a general rule that school 
districts or their governing boards are not liable for torts 
or for injuries resulting from their negligence, unless such 
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liabllitY is imposed by statute. 112 According to Edwards, "The 
common-law principle, almost universally applied by American 
courts, is that school districts and municipalities are not 
liable to pupils for injuries resulting from the negligence of 
the officers, agents, or employees of the district or muni-
cipality. "3 Weltzin states the rule as follows: 
The school corporation as a branch of the state engaged 
in the execution of the governmental function of furnishing 
education to the public, a duty involuntarily imposed upon 
it by the state, is in the absence of statute to the con-
trary, protected to the same extent a~ is the sover~ign state 
from responsibility for its own torts or those of its ser-
vants, resulting either from misfeasance or non-feasance in 
the execution of. public duty.4 
As previously stated school districts are extensions of the 
state and therefore are not liable for torts committed while 
exercising their governmental functions.5 To state it in a 
different way, no action can be maintained against a school 
district for personal injuries by charging negligence unless 
there is a statute or judicial ruling to the contrary. 
The doctrine of immunity from torts had its origin in 
the Middle Ages. This stemmed from the Divine Rule of the kings 
or as sometimes expressed "the king can do no wrong. " The 
state has assumed the sovereign powers of the king and has in-
herited this immunity. The school district, being an arm of 
the state has traditionally shared the principle that it can 
do no wrong.6 
As a historical fact, the first time the doctrine of 
sovereign i,nmunity was applied to a subdivision of the state 
l·n the case of 1ussel v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 671, was 
100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). It might be noted that the English 
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courts later overruled this case and by 1890 the schools of 
England were held liable for torts.7 The infiltration of this 
doctx-ine of sovereign immunity into the law controlling the 
liability of local governmental agencies has been described as 
one of the ,nysteries of jurisprudence. 8 l!1 the early stRges of 
the developrnent of our lega 1 system the ~uling of Russell v. 
Men of Devon was taken over, and under the concept of stare 
--
decisis became a barrier to bringing any action against a govern 
mental a:.:;cncy such as the school district. 
The United States Supreme Court stated that no action 
could be brought against a sovereign without its permission. 
It is an established primciple of jurisprudence in all 
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its 
own courts, or in any other, without its consent and per-
mission; but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privi-
lege and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by 
individuals or by another state. And as this permission is 
altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty, it 
follows that it may prescribe the terms and conditions on 
which it consents to be sued, and the manner in which the 
suit shall be conducted, and may withdraw its consent when-
ever it may suppose that justice to the public requires it .9 
Such was the thinking of the SupreMe Court in 1857 in reference 
to immun;_ty of the state. 
There are hundreds of cases that support this doctrine 
of immunity based upon the theory of "the ld ng can do no wrong." O 
Some cases are given in the footnote. 11 
... 
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B. REASONS GIVEN FOR THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
Different authors give varying reasons for the con-
tinuation of the doctrine of immunity. Davis listed a total 
of eighteen reasons for the maintenance of this doctrine after 
the Civil War. 12 Fuller in his analysis of court decisions 
listed ten reasons given by the courts for school district 
immunity.13 Some of the leading causes will be abstracted and 
discussed briefly as follows: 
1. The most fundamental and the one most frequently 
cited is that the school is an agent of the state 
carrying out a governmental function and therefore 
shares the sovereignty of the state. This is an 
extension of "the king can do no wrong" doctrine. 
Governmental functions are done for the benefit of 
the public, and the school does not receive any 
benefit from such functions.14 
2. The rule of precedent or stare decisis which implies 
the following of previously decided cases of a 
similar nature has meant that the court continues 
to apply the immunity of quasi corporations. Lower 
courts are bound to follow the rulings of higher 
courts and a doctrine, once settled, is very diffi-
cult to alter. 
3. Reasons related to finance, trust funds, impairment 
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service, and expense of litigation are given as 
other reasons for immunity. The prohibitive costs, 
the legal inability to pay these claims, the number 
of law suits, etc. are items that could seriously 
affect the operation of the schoo1.15 
4. The principal of respondeat superior does not usually 
apply to school districts. This principle means 
that the master or principal (not used in an edu-
cational sense) is responsible for the acts of his 
servant or agent. It is enunciated in some courts 
that this principle is not applicable to school 
districts.16 "If a school district is not liable 
for the negligent acts of its officers, it is not 
liable for the negligence of its employees.~17 
5. The defense of ultra vires is stated as a reason 
for maintaining the immunity of a school district. 
An ultra vires act is an act above and beyond the 
power of the school district. It is held that since 
tne school district has only those powers delegated 
to it by the legislature, the district is not auth-
orized to commit a tort. One is not liable for acts 
committed ultra vires.18 
6. School districts which are acting nolens volens 
are sometimes considered as being immune from suit. 
Nolens volens means that no profit or advantage 
obtains to said actor from the performance of his 
duties .19 
7. Some authorities cite the reason that the schools 
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will be embarrassed and lose rapport with the public 
if court actions are allowed and damages are awarded 
for alleged negligence on the part of the school 
district. While this may be a true statement, it 
does not seem to justify the suffering inflicted 
upon individuals which the immunity rule now permits. 
C. MODIFICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY 
While the doctrine of immunity from ~ liability of 
governmental agencies. such as school boards, seems to be al-
most impregnable, the last hundred years, and in particular, 
the last six decades have seen the wall beginning to crack and 
in a few cases completely crumble. Many legal experts have 
denounced immunity as being unjust and illogical. Some of the 
following quotations illustrate this point of view: 
The doctrine of state immunity in tort survives by 
virtue of antiquity alone •••• The doctrine is not only 
an historical anachronism, but, under our present rules, 
works gross injustice to all parties concerned and mani-
fests an inefficient public policy. The nonresponsibility 
of the employing state, accompanied by the theoretical 
responsibility of the mistaken or wrong-doing employee -
the limit of the vaunted "rule of law" - is unfair to 
the victim of the inquiry, to ~Be subo icer or 
employee and to the community. ~ \fJ \ S To v,.., 
" ~'? 
34 
The whole doctrine of governmental immunity from 
liability for torts rests upon a rotten foundation. It 
is almost incredible that in this modern age of compara-
tive sociological enlightenment and in a republic, the 
medieval absolution supposed to be implicit in the maxim, 
the king can do no wrong, should exempt the various 
branches of government from liability for their torts, 
and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the 
wrongful acts of the government should be imposed upon 
the single individual who suffers the injury, rather than 
distributed among the entire community, constituting the 
government, whe.:.·e it could be borne without hards~f P 
upon the individual, and where it justly belongs. 
It may be that the common-law rule of immunity is 
harsh and unjust in requiring the individual to suffer 
the wrong in the instant case, and that society, in 
keeping with the modern trend, should offer relief A but 
this is a legislative and not a judicial question.~2 
The Illinois Supreme Court in the leading Molitor case 
had this to say about immunity: 
We are of the opinion that school district immunity 
cannot be justified on this theory. (The theory of 
sovereignty). Likewise, we agree with the Supreme Court 
of Florida that in preserving the sovereign immunity 
theory, courts have overlooked the fact that the Revolu-
tionary War was fought to abolish that "divine right of 
kings" on which the theory is l:>ased. 
We do not believe in this present day and age, when 
public education constitutes one of the biggP-st busi-
~1esses in the country, that school immunity can be 
justified on the protection-of-public-funds theory •••• Nor 
can it be properly argued that as a result of the abandon 
ment of the common-law rule the district would be 
completely bankrupt. California, Tennessee, New York, 
Washington, and other states have not been compelled 
to shut down their schools •••• Neither are we impressed 
with the defendant's plea that the abolition of immun-
ity would create' grave and unpredictable problems of 
school finance and administration •••• "Tort liability is 
in fact a very small i~~m in the budget of any well-
organized enterprise." 
t• . .. 
0.J 
We are of the opinion that none of the reasons ad-
vanced in support of school district immunity have any 
true validity today.24 
There does appear to be a trend toward relaxation of 
immunity in the United States as will be docu~ented in the 
followinr; chapters. The development of governmental liability 
is on tte increase, witness the Federal Tort Claims Act, so 
stat tJ42, passed in 1946. Other contributing factors are the 
increase in tlle number of private corporations doing govern-
mental work and the need to protect them in some way and the 
increase in tJ1e amount of liability insurance being purchased 
by these bodies in an attempt to protect against negligent suits. 
It is somewhat of an anomaly that in the United States 
the doct~ine of immunity has been retained while in other 
countries closely allied with the Western European culture the 
concept has been abolished. In England, the school dist~icts 
have been held liable for their torts since 1890. 25 In Germany 
the schools under the Weia1ar Republic are held liable for their 
torts. 26 nln fact practically a 11 the western countries of 
Europe have abandoned the rule of immunity."27 The Canadian 
school boards do not enjoy the freedom from tort liability that 
the majority of the states of the union have traditionally 
helct.23 
As Lincoln said on the occasion of his first annual 
message, December 3, 1801, "It is as much of a duty of govern-
ment to render proper justice against itself, in favor of its 
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citizens, as to administer the same between private individuals." 
D. STRUCTURAL FORMS OF MODIFICATION 
It is the prime purpose of this dissertation to point 
out and analyze the various means that are being developed and 
used to change the traditional doctrine of governmental immunity 
on the part of the school district. 
Two forms of classification relating to the modification 
of immunity rule are made. One categorization relates to the 
genesis of the power allowingBJits to be brought against the 
school board. In this system the source of the authority may 
be in the hands of the legislature of the state, or the source 
may come from the rulings of the courts. For the sake of 
brevity these are referred to as either statutory or judicial 
authority. 
The second form of classification relates to the speci.f ic 
charges that are brought against the school board. The type 
of activity engaged in by the defendant at the time of the 
act, the place where the act was committed, and the relation 
of the school district to the act determine what form the modi-
fication may take. Examples of this type are: "safe places" 
statutes, "save harmless" statutes, governmental or proprietary 
functions, nuisances, and trespass to property. 
Of course the two classifications are not dichotomous :f.n 
actual practice. G\:.'nerally, a case will Livolve firms fro:n 
both categories as they are applicable to the instant case. 
"The greatest abrogation of goverm:iental immunity has 
.;n the area of school (bus) transportation and work1nen 's been ... 
compensation. These two special areas have been singled out by 
the legislat\.lres as special fields of injury and have been 
graute-.i relief and protectio .. : for damages. "29 The field of 
workmeu's compensation is not a part of this investigation. 
Pupil injuries in addition to school bus accidents provide the 
major causes of court act ion against school boards for negli-
gence. 
It is the purpose of the rer.ia.ining chapters to examine 
the various forms of mod if icat ion of immunity by er.ch state 
that has so modified. In this examination the philosophy and 
rationalt2 of the legislatures and courts are analyzed. .:·ram 
the opinions and dictas {Jf the courts the operational procedure 
necessary to defend against a charge ol negligence are found. 
Different authors have viewed this classification in other 
lights. Davis ga.ve the following reasons found in case law for 
allowing recovery against a school district for personal injury: 
Recovery against school districts has been granted 
under four distinct sets of circur:1Sta:1ces, three under 
which immunity had not been abrogated and one under which 
it had. School ,Jistricts have been held liable for 
pupil injuries (a) in New York in spite of the existence 
of t!le immunity doctrine, (b) in California, Hashing-
ton. and New York where statutes have abrogated common 
law imu1unity, (c) because special statutes in states 
adhering to the common law doctrine have been interpreted 
to allow recovery, and (d) because of special cir-
cumstances arising in states adhering to the common 
3G 
law doctrine. The arguments raised in the cases allow-
ing recovery were identical in many instances to those 
used in the cases denying recovery. However, whereas 
in the cases where recovery was denied, the courts were 
often over-zealous in interpreting statutes to exclude 
recovery, in the jurisdictions where recovery has been 
favored every effort seems to have been made to inter-
pret facts and statutes to grant recovery.30 
The following chapters study the states which grant 
recovery under statutes and case law. These statutes have pro-
visions which directly impose liability on school districts to 
pay claims, damages, or judgments stemming from personal in-
juries. The states which by judicial interpretations have 
allowed recovery are also analyzed. Also the states which per-
mit the purchase of liability insurance but maintain the imm-
unity doctrine are studied. Finally, the states which by some 
special circumstance or ruling have granted recovery receive 
analysis. The above examination of the various states and their 
types of recovery allowances provide the outline for the re-
mainder of the investigation. 
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CHAPTER IV 
VARIANT AND SPECIFIC FORMS OF MODIFICATI<liS 
In a number of states and in certain specific areas, 
recovery from the school corporation was permitted. Two special 
areas, which were frequent sources of litigation, were school 
bus transportation and workma1's compensation laws. In this 
investigation these ~areas were not studied except in an 
incidental relationship to the larger field of tort liability. 
In some of the states express statutory actions had been taken 
to abolish the i1nmuni ty doctrine. For example, in Alabama, 
Mississippi, and North Carolina, claims for transportation 
injuries were handled by a special agency established by the 
legislature. In the opinion of the writer this area would be 
a fertile field for further research. Different states allowed 
claims under certain specific instances. It was difficult to 
generalize from these specific applications. Some of these 
areas of special ap,lication were: "safe place'' statutes, 
"save harmless" statutes, proprietary aild governmental functions 
and the waiver of liability due to the purchase of liability 
insurance. 
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A. SAFE PLACE STATUTES 
In states such as California and New York the school 
district was held liable for maintaining buildings, grounds, 
and premises in an unsafe manner. ~ashington has partially 
restricted this liability for a "safe place." Two states, 
Colorado and Wisconsin, have enacted special statutes which 
impose liability upon the school district to build and main-
tain its buildings and/or equipment so as to render them safe 
for general usage. 
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The state of Wisconsin had established a definite statute 
converning a "safe place." The "safe place 0 statute of Wis-
consin defined the place of employment, employmemt, employer, 
and a frequenter. Some of the applicable subsections are: 
The employer shall mean and include every person, 
firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village, 
school district, sewer district, drainage district, and 
other public or quasi public corporations •••• 
The term "owner" shall mean and include ••• school 
district ••• 1 
In keeping with the general trend of strict interpre-
tation by the courts, schools in Wisconsin were exempt from 
suit until the above amended statutes which expressly mentioned 
school districts were passed. In one case the court of Wis-
consin allowed recovery. The plaintiff fell down some stairs. 
At the bottom of the stairs a door was closed suddenly by 
another student. The district was held liable for the danger-
our condition of the stairs and door. The boy injured his hand 
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bY ramming it through a glass panel of the door. The shutting 
of the door by another was not the proximate cause.2 In 
another case in which a child was injured while playing with a 
flagpole that was on the school grounds, the court held that 
the f J.agpole was not part of the building as defined in sec-
3 tiOD 101.01. 
A boy was killed when struck by a falling flagpole on 
the evening of OCtober 11, 1938. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the circuit court whichlDd dismissed 
the case. The court held that a flagpole was a true structure, 
but that it was not used as a place of resort assemblage as 
indicated in section 101.01. The doctrine of the immunity of 
a municipality in the performance of governmental functions was 
affirmed. In another Wisconsin case the plaintiff was enrolled 
in a vocational school.4 As a result of operating an unguarded 
wood planer the plaintiff injured his arm, which was later 
amputated below the elbow. He asked damages of $30,000.00. 
The case was appealed from the circuit court which had over-
ruled the defendant's demurrer. The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reversed the circuit court. The court stated that the machine 
was unsafe, not the building. A student was not an employee nor 
was a school a place of employment for a student. This ruling 
upheld the immunity of the school while discharging its govern-
mental functions, and the school district was not liable for the 
acts of negligence of its employees. In a case tried in 1957 
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the court ruled that: 
Under Wisconsin law an absolute duty is imposed on 
the occupant to make the place as safe as the nature 
and place of employment will reasonably permit and per-
formance of the commonglaw duty to make it reasonably 
safe does not suffice. 
As it appeared, the courts of Wisconsin did allow re-
covery for violations of the '~afe place" statutes, but the 
construction of the statute was of the strictest character 
thereby resulting in limited recovery. 
In a decision banded down June 5, 1962 the Wisconsin 
supreme Court upset the theory of municipal tort immunity. 6 
This decision abolished the 125 year old doctrine of immunity 
when the agency was performing a governmental function. How-
ever, in its ruling, the court said that its judgment did not 
apply to school districts. It would therefore appear that 
school districts still come under the old doctrine of immunity. 
By comparison, the applicable statute of the State of 
Colorado reads : 
Any person, firm, corporation, or association operat-
ing a •••• school house •••• or place of public assemblage, 
or any kind of establishment wherein laborers are em-
ployed or machinery used ••• shall provide safeguards ••• 
and if machine:::,y is not aafe:;uarded as provided by this 
act, the use thereof is pr~nibited. 
It also provides that in order to establish liability 
of the defendant and to recover damages, it shall be 
sufficient for the plaintiff to prove that death or 
inquiry resulted from the use of machinery for which 
the defendant failed to provide safeguards as required 
by statute.7 
However, as yet, no cases have tested this statute in this state. 
B. SAVE HARMLESS ST.1\TUTES 
Another technique, which was developed recently, was the 
enactment of "save harmless" statutes. These statutes bave 
indirectly made the board of education liable for negligence. 
BY the enactrllE'nt of this type of law the board of education 
assumed the financial responsibility for the liability of certain 
school employees while acting within the scope of their duty. 
The purpose of this type of act was "to save harmless and pro-
tect all teachers and members of supervisory and administrative 
staff from financial loss •••• n8 ''These statutes are based on 
the assumption that the business of education has become so big 
that it is unfair to saddle teachers and administrators with 
liability risks which may be involved in their respective 
positions. 119 It has been a generally accepted point of law 
that teachers are liable for their acts of tort. Four states 
(Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Wyoming) have "save 
harmless" statutes effectiv~ at this time. California does 
not have a "save harmless" statute, but "the governing body of 
any school district is liable as such in the name of the distric 
or its officers or employees. 1110 The effect of the "save harm-
less" statute in New York is studied in Chapter v. 
In 1949 Connecticut passed its "save harmless" act. It 
was very similar to the statutes of New Jersey and New York 
but appeared to be more comprehensive. It reads as follows: 
r 
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Each board of education shall protect and save harm-
less any member of such board or any teacher or other 
employee thereof or any member of its supervisory or 
administrative staff and the state board of education, 
the board of trustees of each state institution and each 
state agency which employs teachers, and the managing 
board of any public schools, as defined in sec. 10-161, 
shall protect and save harmless any member of such board, 
or any teacher or other employee thereof or any member 
of its supervisory or administrative staff employed by 
it, from financial loss and expense, including legal 
fees and costs, if any, arising out of any claim, demand, 
suit or judgment by reason of alleged negligence or other 
act resulting in accidental damage to or destruction of 
property, within or without the school building, provid-
ing such teacher, member or employee, at the time of 
the accident resulting in such injury, damage, or de-
struction, was acting in the discharge of his employ-
ment or under the di~·ection of such board of education, 
board of trustees, state agency, department, or managing 
board. For the purpose of this section, the term 'teacher' 
shall include any student teacher doing practice teach-
ing under the direction of a teacher employed by a town 
board of education or by the state board of education.11 
Section 10-236 gave the power to insure against the liability 
of the above section. 12 
In searching the citator the only germane case was heard 
in 1955. 13 The court named the principal, the school board, and 
the members of the board as defendants. The charge against the 
principal was assault and battery. The principal slapped a boy 
on the ear when the boy was whistling at his desk. The Superior 
Court of Connecticut, Litchfield County, sustained a demurrer 
dismissing the action against the board and its members. The 
court held that a judgment must first be secured against the 
Principal. The purpose of the statute was not to abolish . 
immunity but to protect teachers from loss by civil misconduct. 
The statute was a statute of indemnification ~ loss, not 
frorn liability. 
- In 1937 New Jersey enacted a statute which allowed the 
board of education to provide legal counsel at the expense of 
the board for legal action brought against teachers. 14 An 
action which alleged the use of corporal punishment on the part 
of the teacher was excluded from this benefit. In 1938 New 
Jersey enacted its "save harmless" statute. It was almost 
identical to the other states. New Jersey passed this act one 
year after New York and it was as follows: 
It shall be the d~ty of each board of education in 
any school district to save harmless and protect any 
person holding office, position or employment under the 
jurisdiction of said board from financial loss arising 
out of any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason 
of alleged negligence or other act resulting in acci-
dental bodily injury to any person or damage to property 
within or without the school building; provided such 
person at the time of the accident, injury or damage was 
acting in the discharge of his duties within the scope 
of his office, position or employment and/or under the 
direction of said board of education; and said board of 
education may arrange for and maintain appropriate in-
surance with any company created by or under the laws of 
this State or in any insurance company authorized by law 
to transact business in this State, or such board may 
elect to act as self insurers to maintain the aforesaid 
protection.15 
The New Jersey courts have held that the "save harmless" 
statute did not create a liability on the part of the school 
district, and the courts have upheld the immunity of the dis-
trict. 16 This statute did not create a new cause of action 
against a school board even if the board of education failed 
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to insure against such liability. 
In 1955 Wyoming passed a permissive statute authorizing 
the school district to "save harmless" and protect teachers from 
civil liability. This act was as follows: 
Each board of directors in any school district is 
empowered and authorized to save harmless and protect 
all teachers and members of supervisory and adminis-
trative staff from financial loss arising out of any 
claim, demand, suit, or judgment by reason of alleged 
negligence or other act resulting in accidental bodily 
injury to persons within or without the school building; 
provided such teacher or member of the supervisory or 
administrative staff at the time of the accident or 
injury was acting in the discharge of his duties within 
the scope of his employment or under the direction of 
said board of directors, and said board of directors may 
arrange for and maintain appropriate insurance with any 
company created by or under the laws of this state, or 
in any insurance company authorized by law to transact 
business in this state, or such board may elect to act 
as self-insurer to maintain the aforesaid protectior.. 
This act (21-158, 21-159) shall not be construed as 
creating or tending to create a liability of the school 
district so protecting or insuring its teachers or staff 
members, nor shall the failure to procure such insurance 
as is authorized by this act be constr¥ed as creating 
any liability of the school district. 
The total impact of the "save harmless" statutes upon 
the immunity of the school district has been negligible in two 
of the four states while in New York it has been coupled with 
a more widespread move toward abrogation. 
C. GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS 
In order to successfully bring a suit against a school 
district, plaintiffs sometimes used the technique of attempting 
to divide the functions of a school. The two functions were 
r 
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governmental and proprietary. 
Recognizing that a school district cannot, under 
the common law, be held liable for the negligence of 
its agents or employees in the performance of a govern-
mental function, plaintiffs in numerous cases have 
claimed liability on the ground that the school district 
was engaged in the performance of a proprietary or 
private function.18 
If engaged in a proprietary function, vicarious liability may 
attach. Some jurisdictions attempted to apply this distinction; 
others did not. Corpus Juris Secundum comments: 
The immunity of a school district or other local 
school organization from liability for tortB applies to 
torts committed in the course of the exercise by the 
district of governmental functions. Some authorities 
held that such immunity exists regardless of whether 
the torts were committed in the exercise of gov~rnmental 
functions, but other authorities held a school district 
is liable for torts committed in t~g exercise by the 
district of proprietary functions. 
One of the chief disadvantages of this approach was the 
difficulty of distinguishing between the two functions. It 
was viewed as a "distinction without difference" by many courts 
and was not applied because of the problem of uniformity. The 
test, frequently used, was whether the act"is for the good of 
all without any element of special corporate benefit or 
pecuniary profit.'~o The fact that a function yielded a 
pecuniary profit or produced revenue did not mean that this 
was a proprietary function.21 
While the jurisdictions that applied this ruling appear-
ed to be in the minority, it is of some interest. Pennsylvania 
has a statute as follows: 
r 
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.:i1unicipal and quasi-municipal corporations, such as 
school districts, are not immune from liability in tort 
for the negligent acts of their servants committed in 
the course of proprietary functions of the municipal and 
quasi-municipal corporation.22 
A school district which operated a swimming pool as a summer 
recreation program was held liable when a boy drownect.23 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that this was a proprietary 
function. When a school district purchased a tax delinquent 
house and the tenant, an eight year old girl fell, the school 
was engaged in a proprietary function for buying, maintaining, 
and possessing property.24 However, the court held that a 
football game was an educational activity and therefore was a 
governmental function. 25 Also, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that a school district was not liable for negligence in 
performing the governmental function of maintaining the school 
grounds and fences.26 
A case heard in Arizona held the school district liable 
for a proprietary function. 27 The Arizona Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court which had upheld immunity. The defendant 
had leased the football stadium to another school and had re-
ceived a fee of $300.00. A paying spectator fell because of a 
faulty handrail. The court ruled that the school district 
had leased, received compensation, and was therefore engaged 
ir1 a Droprietary function and liable. The school districts of 
Arizona are immune as governmental agencies. The dicta of the 
court implied that it did not wish to extend the doctrine of 
r 
i ,,,unitY any further than necessary. Judge Windes, dissenting, m, .. 
did not support the governmental proprietary distinction. He 
believed that other decisions showed that all functions are 
governmental. 
Two cases heard in Illinois during 1961 and 1962 re-
f used to make the distinction of dividing the functions.28 In 
the Thompson case tried in New Jersey, the distinction was 
l)C 
made. ,,,;;.i In Oregon the district was held liable for performing 
the proprietary function of painting a flagpole. 30 
The amount of litigation based upon this count is small 
in comparison to the total picture of tort liability. Within 
any one given jurisdiction, prudence would indicate the nAed 
for ascertaining if this division was attempted. 
D. THE EFFECT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Another enigma that is difficult to unravel is the effect 
of liability insurance. Many states have statutes which permit 
the purchase of liability insurance. In some states liability 
insurance is purchased without the express statutory power to 
do so. It is doubtful if this expenditure would stand if sub-
jected to a judicial interpretation. In the field of insurance 
law it is common knowledge that the mere possession of liability 
insurance does not imply the recognition of potential liability. 
In fact, in many jurisdictions the fact that the defendant may 
r 
l·nsurance is not admissible in evidence. have 
Jr.e of the reasons advanced for the immunity doctrine 
was the protection of the trust funds; however, if these funds 
were adequately protected by insurance, it might seem that 
this argument would be voided. '~he great weight of authority 
seems to hold that the purchase of liability insurance does 
not waive governmental immunity, although there are some ex-
ceptions. "31 A Kentucky court has said that "a statute giving 
a school district permission to carry liability insurance to 
cover torts ••• in no way makes the district itself liable 
for such torts. 032 
Despite this fact there were some exceptions to the 
rule. American Law Rt:ports had this to say about removal of 
immunity to the extent of the coverage. 
In a few jurisdictions the courts have taken the 
view (which is worthy of characterization as enlighten-
ment) that to the extent that a liability insurance 
policy protects a governmental unit against tort lia-
bility, the otherwise existing immunity of the unit is 
rernoved. 33 
Tennessee and Kentucky were two states which have 
pioneered in this new legal area. Illinois allowed recovery 
at one time under insurance but has since changed to an even 
more liberal modification of tort liability. Oregon in 1961 
allowed recovery to the extent of the policy. At the time of 
Writing the picture in Indiana appeared to allow recovery. 
In a leading case heard in Tennessee during 1932 the 
court did not allow the d fense of 
r 
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because the plaintiff a 11d the :f.nsurance company had a6reed to 
waive any excess da.mages over the limit of the policy. 34 In 
1936 a similar ruling was made which removed immunity to the 
extent of the coverage which protected the public funds of 
the school. 35 In 1945 the court held that the reason for the 
immunity doctrine was that there were no funds available to pay 
the claims, but, if insurance was carried, recovery could be 
had, but only to the limits of the policy.36 
Kentucky has taken a similar view. In the Taylor case 
where a child was injured in a bus accident, the school had a 
policy with the immunity waiver clause.37 Recovery was allowed 
to the extent of the policy. Kentucky has taken the middle 
ground and "does not make the board liable for the torts of 
its agents and employees but does permit suits and a judgment 
to be obtained which, when final, shall measure the liability 
of the insurance carrier to the injured party for whose benefit 
the insurance policy was issued. n 38 This is a subtle dist inc-
tion in that in effect, Kentucky is not admitting liability, 
but is allowing the case to be heard so that recovery can be 
made against the insurance carrier, and the amount of recovery 
is fixed by the court. An interesting case was heard in 1947. 
A school board member was legally riding a school bus and was 
killed in an accident. The defendant had a policy with the 
waiver of immunity rider attached. The deceased was held to 
be within the coverage of the policy and immunity was removed 
r 
to the extent of the coverage. 39 In another case an appeal 
beard in 1952 allowed a jury trial against a school district 
which had liability insurance.40 
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In Indiana the Hummer case heard in 1953 ruled that the 
statute permitting the purchase of insurance was not a waiver 
of imrnunity. 4 1 However, in 1960 in an action against a county 
board of commissioners, the liability for a proprietary function 
was set at the policy limits.42 The Indiana Supreme Court dis-
approved of the Hummer ruling by stating: •'The opinion of 
the Appellate Court in the case of Hummer v. School City of 
Hartford City (1953), 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E. (2d) 891 is 
disapproved insofar as it is inconsistent with the views herein 
expressed."43 In other words, that while the purchasing of 
insurance is not a waiver of immunity, it does allow recovery, 
but only to the limits of the policy. Hummer allowed full 
judgment recovery. 
In Illinois the doctrine of immunity was modified for 
a period of time so as to permit recovery to the amount of 
insurance. The permissive statute allowing the purchase of 
liability insurance was passed in 1947• It was first applied 
to public schools in 1952.44 The Illinois appellate court 
held that it was public policy to protect public funds. If 
the funds were protected there was no need for immunity. 
"Liability insurance, to the extent that it protects the public 
funds, removes the reason for, and thus the immunity to auit.'45 
r 
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Jn 1059 the ~olitor case further modified immunity in Illinois 
as will be discussed in a later chapter. 
The Vendrell case heard in Oregon in 1961 constructed 
the statute allowi.ng the purchase of insurance to mean that 
the inrnunity of the district was lifted only to the extent of 
the policy.46 If a district did not purchase insurance, it was 
still i~mune and not negligent for failure to do so. 
It was apparent that a few states have taken this route 
as a means of alleviating some of the injustices of immunity 
without the violation of the trust funds or public money. It 
was a safe middle of the road technique which has had some 
limited application. 
E. SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
In the bulk of special legisla.tion, the emphasis has 
been upon the field of transportation. Alabama and North 
Carolina have a special agency to handle these claims. Miss-
issippi has established a special fund from which payment of 
not more than $500.00 can be made for bus accidents. In 
Louisiana a legislative resolution allowing a suit did not have 
the effect of waiving the state's immunity. 47 
In several jurisdictions which theretofore have been 
immune, the doctrine has been shaken to some extent. In 1956 
a Maryland court hinted at the liability of a school district. 
The court of appeals speaking to the appellant's contention 
r 
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that the school board was a body corporate and a body Politic 
which may not be sued in tort for the negligence of its 
employees and agents stated: 
We find it unnecessary to decide whether this 
contention is correct and assume, without deciding, that 
it is, because, as we see it, the evidence shows no 
negligence on the part of Choate, the agent and servant 
of the board, and therefore no liability4gn the part of the board even if it is subject to suit. 
As reported earlier in this chapter Wisconsin in 1962 over-
threw the immunity of a municipal corporation. In 1961 the 
Supreme Court of Michigan handed down a decision relating to 
municipal corporations. The court "overruled the doctrine of 
governmental immunity for future cases by a majority of the 
court. 049 
It was concluded that the rule of immunity has been 
chipped away in some states with some far-reaching decisions. 
The inevitable lag was also at work, and it will undoubtedly 
be many years before immunity disappears, if ever. 
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CHAPTER V 
LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
The state of New York although not the first state in 
the United States to grant recovery under judicial or statutory 
authority was one of the leading states in the number of suits 
allowing recovery. 1 Schaerer in his classification rated New 
York as one of the liberal states in the field of modif i-
t . 2 ca ion. Of the sixty-four court cases reported in The Pupil's 
Day in Court: Review of 1961, twenty-two cases dealt with 
--- _.._..._ 
pupil injuries of which fourteen came from the state of New 
York. 3 
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Davis stated the following regarding the development of 
liability in New York: 
New York has been the most liberal state with 
respect to granting relief to injured parties. It 
is the only state where tort liability has been imposed 
without statutory provision. over a half century before 
its immunity from suit was abrogated, New York Courts 
held that a school board which is responsible for pro-
viding and maintaining school buildings cannot escape 
liability on the basis of governmental immunity. The 
school district is responsible for the torts of its 
officers (that is, for its own torts), but not for the 
torts of its servants or employees; that is, the doctrine 
61 
G2 
of respondeat superior does not apply.4 
At the time of writing New York did not have a statute 
which expressly ma.de the school district liable for tort 
actions.5 Accordingly, New York was one of the few states 
which imposed liability by judicial authority. However, this 
condition has been modified by "save harmless" laws, a court 
of claims act, and a comprehensive education statute. 
Development of tort liability in the state of New York 
followed rather an unusual path as compared with the majority 
of the other states. However, certain elements of this develop-
mental pattern are being duplicated in other jurisdictions as 
they move toward the modification of immunity. New York at one 
time adhered to the doctrine established in Russell v. Men of 
Devon and followed this ruling under stare decisis. Two early 
cases were the vanguard of the coming change in judicial think-
ing in the statt of New York. In the case of Bassett v. ~, 
tried in 1878, where trustees were being sued individually, 
the court held that the school district was a complete corp-
oration and therefore liable.6 This meant that if the trustees, 
acting as a board, committed an act which was judged to be 
negligent, they were liable for their tort, as a whole board 
of trustees and not just individually as members of the board. 
In other words, you had to sue the whole corporation. Decision 
later reversed in 12 Hun. 209. In another case heard in 189:1 
against the city of New York, the ruling was that a city was 
&3 
never authorized to commit a tort· in discharge of its govern-
~ental functions but may be liable for proprietary functions. 7 
The leading and precedent case in New York which liter-
allY broke the back of immunity was the Wharman v. Board of 
Education case decided in 1907. 8 A twelve year old boy while 
-
sitting in a classroom was struck on the head by a piece of 
falling plaster. This blow fractured the skull of the boy. 
Action was brought against the school board for negligence in 
maintaining and permitting students to frequent a dangerous 
building. The defendant claimed that the repair of buildings 
was in charge of subordinates and that the rule of respondeat 
superior was not applicable to school districts. The court 
agreed with this point but held that the board had the power 
to close the school and remove the pupils from an inherently 
dangerous situation. A jury held the board negligent for per-
mitting a dangerous building to be occupied by students. A 
governmental agency which must provide and maintain buildings 
and equipment cannot escape liability on the ground that it is 
a governmental agency. This decision was appealed to the 
Appellate Division and then to the Court of Appeals which 
sustained the trial court's verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
From the ruling in this case the torts of agents, employees and 
servants were not imputed to the school district because 
respondeat superic..i.· did not apply. But for its own torts 
the school district was held liable. This condition held until 
r G4 the enactment of the "save harr:iless" statutes in 1937 and their 
subsequent construction. 
In 1910 New York legislated a comprehensive act which 
had applicable sections dealing indirectly with the tort 
liability of school districts. One subdivision of section 1709 
provided that boards of education of every union free school 
district shall "establish such rules and regulations con-
cerning the order and discipline of the schools, in the several 
departments thereof, as they deem necessary to secure the best 
educational results. "9 In other words, the school district was 
charged with the duty of being in full control of not only 
the students and the educational program, but also with 
establishing a safe environment in which to carry on a program 
of education. A subsequent subdivision of the same section 
empowered the school district "to pay any judgment levied 
against the school district, and in the event there are no 
moneys otherwise available, to levy a tax upon the taxable 
property of the district to pay the same."10 Yet another sub-
division ma.de it the duty of the school district to furnish 
proper equipment and supplies. 11 The definition of equipment 
has been interpreted rather liberally in the case of Edkins v. 
Board of Education of City of New York. 12 Another subdivision 
- ---------
of section 1709 mandated the care and provision of school 
property to the local board of education. 13 "This section 
has been the basis of recovery on the part of pupils injured 
due to the dangerous con1ition in which school buildings have 
been maintained when the condition is directly imputable to 
the negligence of the board."14 It was in section 1709 that 
the beginning of the "save harmless" statutes had their origin. 
From this section the board was given the mandate to establish 
rules and regulations, provide safe buildings and equipment, 
and pay claims arising from their negligence to comply there-
with. But as a point of law the principle of respondeat sup-
erior was untouched. The board being liable for its own neg-
ligence but not for that of its agents, employees or servants 
was termed the "New York rule." 
In McCarton v. City of New York, a rotten flag pole fell 
---------
upon the decedent and killed him. 15 The pole was on the school 
grounds but suit was brought against the city and the school 
district. The action was dismissed against the city, but the 
board was held liable for not performing its statutory duty 
to provide proper repairs. Another reason for holding the 
school liable was that, if the school had knowledge of the 
pole's unsafe condition, the district was maintaining a 
nuisance. 
The philosophy and reasoning of the New York courts can 
be seen from two cases heard during the Twenties. In the first 
case a boy who was operating a power saw as part of the regular 
school program received injuries. A jury unanimously found 
the school district guilty of negligence in purchasing and 
operating a dangerous instrument without proper safeguards. 
To the defense that the board was a governmental agency the 
court said: 
The board of education is a governmental agency 
of the state. It is not liable for the torts of its 
agents. Such agents, like policemen of a city, are 
personally liable for their torts done in the course 
of their employment, but the corporation is not charge-
able with their defaults. It, however, remains liable 
for its own negligence. 
When the state surrendered to the board a portion of 
its sovereign power and delegated to it a duty imposed 
upon the state by the constitution, and it accepted the 
trust, it undertook to perform with fidelity the duties 
which the law imposed upon it. It is not immune from 
suit. The state has not created an irresponsible in-
strumentality of government and invested it with the 
power to put ch:i.ldren at work at dangerous machinery 
which it would be a statutory1gffense against its laws to use in private industries. 
Further, the court held that the board of education is a body 
corporate which may be sued. State and civil divisions while 
in the discharge of governmental functions are immune from 
tort actions. However, the board of education is a govern-
mental agency not a civil division, and the board is liable 
for negligence and its own derelictions. The court of appeals 
upheld the appellate court's sustaining the trial court's 
decision in favor of the plaintiff. 
In the second case, Williams v. Board of Education No. !_, 
the board of education had contracted for a farm woman to drive 
a wagon with an. P."l{posed rear wheei. 17 In this device, children 
were transported to and from school. A child fell or was 
pushed into the wheel and was permanently injured. The court 
beld the school district liable for negligence in failing to 
foresee the hazards of such an omnibus. That the court was 
fully aware of the incongruity with the immunity doctrine and 
cognizant of the far-reaching implications of this decision 
is clear from its statement: 
We fully appreciate the far-reaching effect the 
principle we have stated as to the liability of school 
districts may have on the matter of expense of rural 
education, and the particular consequences which 
necessarily fall on the residents and taxpayers of the 
district. But we deem the protectio11 of small, help-
~ess childrig from avoidable injury of still greater 
importance. 
Because of the rule that the district was liable for 
its own torts but not for those of its employees, recovery was 
limited. That is, the board could not be held liable for the 
negligent acts of employees, and yet, most suits were the 
product of employee acts. Consequently there was no recovery 
for many wrongs. Therefore, in 1929 New Yor.k passed the Court 
of Claims Act, Section 12-a. This act provided for tort claim 
against the state for the negligence of its officers ~ 
employees on the same basis as an individual or corporation. 
This statute has been held to subject the state to liability 
for the negligence of its employees under respondeat superior. 
Filing must be accomplished within ninety days unless a written 
notice of intention is filed and proceedings started within two 
years. The primary emphasis of this enactment rested upon the 
liability of the state, not upon the liability of the school 
district. 
A somewhat similar effect was brought about when the 
state of New York passed the "save harmless" statutes in 1937. 
These enactments placed the financial responsibility for the 
negligence on the part of teachers directly upon the board of 
education. These acts protect the teacher from financial 
loss as a result of injury caused by the alleged negligence of 
the said teacher while acting within the scope of his duties. 
New York has two "save harmless" statutes. One is applicable 
to cities having a population of more than one million;l9 the 
other is applicable to cities of less than one million.20 In 
the Reeder case the statute applying to cities of more than one 
million was interpreted to impose direct liability upon the 
board, and it was not necessary to secure judgment against the 
teacher as a prerequisite.21 In another case the court ruled 
that this statute was passed for the benefit of teachers, and 
this right cannot be subrogated. 22 Here, a teacher who had 
been negligent injured a student. The teacher's insurance 
company paid the damages and then sued the board of education 
to recover in the name of the teach er. The court did not a "'.low 
this claim. In the case of Massimilian, section 3023, dealing 
with cities of less than one million in population, was held to 
be only a statute of indemnification.23 Thus it will protect 
the actor from loss only after actual financial loss baa been 
r 
Tbe status of liability of school districts in the state 
of New York for torts of itself and of its employees has stabi-
lized, and many of the cases now deal with procedural :natters. 25 
B. RELEVANT STATtITES 
In the historical development some of the New York 
legislative acts and their provisions were noted. In this 
section a more comprehensive picture of the existing statutes 
will :-::ie given. 
Sect ion 1709 charged boards of education with the 
responsibility to establish rules and regulations concerning 
discipline and to supply adequate supervision. other sub-
divisions of this act made it the duty of the school board to 
furnish proper equipment and supplies and to provide and care 
for ~chool property such as buildings and grounds. A subsequent 
subdivision empowers the district to pay any judgment and, if 
necessary, to levy a special tax to pay the same. 25 
Section 2560 dealt with the liability of a board of 
education of a city with more than one million population. 
This act provides that the board shall be "liable for, and shall 
ass•rn1e liability to the extent that it shall save harmless, any 
duly appointed member of the teaching or supervising staff, 
o:.Cficer, or employee of such board •• " This liability . . 
Shall be for the negligence "resulting in personal injury or 
property damage •• ,,27 Of course the in Ji vidual raust !:;e • • 
worldng within the scope of his duties. 
Section 2561 provided "save harmless" benefits to per-
sonnel working with needy children. 28 
Section 25G2 stated that claims against a board of 
education of a city having a population of four hundred thous-
and or more must allow thirty days before commencing legal 
action. This gives the board or its officers an opportunity to 
act on the claim before litigation. 29 
Section 3023 prescribed the liability of a board of 
e<luca ti on, trustee, trt1stees, or board of cooperative educa-
tional service in cities having a population of less than one 
million.30 This act was to "save harmless" teachers, student 
teachers, members of supervisory and administrative staff or 
employees from financial loss. It was noted that both "save 
harmless" statutes dealt with neglii;ence of personnel. Section 
3023 does not mention property damage as does sect ion 2560. 
Section 2560 provided that the board shall be liable and shall 
assume liability; however, section 2560 was construed as an 
indemnification statute. 31 Thus, it will indemnify personnel 
only after actual loss. 
Section 3813 outlined the presentation of claims against 
the governing body of any school district. The claim must be 
filed within ninety days, and the board must have thirty days 
. 32 
in which to act before court action is taken. Subdivision 
two stated that the clai:n must l'e filed in compliance wtth 
section 50-e of the General Municipal Law. 33 
The General ~,funicipal Law, section 50-e, gives the pro-
cedural plan for filing a claim based upon a tort.34 The 
not ice r1mst be made in writing within ninety days of the in-
jury. A sworn statement giving the name and address of the 
claimant, the nature of the claim, the circumstances of the 
injury, z.nd the items of damage or injury was mandated. The 
notice shall be served personally or by registered mail. The 
court may grant leave to serve a late claim if the claimant 
is an infant, dies, or certain representations are made with 
authorized officers or insurance carriers. Such a late claim 
must be initiated within one year of the time of injury, and 
an affidavit must be filed stating the reason for delay. 
C. CASE LAW IN NEW YORK 
Liability in general. In the jurisdiction of New York 
the school district is held liable for its own torts.35 The 
board of education is liable for negligence in the exercise of 
its powers or in the fulfillment of its statutory duties. 'fhe 
board cannot plead on the grounds that respondeat superior is 
not applicable to school districts.36 When the state waives 
its immunity, it may become liable for injuries to a state 
ec~·iool pupil ca.used by the negligence of its teachers •37 
Alth::>ugh the state has a duty to provide competent teachers, 
'72 
this provision may not he adequate to avoid liability.38 In 
the state of New York this liability has indirectly been imposed 
by statute.39 
Liability for torts of officers, agents, and employees. 
-------- - -
In the majority of jurisdictions, school districts, in the 
absence of statutes, are not liable for the torts committed by 
its off ice rs, agents, and employees in the discharge of their 
duties. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable 
to school districts. However, the situation in New York is not 
tiit: tyi.)ic:al one. With the passage of the "save harmless" 
statutes, the indemnification of loss on the part of an employee 
was imputeJ. to the board of education. Thus, while the board 
cannot be sued for the negligence of its employees, the employee 
can, and they in turn must be indemnified for their loss, by 
the ~oard. These statutes cover practically all the individuals 
who work for the school as long as they are within the scope of 
their duties. 
In the case of Massimilian v. Board of Education of (;ity 
---- --
of Niagara Falls, section 3023 was held to be only a statute 
of indemnificatiou.40 A young boy, who was injured while play-
ing under the supervision of the board and teachers, alleged 
t l1c ir negligence. The supreme court reversed a lower court 's 
denial of dismissal of suit. The major question posed was 
whether section 3023 gives a cause of action against the school 
r 
district or is it a means of indemnification to protect the 
individual teacher, etc., from financial loss. The court said 
that it was the intent of the legislature only to protect the 
individual teacher from loss, and not to give a right of action 
to the injured party. 
41 
'). A leading case in this area is the Reeder case. The 
court of appeals in New York affirmed the lower court and its 
decision. A boy who was helping a teacher move a car motor on 
a dolly injured his hand. A jury awarded $5,000.00 to the boy 
and $200.00 to the father. This case interpreted section 2560. 
The court held that responsibility is imposed upon the board 
of education, first to the injured person and, secondly, to 
the employee by the way of indemnity. The statute is clear 
and unambiguous leaving no room for judicial interpretation. 
The statute states that the board is "liable and shall be liable 
for . . . Since this case was heard, it has been followed 
in the state of New York. 
The court held in the Sun case that section 2560 was 
passed for the exclusive benefit of teachers. Only the par-
ticular teacher may sue the board for indemnity as this right 
cannot be extended by ~brogation, and the statute is personal 
and cannot be assignect.43 The plaintiff, an insurance company, 
had insured the teacher against liability while teaching. A 
pupil was injured by an act of negligence on the part of the 
teacher and collected from the insurance company by an out of 
r 
court settlement. The plaintiff tried to collect iro~ the 
school district, but the court ruled this right could not be 
subrogated. An appeal was denied by the appellate court and 
also by the court of appeals. It would seem that there is no 
need for a teacher to have insurance or for an insurance company 
to sell it to teachers. 
The school district is responsible for the negligence 
of its employees if they are acting within the scope of their 
duties.44 In order that a school district be lia.ble the 
ordinary rules of determining negligence must be followed. If 
there is no negligence there is no liability. In other words, 
respondeat superior is applicable, but by statutory action.4 5 
Essential elements ~~negligence clain. A legal duty 
must rest upon the school board before a claim of negligence 
will be allowed. Not only must there be a duty but a failure 
to conform to the standard expected must exist. An omission 
or commission of some act either general or particular is 
essential to negligence. In the case of Scully v. State the 
court helcl tbat statutory duties must be perform€d with care.46 
The state was responsible for the provision of a safe building. 
As will be shown in the section dealing with supervision, the 
scliool board has a duty to adequately supervise students while 
at school. 47 The board of education has a duty to establish 
adequate rules to protect students against preventable accidents 
75 
In the Gove! case the failure to do so was considered a vio-
iation of statutory requirements and imposed a liability upon 
the district.48 The plaintiff, a boy, broke his leg while 
doing au extremely difficult acrobatic stunt. While this was 
not the cause of the suit, it was introduced in the case to 
try and show a history of negligence on the part of the school 
since the plaintiff claimed that there were not proper safety 
precautions taken in the gym. One month later he received a 
gunshot wound when a gun accidentally discharged. The gun 
was being repaired in an industrial arts class. The court held 
that the board was negligent because of its failure to establish 
rules concerning the inspection and regulation of dangerous 
instrumentalities. This decision was upheld by the court of 
appeals. In the ~case the plaintiff brought action against 
t.b.e school board charging negligence.49 A small girl was 
asked by her teacher to pick up a paper sack lying on the ground. 
She cut her hand on a broken pop bottle inside the sack. The 
city court awarded damages of $3,388.25 to the child and $124.50 
to the father. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed 
this decision and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court 
denied recovery because of the failure to "establish that the 
latent danger was reasonably foreseeable in the exercise of 
reasonable care in supervising the infant plaintiff under the 
circumstances. u 5o In a similar decision the court held that, 
if the injury could not be reasonably foreseen, the school is 
76 
absolveJ of liability. 51 A boy was struck in the eye by an 
eraser thrown by another boy. The teacher was out of the room. 
fhe boy had committed this act twice before, and the teacher 
11ad required him to stay out of the room until the teacher 
arrived. This rule was enforced for one nnd one-half months, 
at which time the boy was allowed back into the room even when 
the teacher was not there. The supreme court reversed the trial 
court's judguent on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
The RIJI)ellate court held that it was an error to ask the jury 
whether the school authorities were negligent in allowing him 
bac~ into the room. The fact that the child was allowed bacl~ 
into the room was not causally connected to the injury. The 
question that a new trial must answer is whether the teacher 
could have reasonably foreseen the injury and so was negligent 
in aot better supervising the room. 
The Weiner case exemplified the second essential element 
of a claim for negligence. There must exist a close causal 
connection or proximate cause between the act and the resulting 
. . d 52 d f d . t i lnJury or amage, an none was oun 1n h s case. In the 
DeBenedittis case, an industrial arts student was trying to 
extricate a piece of metal from a !!lachine when another student 
ster•ped on th(> activatinr; button. At this time the teacher 
was only nine feet away. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
affirmed the lower court's decision holding the teacher neg-
ligent. The teacher was negligent because of not warning the 
77 
student to stay away from the machine and not exercising minute 
53 enough supervision. In another case a boy was injured while 
standing on the playground by the conduct of three other boys 
in pulling him down on a clinker lying on the ground. 54 The 
plaintiff attempted to secure a judgment against the school 
board, alleging negligence in not maintaining the playground 
in a safe condition. The court held that the proximate cause 
of the injury was the unforeseen act of the three boys, not the 
condition of the playground. In a split decision the Supreme 
eourt, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's decision 
of dismissal. In another case the plaintiff, an eleven year 
old girl, was injured when stepping over a wire fence which 
was raised by another student.55 No teachers were assigned to 
supervise. Negligence was charged against the school board. 
The trial court entered a verdict for the plaintiff. However, 
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed and dismissed 
the complaint. The proximate cause of the injury was the un-
foreseen act of the student raising the wire, not the lack of 
supervision. An older case held that a school board is not 
liable to a pupil injured by another on the grounds that it had 
failed to provide guides for the safe conduct of pupils while 
playing, where no such duty was imposed by statute. 56 Under 
section 2560 no new rules of negligence were created, and the 
teacher must use only such reasonable care as a prudent parent 
would. A third person's act was unforeseeable as the proximate 
78 
cause. 57 In this case a boy was struck in the eye by a thrown 
pencil. The pencil was thrown to another boy who ducked and 
the pencil hit the plaintiff. The teacher was temporarily 
absent obtaining supplies. Conflicting evidence placed the time 
of the absence from a few minutes to seventy-five minutes. The 
court of Appeals affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the 
trial court's decision for the plaintiff. Judge Conway in a 
dissenting opinion stated that the jury apparently believed 
that the teacher had been gone for a long time, and that there 
was much chaos and disorder. If so, this absence was the cause 
of the accident and could have been foreseen and prevented. 
Such a question is a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury.58 
The evidence must clearly show that negligence was 
present, and many cases ha~e been dismissed for lack of evidence 
Some of the following cases demonstrated the rationale of the 
courts. In the case of Pelcak v. Board of Trustees of Common 
School District No. 10 a dog bit a child while the child was 
~~~~ ~ ~
59 playing on the playground. This was a rural school with 
only two teachers assigned to the building. The child's 
teacher, the only one present at the time, was inside having 
a conference with the parent when the injury occur~ed. A 
jury trial held for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court, App-
ellate Division, reversed and dismissed the complaint. The 
court held that the evidence was insufficient to show that 
r 
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the teacher was negligent; therefore, the board was not liable. 
In another case the fact that the teacher was talking to another 
teacher in the hall while her class went up the stairs was 
60 
not negligenct. The passage of the class was orderly, and 
she could not have anticipated the misbehavior. In an action 
against a school district and an eleemosynary association a 
cerebral palsy child became petulant when refused permission 
to go with some other boys and fell over in his specially 
constructed chair. 61 The Supreme Court of Nassau County ruled 
that there was no evidence of inadequate supervision or main-
tenance of a defective chair. Mere testimony by a child was 
held to be insufficient evidence establishing inadequate super-
vision. 62 
A comparison of the record made at the time of the injury 
and at the trial exhibited some discrepancies causing the court 
to hold insufficient evidence. 63 ~In the case of Vitagliano v. 
f 
Board of Education of City of New York, a suit was brought 
----------
against the board for injuries incurred by a pupil when struck 
in the eye by an eraser. The verdict of the lower court was 
reversed by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, as against 
the weight of evidence. 64 
Standards of care. The courts of New York have con-
sistently held that the school must exercise only ordinary care 
in the operation of the schools, and that the schools are not 
80 
insurers of the safety of the child. The board of education 
18 held to reasonable standards of care and is required to take 
onlY those steps reasonably calculated to protect the students 
and personnel. A jury had awarded $4,500.00 to the plaintiff, 
a teacher, for injuries incurred while settling a fight in the 
school cafeteria. 65 In the Cambareri case a fifteen year old 
boy injured his knee when a mat slipped during a relay race. 66 
The complaint alleged the boy was rather awkward, the floor 
was slippery, and the mat was not secure. The Supreme Court 
reversed the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The£!!_ 
curiam opinion of the court stated that the defendant was not 
the insurer of the plaintiff's safety and many hazards surround 
individuals. Injuries are suffered in spite of reasonable care 
and for which no legal liability can be attached. In the 
Leibowitz case a twelve year old girl had descended stairs and 
walked across the gym under supervision.67 In a small outer 
exit hall she fell or was pushed down three stairs. The Supreme 
Court, trial term, dismissed the claim of failure to supervise 
the outer exit hall. The court said, "The duty did not devolve 
on the defendant to have supervision every single step of the 
way. There were guards up to within a few feet of the doors 
leading to the three step staircase. "68 Only a few children 
could get into the hall at one time. Negligence is relative 
to time, place, and circumstance. The district owed reasonable 
care such as a parent of ordinary prudence would have exercised 
r 
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under like circumstances. To hold negligence in this case 
demanded a responsibility greater than reasonable caution. 
81 
When a child fell from playground apparatus, the court held 
that the school was not required to provide specific super-
vision. General superintendence would not have prevented the 
accident. 69~ In the Conway case the Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, reversed the jury award of damages in the sum of 
$2,500.00 for the infant and $75.00 for medical expense.70 The 
plaintiff was standing in a line extending from the vice-prin-
cipal 's desk out into the hall. A monitor was in the office at 
the moment. Several boys were scuffling and the plaintiff was 
thrown backwards into the jamb of a closing classroom door. 
The complaint alleged inadequate supervision. The court held 
that all movements of pupils need not be under constant scrutiny, 
and closer supervision might not have prevented the accident. 
Furthermore, negligence is relative to time, place, and cir-
cumstance. In the Sanchick case to impose negligence would be 
tantamount to insuring the safety of the child.71 
Buildings, playgrounds, ~equipment. In New York the 
statutes impose a duty upon the board of education to provide 
and maintain buildings, playgrounds, and equipment in a reason-
ably safe condition. In fact, the Wahrman case, which was the 
first case to depart from the immunity doctrine, pertained to 
the unsafe condition of a building.72 Another leading case in 
B2 
this area is the Lessin case.73 This decision held that the 
maintenance of school premises and facilities in a reasonably 
safe condition cannot be delegated, and the school is liable 
for the nonperformance of such maintenance. The court had 
this to say: 
The Board of Education of New York is a governmental 
agency, not a civil agency of the State. Even where the 
rule is maintained that civil divisions of the state, 
when engaged as delegates of the state in the discharge 
of governmental functions are not liable for the acts 
of their agents and contractors, the rule has not been 
extended to exempt a governmental agent from liability 
for its dereliction. The state has created the board 
of education as a corporate agent to discharge govern-
mental functions. No exemption from responsibility for 
dereliction in the discharge of a corporate duty has been 
granted. The responsibility of the individual agents 
and officers of the state has been transformed into a 
corporate liability. 
The members of the board cannot discharge that duty 
collectively without the intervention of agents or 
employees, but the duty of the board is not complete 
when it appoints such agents or employees. It acts 
through them. If they fail to discharge property the 
functions assumed by the board, the board is responsible 
for such failure, aside from any rule of agency. The 
board has in such case failed to perform a duty imposed 
upon it by law. and liability may be predicated upon 
its own wrong • 1 4 
tln the Scully case an elderly woman fell while descending the 
steps of an auditorium after watching a movie held at night.75 
The complaint alleged the maintenance of the building in a dark 
and unsafe manner. The lower court held the state responsible; 
however, the appellate court reversed the decision because there 
was no defect in the stairs. When a six year old boy was injure 
while playing on a defective fire escape door, negligence on 
r 
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the part of the school was shown and so the board was held 
liable. 76 In the Edkins case an apron was defined as equipment 
to be furnished by the district. 77 A fifteen year old boy 
while working on a lathe caught his sweater in the machine. In 
trying to extricate himself his thumb was amputated. No apron 
was furnished although this was the general practice. The 
trial court found for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, reversed on the law and directed dismissal. 
However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's de-
cision. The Court of Appeals held that the statute required 
the board to furnish such apparatus, maps, globes, books, 
furnitures, and other equipment and supplies as may be necessary 
for the proper and efficient management of the school. It 
was its duty to provide such equipment, including aprons. When 
the school contracted for the use of an unsafe wagon as a means 
of transportation, the board was liable for failure to provide 
proper equipment.78 A kindergarten student fell from the stage 
of an auditorium while practicing rhythms. The court held the 
district not liable for maintaining a dangerous condition.79 
The furnishing of a standard wheel chair was held to be per-
missible, if it was not defective. 80 School districts were 
required to use ordinary care in maintaining school property. 81 
-'" Supervision ~ students. Under the statutes in New 
York it is the duty of the school to supervise the conduct of 
the students while on the school grounds. 82 In the Ferrill 
case a seven year old girl was on the slides during the noon 
hour recess under the supervision of two teachers. 83 Near the 
top, the lead child did a "belly whopper" and kicked the defen-
dand off the slide. There were between 125 and 150 children 
on the playground under the supervision of two teachers. Neither 
teacher saw the accident. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
reversed the lower court and ordered a new trial. The court 
held that the school district owed no duty to provide more slides 
than now present. It was the board's duty to provide adequate 
supervision. The question of adequate supervision was a ques-
tion of fact to be determined by a jury. The case was reversed 
because the appellate court could not determine if the jury 
found against the school district for failure to provide more 
slides or to provide adequate supervision. In another case the 
board was held not liable when it had appointed competent per-
sonnel. The board was not required to segregate a mentally 
retarded pupil into a spec.ial class. 84 
A more fundamental question is the adequacy of the super-
vision. Negligence is relative as previously noted. In the 
Silverman case the plaintiff had attended a physical education 
class and was walking to the locker room. 85 The instructor 
had gone into the locker room. There were 200 to 250 students 
Present. Usually the "difficult" students were separated, but 
not on this occasion. Two of the students had a history of 
r 
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trouble. The municipal court awarded $900.00 damages to the 
plaintiff. In an appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
affirmed the decision holding that the question of adequacy of 
supervision was for the jury. Further, tbere was ample evidence 
to show the foreseeability of the incident and, with adequate 
supervision, the accident would have been prevented. In another 
case a six year old boy was injured while playing on the de-
fective door of a fire escape. 86 The facts were that at the 
noon hour the class was playing outside without teacher super-
vision, although the superintecdent had so instructed. The 
classroom teacher supervised by looking out the window and 
could not see the fire escape. The jury found the board negli-
gent in not providing adequate supervision. The trial court 
set aside this verdict, which was iater upheld by the Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, in a split decision. The Court of 
Appeals reversed the appellate court. The court held the board 
negligent. The failure of the teacher to supervise did not 
break the causal relation between the defendant's conduct and 
plaintiff 'a injury. The board was not responsible for the 
negligence of the teacher except under section 3023. The court 
did not hold the teacher liable because of a lack of a motion, 
but as a matter of law she was clearly negligent. In the Fein 
case a high school student injured himself when he fell from 
a chinning bar.87 In an optional exercise he completed twelve 
Chins and fell six inches to the floor. He lost his balance 
and twisted his tac:{ res•Jlting in a ten ;aonths' stay in the 
hos Pi tal. The complaint charged a lack 'Jf supervision and a 
failure to provide mats. The jury found for the plaintiff, but 
the trial court dismissed for lack of evidence. There appears 
to be some discrepancy as to whether he fell or jumped. The 
supreme Court, Appellate Di\ision, upheld the dismissal, but 
this was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The court held that 
there was adequate supervision, but the provision of a !llat was 
properly a question for the jury. The supervision of the noon 
hour recess by a janitor was held to be inadequate.88 There 
were no rules for the noon hour. A boy broke his arm when he 
fell seven feet from the mat after being propelled into the air 
by the janitor. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, re-
versed the lower court's dismissal of the suit. The court 
held that the board must select adequate persons to supervise. 
The board is responsible for the acts of the janitor as he 
was their representative. The reasonableness of this was a 
question for the jury. When the teacher was taving a con-
ference with the parent, the evidence was insufficient to show 
negligence on the part of the district. 89 When a boy was in-
jured in a scuff le while standing in a line and supervision 
was present, the court held that it was impossible to guard 
against every act.90 In the Barbato case a class of twenty-
five kindergarten pupils was doing rhythms on the stage.91 The 
teacher was nearby playing the piano, when a child fell from 
S. ta.re. tl1l' ~ The students were under control, had :.ecu l.i:structed, 
and Lle teacher was expcrieuced. The court held t Lai. t hi:::: uid 
not coustitute negligence nor was the activity inherently 
dangero,is. In another case a boy was strucl: by a bat wbilE: 
chasing a ball. 92 The supervising teacher was thirty f €et 
away distributing milk. The complaint charged negligence be-
cause the teacher was not actually supervising. The jury found 
for the plaintiff, but tl!e tri.al court reversed the verdict 
stating that general supervision was adequate. The teacher 
could not foresee the accident, and it would have happened 
evf;n if the teacher were closer. The teaclier is not required 
to constantly supervise every aspect of play at all times. In 
an action against a school district, the trial court held for 
the plaintiff, a six year old who fell from a horizontal ladder. 
The: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, dismissed the claim on 
the grounds that more specific supervision was unreasonable and 
the apparatus was suitable for play. 93 In an opinion by the 
counsel for the educational department the following was stated: 
Where parents or other adults are used as chaperons 
or assistants to the teacher on field trips by school 
bus, and there is an accident causing injuries, the 
school district, in an action against it for negligence, 
may use the defense that the district had placed the 
children und~i the supervision of trained and competent 
individuals. 
The presence of a «.!Or.1petent and qualified teacher is generally 
construed as fulfilling the obligation of providing adequate 
supervision. In the Graff case a high school student was struck 
r 
in tJ1c eye by a SDft rubber ball.95 The Supre.1e Court, A!;pel-
iate Court, reversed the lower court's judgment for the )Jaia-
tiff. There appeared to be no actionable negligence on the 
part of the instructor, and a rubber ball was held not to IJe 
an inherently dangerous instrument. In another case the county 
court reversed the lower court's payment of medical damages to 
the plaintiff. 96 While exercising on a "gym horse", a four-
teen year old boy fell and brol\.e his arm. The complaint alleged 
nagligence on the part of the defendant to provide adequate 
supervision and instruction. The facts showed that the boy 
had been gtven instructions, and performed the exercise t::efore, 
and the instructor was only five feet away. The court held 
that the district is only liable if negligence is shown. Under 
section 2560 the court held the district not liable for in-
juries to an infant incurred by hitting another swimmer under 
the w~ter. In this case the court did not feel the instructor 
was negligent. 97 An interesting point of law was discussed 
in the Luce case.98 A young girl who had a history of broken 
arms previously had requested no rough games, but had not 
obtained a doctor's certificate to that effect. Wh:lle playing 
"jur.ip the stick" relay, she fell and brolrn her arm. The complain 
alleged negligence on the part of the board, the supervising 
Principal and the physical education teacher. The Supreme 
Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court's decision 
for the plaintiff. The court indicated that the rules must 
89 
be of a practical nature and cannot cover every detail. The 
principal did not have the authority to direct the gym class 
since this was a separate department. The physical education 
teacher was under a direct duty io exercise r£asonable care 
and foreseeability. Such a question was for a jury; the other 
points confused the issue. In reference to section 3023 the 
court said: "In view of section 3023 to indemnify there seems 
to be little practical value in distinguishing the liabilities 
of the respective defendants. However, this case calls for it 
and individual liability must be determined without regards to 
the indemnification statute. u99 
Supervision relates also to the provision and enforce-
ment of policies and regulations. Several cases dealt with 
this area and the board's responsibility therefor. In a 1960 
case the plaintiff brought action against the school board for 
lack of alleged supervision. 100 A second grade girl was struck 
in the face by a baseball bat, which was swung by another girl. 
The girl that swung the bat was from an older group. The 
second grade teacher was standing nearby when the accident 
occurred. The older girls, who had been excused from study 
hall, had obtained the softball equipment without procuring the 
permission required by the rules of the board. Contrary to the 
rules of the board, no teacher was supervising these older girls. 
In a lower court the jury found the district liable and award-
ed damages of $5,000.00. The reviewing court modified the 
decision by orde1~1ug a new trial unless the hoard agreed to 
tnc1•ease the damages to $10,000.00. The court said: "The 
-ndate of the Legislature to establish rules means more than 
to write them 111 a book..... Reasonable efforts must be made 
bY the Board to enforce salutary and adequate rules; and a 
liability may be incurred for a failure to enforce as well 
as uiaiie a rule. ulOl In a case where the plaintiff wa3 injured 
by the accidental discharge of a gun, the board was held liable 
for failure to establish adequate rules. 102 The board must 
establish rules coucer11ing the inspection and regulation of 
dangerous instrumentalities. 
Generally, when the board of education UUlkes no ef:fort 
to supply after school supervision, the board is not liable for 
any accidents that may occur. The contention invoked in many 
of these cases was that the plaintiff assumed the risk himself 
when committing the act resulting in the injury. In a case 
where a nineteen year old boy was injured while playing basket-
ball, he should have Jmown the conditions under which he 
played. 103 The plain ti.ff had played there many times. Assump-
tion of risks consists of actually doing a deed with foresight 
of consequences. The boy, no infant, had knowledge of the 
physical arrangement of the gym and had an appreciation of the 
dangers involved. The court dismissed the complaint against 
the defendants. In another case a seventeen year old boy came 
onto the playground after school to play handba.11. 104 He was 
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struck by a bat slipping from the hand of a stick ball player. 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Di vision, reversed the tria 1 court's 
jury verdict for the plainti~. The court held that, when the 
school board kept the playground open after school, it was under 
00 duty to supervise. The school district is not liable for 
damages caused by the .:ond:.ict of a participant on a playground 
without supervision. The plaintiff had assumed the risk when 
he entered the playground. In another case a young boy was 
injured in the school yard after school when struck by a 
bicyclist. 105 The trial court left the question of negligence 
to a jury which awarded damages of $250.00 to the infant and 
$371.45 to the mother. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 
reversed and dismissed the complaint. The court held that there 
was no duty on the part of the school board to prevent any 
particular kind of play. No supervision was attempted; no 
pretense of supervision was made. The parents knew of the 
hazards involved in sending their child to the playground. 
There are natural risks which are to be borne by whom they 
happen to strike. 
Procedural matters. Almost fifty per cent of the cases 
reported in The Pupil's Day in Court: Review of 1961 pertained 
- _...._ --------
to some phase of procedure. 106 The General Municipal Code 
outlines the statutory requirements for filing a claim against 
a municipal body, based upon the tort of negligence, in the 
state of :{cw York •107 In most cases the issues revolved around 
the claim that was filed after the statutory deadline had elapsed 
and the sufficiency of the claim notice. 
In the Sunshine case the claim was filed after the ninety 
108 daY statutory period had passed. The plaintiff had injured 
herself in a fall in the gym. Since the statute gives the court 
discretionary power to permit the filing of a late claim, the 
claim was allowed insamuch as the claim was filed within eight 
months. The statute permits such claims if made within one 
year. In one case the court allowed a suit even though a period 
of three years and eight months had elapsed since the time of 
109 injury. After the statement of claims was made, the actual 
particulars of the claim were not filed for another two years. 
The statute which authorizes late notices stipulates that the 
claim must be filed within ninety days. The boy was injured in 
a football game OCtober 17, 1952 and the final ~ummons was 
served February 25, 1958. The lower court denied a motion to 
dismiss the motion upon the grounds of a late claim. The 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, upheld this denial. The 
court stated that the board of education knew about the suit 
all the time. Jn fact, the board was negotiating a settlement 
most of the time; therefore, the rights of the board were not 
prejudiced. On the other hand a claim that was filed sixteen 
110 
months after the injury was denied. In another late claim 
case the court approved a late claim although no court order 
bad authorized the filing of a late claim.111 The court noted 
that the board of education had received timely information 
about the case from several sources. The claim was filed four 
and one-half months after the accident, but the attorney forgot 
to get the court's permission to file a late claim. The court 
noted that this usually nullifies a claim but permitted an 
amended notice of claim because of the school's knowledge of 
the accident. In the Martin case a claim that was made nineteen 
months after the injury was denied under the statute which 
requires filing within one year. 112 This seems to be consistent 
with the reaEoning in the Brown case where the claim was filed 
sixteen months after the injury. The father petitioned for 
the service of the claim, nunc pro tune. The Supreme Court, 
---
Appellate Division, unanimously a~irmed the lower court's 
dismissal of claim. This action was later affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals. The dicta of the case commented upon the 
history of section 50-e. The Judicial Council wanted the state 
law to read, in the case of infants, that a reasonable time 
after the cessation of the disability be allowed for filing. 
However, the compromise bill which allowed one year was passed, 
much to the disµprobation of the Judicial Council. In the 
Lambo case a late claim was permitted, but later reversed upon 
the submission of new evidence.113 On December 2, 1958 the 
plaintiff was injured in a fall during gym class. Upon the 
evidence that the father had suffered a stroke February 2, 1959, 
tllC trial court permitted a motion to file a late clai:n. Upon 
alJl)eal the evidence showed the stroke lad occurred February 4, 
1ssa. It was n.Jt possible to ascertain whether this was an 
erroneous belief on the part of the trial judge or a typo-
graphical error. The appellate court ruled that the case must 
be retried. 
The sufficiency of notice accounted for a good share of 
the procedural points upon which litigation was based. Two 
subdivisions of this are found: (1) the proper receipt of the 
notice, and (2) material content of the claim. 
In the Salner case a suit was initiated against the city 
of New York and the Board of Education of the City of New 
Yorlt • 114 The claim was served upon the city cotu.ptroller. The 
lower court found for the plaintiff stating that the board had 
immediate notice of the injury. Tho Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, held that the claim was not received by the person 
designated by the statute. Accordingly, the lower court's 
order was reversed. 
In another case the court permitted a suit which was· 
erroneously served on the city comptroller. 115 By inference 
the court concluded that the school board had been notified in 
sufficient time, since the board's attorney had examined the 
plaintiff, and the item was verified by the secretary of the 
board of education. 
After being assaulted by another pupil at school the 
plaintiff sought permission to file a late claim against the 
116 
school board. The attorney had filed a claim with the 
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comptroller, but his secretary had forgotten to notify the 
school board. The school was presumed to have knowledge of the 
occurrence because a teacher was present, a conference with 
school officials was held, and a letter was sent to the board 
informing them of the incident. Since the rights of the board 
were not prejudiced, the claim was allowed. 
In a similar case when an eighteen year old girl was 
injured but neglected to file a claim within the ninety day 
period, permission was granted. 117 The Oneida County Court 
held that the school authorities had knowledge of the injury. 
The purpose of the statute was to prevent fraudulent or stale 
claims. In this case the district had time to investigate 
the claim. Unless the school is definitely prejudiced by the 
late claim, the court may use discretion toward the claimant. 
The matter of her age is not too important, because she was 
a minor and her parents or guardian had to do the filing for 
her. 
In another case the opposite ruling was given. 118 A 
boy was injured in a bus accident, but no written notice was 
ever filed. The representatives of the district and the dis-
trict's insurer investigated, discussed, and negotiated with 
the claimant. In fact, they arranged for his medical care. 
96 
No action was commenced on the case for two years. The court 
held that the investigation did not waive the statutory re-
quirements of the formal notice. Certainly, it is the right 
of the board and its insurer to investigate without a formal 
claim. It may be possible to waive some forms of irregularity 
but not the notice itself. 
An infant's statement of the accident was held not to 
be a notice of claim under section 50-e. 119 The Supre~e Court, 
Appellate Division, reversed the jury verdict for damages of 
$1,500.00 for the plaintiff. 
When a seventeen year old suffered injuries at track 
practice, his guardian, ~ litem, sued for damages in the sum 
of $150,000.00 for the infant and $20,000.00 for hiruself. ~he 
complaint alleged negligence on the part of the board, its 
agents, servants, and employees. 120 At a later date the plain-
tiff sought to amend the claim to include the teacher. The 
school sought to block this because. under section 3023 the 
district was bound to "save harmless" teachers, if acting 
within the scope of their duty. Since the teacher was not 
truly a real party to the case because of the above statute 
it was not necessary to amend the claim. In a like case it was 
held by the Court of Appeals that it was not necessary to serve 
the claim on the teacher when both the district and the teacher 
were parties to the suit. ''For all practical purposes, even 
though the suit is in the name of the teacher it is the school 
J7 
district which is the real party against who111 the claim is 
d ul21 The court uranted leave to amend the notice of claim nsa e. ~ 
,,ben a single ccpy of uotice had gone to the business manager 
of the town. 122 The board received the notice from the business 
inanager. The school board was not prejudiced nor fraudent ly 
victimized. The court also permitted some change in the bill 
of particulars but would not permit an increase in the amount 
of damages asked. 
In the case of Horowitz v. Board of Education the notice 
------- ~-------
was sent by regular mail to the school board by the counsel for 
the plaintiff •123 The cour-t dismissed the claim on the grounds 
that the service of the claim was improper because it was not 
served <>n a member of the beard, nor any trustee or clerk thereof 
The failure to comply with the statute could not be waived in 
any way by the court • 
Abatement and/or diminishment £!..liability. The New 
York courts have established some principles which may be 
relied upon as ~eans of defense against the suit based upon 
negligence. In many cases these defenses are combined or 
somewhat altered. In several cases the courts have said that 
the school is legally not responsible for the safety of the 
Child. 124 Nor is the school responsible for establishing 
elaborate and detailed rules of conduct .125 It is also held 
that it is not necessary to be with the students every moment • 12 
'l'be court in New York recognized the assumption of risk rule 
and made it available to the school as a defense.127 The 
school district is not liable for the acts of teachers, employee , 
agents and officers if they are acting beyond their scope. And 
in a few cases the court has ruled that pure accidents or "acts 
of God" occurred. Judging from the number of cases studied, 
the prime defense employed was that the omission or commission 
of the act must give rise to actionable negligence. In the 
final analysis the question of what is negligent behavior is 
a question of fact t·.J be determined by the jury or the judge. 
D. INSURANCE PRACTICES IN THE STATE 
Section 3023 authorizes a board of education to procure 
insurance or to act as a self-insurer. No mandatory provisions 
are found for the purchase of liability insurance, but the 
majority of school boards carry insurance. Most of the policies 
are of the owner, landlord and tenant public liability type. 
Some of the awards of damages in New York have ranged from 
$500.00 to $45,ooo.oo. In the latter case the board had a 
policy with a $25,000.00 limit. A tax levy was required to 
pay the remainder of the suit brought by a boy injured in an 
unusual bicycle accident.128 
In 1949 the state comptroller said the following about 
the purchase of insurance: "Boards of education in a city 
having a population of less than one million may insure against 
itS net;ligence and that of its off ice rs and employc:es; such a 
boa.rd is not a general insurer of safety of pupils. 11129 The 
IJ].lltter of carrying insurance or not has had little importance 
in the development of tort liability in the state of New York. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LIABILITY IN THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
The state of california, which did not enact its first 
abrogation statute until 1923, holds one of the leading posi-
tions in the modification of tort liability. California was 
the only state that expressly passed legislation to abolish 
immunity and has maintained this role virtually unchanged since 
inception. Of the ninety-six cases granting recovery by 
statutory authority Davis reported that thirty-two came from 
the State of California. 1 In another classification Schaerer 
rated California as one of the liberal states in the United 
States.2 ''Because of these statutes abrogating immunity, Cali-
fornia, through the years, has usually led in the number of 
damage suits brought against the school district, although it 
contests with New York frequently for this distinction.'.3 
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Prior to 1923 a number of lawsuits were being filed 
against the members of school boards and school trustees on 
the theory that the board members were personally liable for 
any injury to students, due to negligence of any policy, 
building or employee of the schocl system. In some of these 
108 
109 
actions these officers were found liable for personal injuries 
to pupils of the public schools. Quite naturally, these in-
dividuals were becoming alarmed and apprehensive at this 
development. In addition to being a thank.less task and a job 
•ithout monetary compensation, the possibility of a costly 
court action was sufficient to cause many school board members 
to resign. 
In order to combat this alarming state of affairs, the 
state of California enacted a series of statutes designed to 
ameliorate this situation. Two statutes were passed by the 
legislature in the year 1923. The ''Public Liability Act" made 
the district liable for injuries to persons and property caused 
by the dangerous or defective condition of buildings, grounds, 
and property. At the same session of the legislature, but at 
a different time, the district was made liable for injuries to 
any pupil caused by the negligence of the district or its 
officers or employees. A few years later the lawmakers passed 
an act making the district liable for injuries or damages 
caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned by 
the school. 
"As bas been the usual practice when the flood gates of 
school immunity are open and the flood of court cases tends to 
engulf the schools, some stopgap m.ethod must be made to plug 
the hold and save the schools.'~ California reacted by passing 
110 
a statute in 1931 which restricted the claims by establishing 
procedural guidelines. 
It was in this era that the school districts were given 
• mandate to purchase liability insurance to protect the distric 
-
against tort liability. This was mandatory legislation as con-
trasted to the usual permissive provisions. 
In 1931 the statute which made the district liable for 
injuries to pupils for negligence was amended. The words "to 
any pupil" were deleted and the words "on account of injury to 
person or property" were added, thus greatly broadening its 
coverage. 
California has long provided for the payment of claims 
against the district. The statutes also provide for legal 
service. 
In recent years California has added various acts to the 
already complex field of tort law. Article II of The Govern-
ment Code was added in 1959. This article deals with the 
--
presentation of claims. In 1961 further amendments were added 
to this article. 
It was not possible to anive at a precise general 
statement of the law in California at this time. In fact, the 
area of claims procedures is vague, overlapping, and contra-
dictory. ''The present law of California governing the pre-
sentations of claims is complex, inconsistent, ambiguous, 
difficult to find, productive of voluminous litigation, and 
often results in the denial of just claims. 05 
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From the historical data it appears that California has 
completely abrogated its immunity from tort liability, and in 
th~ subsequent sessions of the legislature has sought to refine 
and clarify its status. At this moment it appears that further 
clarification is needed. The break with inmmnity has been so 
thorough that the liability of the school district in Cali-
fornia is quite similar to the liability of individuals or 
private corporations. 
B. RELEVANT STATUTES 
When looking at the statutes of california many major 
recodifications are found. Originally, the school laws were 
found in The Political Code in the year 1872. They remained 
in The Political Code until 1929. Since the 1929 Code two 
major recodif ications are found, the 1943 Education Code and 
the 1959 Education Code. Because of these major rearrange-
ments confusion results when looking for a given section under 
cross referencing. The location of desired materials was 
difficult to find. 
The first abrogation statute passed in 1923 is some-
times called ''The Public Liability Act." This bill which is 
similar to some "safe place" statutes read as follows: 
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Counties> municipalities, and school districts 
shall be liable for injuries to persons and property of 
public streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works and 
property in all cases where the governing or managing 
board of such county, municipality, school district, 
or other board, officer or person having authority to 
remedy such condition, had l:nowledge or notice of the 
defective or dangerous condition of such street, highway, 
building, rrrounds, works, or property and failed or 
neglected, for a reasonable time after acquiring such 
lmowledge or receiving such notice to take such action 
as may be reasonably necessary to protect the ~ublic 
against such dangerous or defective condition. 
During the same session of the state assembly, but at a 
different time, the following statute was passed: 
Boards of .school trustees, high school boards, 
junior college boards, and boards of education are liable 
as such in the name of the district for any judgment 
against the district on account of injury to any pupil 
arising because of the negligence of the district or its 
officers or employee9, and they must pay any judgment 
out of school funds. 
In the Ahern case it was held that these two statutes 
were separate entities and were to be construed individually. 8 
Section 1623 dealt •::i th the negligence involved in injuries to 
pupils while ''The Public Liability Act" dealt with the lia-
bility toward the general public. 
In 1929 the school district was made liable for any 
damage or injury to persons or property caused by the negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle by any officer, agent, or employee 
While acting within the scope of his duties.9 At the same time 
that the district was made ltab1e for the negligent operation 
of motor vehicles, the district was given the power to purchase 
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109urance to protect itself against the liability as given 
above. The payment of such a premium was considered a proper 
cnarge against the school district. 
Because of the apprehension existing among the board 
members during the early part of the century, the statutes 
passed were very explicit in absolving these officers of per-
sonal liability. Two statutes were enacted in 1923 which per-
tained to the liability of board members. One dealt with 
necligence: t'No member of any board of supervisors, board of 
trustees, city council or board of school trustees, shall be 
liable for the negligent act or omission of any appointee or 
employee appointed or employed by him in his official capa-
city. nlO In a similar vein and contained in tho same act, 
"No member of the board of school trustees and city boards of 
education shall be held personally liable for accidents to 
children going to or returning from school or on the play-
crounds in connection with school work."ll 
In the same year the district attorney of the county 
was instructed to defend the district or any members of the 
board without fee or charge. 
In 1931 the school district was given the power to 
insure against the liability of the district or board members 
for the negligence of the distri.ct or its officers, agents, or 
employees while acting within the scope of their duty .12 
The state assenbly, in 1331, amended The :Political 
code of 1923, sec. 1623, p. 298. Formerly, the liability was 
--limited only to pupils, but the new amendment expanded the 
coverage to "persons or property. ul3 
In an act designed to accompany ''The Public Liability 
Act" of 1923, C~lifor!1ia enacted in 1931 the method of filing 
a claim based upon this liability. It read as follows: 
Whenever it is claimed that any person has been 
injured or any property damaged as a result of the danger 
ous or defective condition of any public street, high-
way, building, park, grounds, worlta, or property, a 
certified claim for damages shall be presented in writing 
and filed with the clerk or secretary of the legislative 
body of the municipality, county, city, or school dis-
trict, as the case may be, within ninety days after 
such accident has occurred. Such claim shall specify 
the name and address of the claimant, the date and place 
of the accident, i~d the extent of the injuries or 
damages received. 
In a further effort to restrict the number of actions 
being brought against the school board, the state of Cali-
fornia passed a restrictive statute pertaining to the lia-
bility for negligence. 
The governing board of any school district is liable 
as such in the name of the district for any judgment 
against the district on account of injury to person or 
property arising because of the negligence of the dis-
trict, or its officers, or employees in any case where 
a verified claim for damages has been presented in 
writing and filed with the secretary or clerk of the 
school district within ninety days after such accident 
has occurred. The claim shall specify the name and 
address of the claimant, the date and nlace of the 
accident, and the extent of the injuries or damages 
receivect.15 
TbiS section was in effect until 1959 when the procedural 
aspects were shifted to another section of the code. 
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As the reader may be beginning to understand, the state 
of affairs in California is elusive and hard to elucidate with 
any feeling of accuracy and thoroughness. In fact an article 
entitled "Claims Against Public Entities: Chaos in Cali-
fornia Law" was an apt title. 16 The author of this article 
stated that there are more than 170 separate tort liability 
provisions dealing with the various types of government. They 
are of a great variety. Some of them duplicate each other, 
others contradict, and some establish variable requirements for 
the same type of claim. Since the beginning of the claim pro-
visions, litigation has increased four times. There appears 
to be a desperate need for new legislation in this area. 
Primarily, the statutes pertaining to the tort liability 
of school districts were found in two codes. The 1959 Educa-
~ Code and The Government Code were the two major sources 
although the statute relating to the liability of the school 
district :ivr negligent operation of a motor vehicle was 1bund 
in The Vehicle Code. Some of the current enactments embodied 
parts of the previous laws which have been discussed above. 
In addition the new code utilizes a new and different numbering 
system. All of the following situations are from West's 
Annotated California Code. 
llC: 
Section 903 of The Education Code, formerly Section 1007, 
- -
makes the district liable for negligence. It reads as follows: 
·~he governing body of any school district is liable as such 
in the name of the district for any judgment against the dis-
trict on account of injury to person. or property arising be-
cause of the negligence of the district or its officers or 
employees. "17 This statute had its derivation in The Political 
code of 1923, sec. 1623. 
- West's Annotated California Education Code, section 904, 
outlines the payment of claims against the school district.IS 
The board is given the power to pay claims out of the school 
funds subject to the constitutional limitations. If the claim 
is too large to be paid in one year, the board may budget it 
for the ensuing year. If this presents an undue hardship on 
the board, the board may amortize the payments over a three 
year period,and the rate of interest shall not exceed four per 
cent per annum. (Rate of interest held unconstitutional in 
Welch v. Dunsmire, 326, P. 2d. 633, 1958).19 This section 
also had its origin in ~Political Code of 1923, sec. 1623. 
Section 906 makes it the duty of the district attorney 
to defend suits against the district. ''The district attorney 
of the county in which a school is located shall, without fee 
or other charge, defend the district in any suit brought for 
injury to any pupil for any cause. 1120 Section 806.5, which was 
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added in 1961, authorized the services of an attorney and that 
compensation of said attorney was a proper use of funds. 21 
Very similar to the old statute was section 1041 which 
dealt with the personal liability of board members. "No member 
of the governing board of any school district shall be held 
personally liable for accidents to children going to or re-
turning from school or on the playground or in connection with 
school work. 1122 
Another section held the members of the board of education 
not personally liable ur-less there is negligence on their part.23 
section 1043 made it the duty of the district attorney to de-
fend board members or district employees for any act, or 
omission, in the line of his official duty. 24 
The district was required to carry liability insurance 
for negligence. Section 1045 covers this area as follows: 
The governing board of any school district shall 
insure against the liability (other than the liability 
which may be insured against under the provisions of 
Divisions 4 and 5 of the Labor Code) of the district and 
against the personal H.ability of the members of the 
board and of the officers and employees of the district 
for damages to property or damages by reason of the deat.h 
of ,or injury to, any person or persons, as the result of 
the negligent act by the district, or by a member of the 
board, or any officer or employee when acting within 
the scope of his office or employment, and may also 
insure against the personal liability of the members of 
the board of any officer or employee of the district as 
an individual, for any act or omission performed in the 
line of official duty. The insurance may be written in 
any insurance company authorized to transact the busi-
ness of insurance in the state, or in a nonadmitted in-
surer to the extent and subject to the conditions pre-
scribed by Sec. 1763 of The Insurance Code.25 
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Jn the case of cities having a population of more than 500,000, 
theY may act as self-insurers and provide the money for the 
liability of the district, officers, agents, and employees 
from their own funds. 26 
California imposed a strict manner of supervision upon 
the teachers. "Every teacher in the public schools shall hold 
pupils to a strict account for their conduct on the way to and 
from school, on the playgrounds, or during recess. 027 
West's Annotated california Government~ spells out 
other provisions relative to the tort liability of local en-
tities. In attempting to ascertain which statute is controlling, 
the reader should remember that as a point of law the specific 
statute usually is controlling over the general enactment. 
However, various parts of The Government Code do pertain to 
- -
the school district. At this time the procedural matters seem 
to rest in this part of the California laws. The old ''Public 
Liability Act" also has been transferred into this code. 
Section 53050 defined the terminology of the act. A 
person is defined so as to include school buildings, playgrounds 
and property. A local agency means any school district. 28 
Section 53051 makes the agency liable for dangerous or 
defective conditions of public property. This act is very 
similar to "The Public Liability Act" passed in 1923. It 
reads as follows: 
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A local agency is liable for injuries to persons 
and property resulting from the dangerous or defective 
condition of public property if the legislative body, 
board, or person authorized to remedy the situation: 
{a) Had knowledge or notice of the dangerous or de-
fective condition. 
{b) For a reasonable time after acquiring knowledge or 
receiving notice, failed to remedy the condition or 
take action reasonably necess~9y to protect the 
public against the condition. 
In section 53052 the claimant is told the manner of 
presentation of a claim. 
When it is claimed that a person has been injured 
or property damaged as a result of the dangerous or 
defective condition of public property, a written claim 
shall be presented in conformity with and shall be 
governed by Chapter 2 of Division 3.5 of Title 1 of 
The Government Code.30 
At one time this procedure was given in sec. 53053 but is now 
found in Chapter 2 of Division 3.5 of Title 1. 
The Government Code sec. 53054 reads that "the fees and 
expenses of defending the suit are lawful charges against the 
local agency. 031 
Section 53055 deals with the payment of claims and com-
promise of disputed claimso ''When a legal liability is ad-
mitted or disputed the local agency may pay a bona fide claim 
or compromise a disputed claim out of public funds, if the 
attorney for the local agency approves of the compromise. u32 
The Government Code, Title 1, Division 3.5, Chapter 2, 
,- -
secs. 711, 715, and 716 are relevant to the filing of claims 
against local entities. The bulk of these sections were passed 
in 1959, 1961 and 1963. 
Section 711, which was passed in 1959 and amended in 
1961, outlined the content of a claim. 
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A claim shall be presented by the claimant or by a 
person acting on his behalf and shall show: 
(a) The name and post office address of the claimant; 
(b) The post off ice address to which the person pre-
senting the claim desires notices to be sent; 
(c) The date, time, place, and other circumstances of 
the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the 
claim asserted; 
(d) A general description of the indebtedness, obligation 
injury, damage, or loss incurred so far as it may be 
known at the time of the presentation of the claim; and 
(e) The amount claimed as of the date of presentation 
of the claim, together with the basis of computation 
thereof. 
The claim shall be signed by the claimant or by some 
person on his behalf. Claims for supplies, materials, 
equipment or services need not be signed by the claimant 
or on his behalf if presented on a billhead or invoice 
regularly used in the conduct of the business of the 
claimant. 
A claim may be amended at any time, and the amend-
ment shall be ~onsidered a part of the original claim for 
all purposes.33 
In 1959 the State of California passed a new law con-
cerning the deadline for filing a claim. The prior statute 
established the deadline as of ninety days from the date of 
the occurrence complained thereof. The new act sets one hun-
dred days after the occurrence as the deadline for filing. 
A claim relating to a cause of action for death 
or physical injury to person or to personal property or 
growing crops shall be presented as provided in Sec-
t ion 714 not later than the one hundredth day after the 
accrual of the cause of the action. A claim relating 
to any other cause of action shall be presented as pro-
vided in Section 714 not later ~han one year after the 
accrual of the cause of action. 4 
Section 71G makes an allowance for presentation of 
clai:ns after the expiration of the deadline, in the case of 
claimants under disability. 
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The superior court of the county in which the local 
entity has its principal office shall grant leave to 
present a cla.irn after the expiration of the time speci-
fied in Section 715 if the entity against which the claim 
is made will not be unduly prejudiced thereby, where no 
claim was presented during such time and where: 
(a) Claimant was a minor during all such tirae; or 
(b) Claimant was physically or raentally incapacitated 
during all of such time and by reason of such disability 
failed to present a claim during such time; or 
(c) Claimant died before the expiration of such time. 35 
Undoubtedly, the change was precipitated in part by the 
strict interpretation of the deaciliu~ by I.he courts of Cali-
f oruia. In fact, one case was denied because it was filed on 
the ninety-first day.36 In this change of rationale the state 
of California appears to be doing by statute what the judicial 
authorities of New York are doing. 
Section 801 describes the time and verification of 
filing a clai•11 against an individual for his carelessness or 
negligence concerning the dangerous or defective condition of 
any public property. 37 A verified claim must be filed with 
the proper officer within ninety days. The contents of the 
claim "shall specify the name and address of the claimant, the 
date and place of the accident and the extent of the injuries 
or damages received. ,,3S 
West's Annotated California Vehicle Code, sec. 17001, 
-
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contains the act concerning the school district's liability for 
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
Any public agency owning any motor vehicle is 
responsible to every person who sustains any damage by 
reason of death or injury to person or property as the 
result of negligent operation of the motor vehicle by 
an officer, agent or employee or as the result of the 
negligent operation of any other motor vehicle by any 
officer, agent or employee while acting within the scope 
of his office, agency or employment.39 
Section 17003 grants the power to purchase insurance to 
protect against the negligent operation of motor vehicles. "Any 
public agency may insure against liability under this chapter 
in any insurance company authorized to transact the business 
of such insurance in the State of California, and the premium 
for such insurance shall be a proper charge against the re-
spective general fund of the public agency. 040 
C. CASE LAW 
As contrasted with New York, California has an elaborate 
statutory framework upon which the tort liability of a school 
district rests. Due in part to the complexity and elusive 
character of the statutes, California courts hear a large 
number of tort liability cases each year. New York and 
California compete for the largest number of cases heard in 
this area of law. 
Liability in general. A case heard in 1961 described 
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the general feeling of the courts in California toward lia-
bility. 41 The court stated that the doctrine of immunity must 
be discarded as an unjust anachrorism which exists only through 
inertia. Accordingly, the rule is that when there is negligence, 
liability results. In fact, nonliability was the exception. 
In another case the court held that the district was liable for 
all damages to persons or property caused by ordinary negligen-
42 The incident need not occur on the school grounds. In ce. 
the Grov~ case the plaintiff, who was a student, was injured 
in an airplane crash while taking an aviation course.43 Al-
though the operator of the airplane was a private independent 
contractor, the district was held liable since it was deemed 
that the district had sufficient control of the operator. 
From the above examples and from the general tenor of 
the statutory enactments, it may be said that California is one 
of the most liberal states in its interpretation of the tort 
liability of a school district. 
Liability !£!:.torts £!._officers, agents ~ employees. 
California statutes impose liability upon the district for the 
torts of its officers, agents and employees provided that they 
are working within the scope of their assignment. The district 
was held liable for injuries occurring to a person as a result 
of negligence.44 This is a very unusual result becnuse Re-
spondeat Superior does not apply in relationship of an indepen-
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dent contractor. In another case the district was held liable 
for the negligent act of a teacher.4 5 In this case a small 
group of junior college students practiced tennis after school 
as part of their physical education course. Since the school 
bUS had gone, arrangements were made for students to drive 
these persona home, and the school would reimburse them for 
thiS travel expense. The car used in this case wall a sports 
roadster, "a hot rod" with no fenders, no horn, no top, faulty 
lights and in general poor condition. On the way home a fatal 
accident occurred. The basic question was whether the teacher 
used ordinary care under the circumstances in permitting this 
means of transportation to continue. The evidence disclosed 
that the teacher knew of the unsafe condition of the car and of 
its "reckless" driver. The jury determined that this was neg-
ligence and that said negligence was the proximate cause of 
the accident. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's 
judgment of damages of $5,000.00 to the plaintiff and $1,500.00 
to another rider. 
When an instructor gave a student a defective oxygen 
gau~e on an oxyacetylene tank which exploded, the district was 
helJ liable under the ''Public Liability Act. 046 The plaintiff 
lost an eye in the accident. The decision held that tbe dis-
trict was liable for maintaining a dangerous and defective 
condition. The supreme court upheld the decision but reduced 
damages from $35,ooo.oo to $1H,ooo.oo. 
:Sven though the pilot who taught the cross-country 
flyinG was an independent contractor, it was held that the dis-
trict had sufficient control of his actions so as to make the 
district liable for a student injured in a crash. 47 
Generally speaking, the statutes and judicial inter-
pretations of the State of California have imposed liability 
upon the district for the negligent acts of its agents, officers, 
and employees as long as they were acting within the scope of 
48 their duty. 
Essential elements £.!_ ~ negligence claim. In order to 
maintain an action based upon negligence, the necessary in-
gredients must be present. These elements are: (1) a legal 
duty, (2) a failure to perform up to standard, (3) the act 
must be the proximate cause, and (4) actual damages. 
Section 1623 of The Political ~ of 1923 imposed the 
duty upon the school district to maintain its buildings and 
property in a safe condition. This act made the district 
liable for negligent acts which injured pupils. When the plain-
tiff lost two fingers in a saw, he charged negligence on the 
part of the defendant.49 The actual determination of negligence 
was put to the jury which awarded damages of $3,000.00. The 
supreme court affirmed the decision. The statutes of California 
impose a duty upon the schools to act in a reasonably safe and 
Prudent manner. 
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The Ballman case illustrated the reasoning of the court 
l·t pondered a negligence claim.50 The plaintiff, a student as 
iD a physical education class, fractured her skull while doing 
1 "rolling over two" acrobatic stunt. The court specified the 
following test for negligence: (1) care is defined as what a 
person of ordinary prudence would do under the same circum-
stances; (2) ordinary care is relative to the instant case; and 
(3) no absolute standard can be determined, as individual 
abilities must be considered. The superior court awarded 
damages of $15, 000 .oo which, while affirmed by the supreme 
court, was reduced to $5,000.00. 
When a fifteen year old girl was struck by a truck as 
she was running toward the athletic field for class, the school 
district was held negligent for allowing a dangerous condition 
t . t 51 o exis • The school permitted eighteen trucks a weelt to 
cross the grounds without any precautionary practices. The 
court held that this was not the conduct of a prudent person, 
and that the school must take steps to protect its students. 
After a long legal battle with two reversals, the supreme court 
affirmed· the judgment and damages of $20,000.00. 
Ordinary care is determined by the facts of the instant 
case. While playing a supervised game at recess time under the 
supervision of a teacher less than fifty feet away, the plain-
tiff was struck by a bicyclist. 52 The teacher and the school 
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.as aware o.f this practice of riding bicycles 011 the playground. 
The r>laintiff alleged the r•intenance of an unsafe and dangerous 
playground. The court held that the teacher was negligent for 
per11itting the boys to ride their bicycles. and that sufficient 
evidence existed to permit recovery against the district. 
Again the test was what would a person of ordinary prudence do 
in the same situation. The appellate court affirmed the superior 
court's judgment and damages of $1, soo.oo. 
Foreseeability is another factor that the courts look 
for in the determination of negligence. It is .not essential 
that the specific event be foreseeable but that the possibility 
of damage is present. lVhile a group of 100 to 125 children were 
playing under the supervision of one teacher, a boy had his leg 
twisted and broken. 53 The trial court held the teacher negligent 
for uot exercising ordinary care or prudence. The children 
were carelessly and improperly cared for and supervised; there-
fore, the district was negligent for not providing proper super-
vision. The fact that a third party was the immediate cause 
of the accident did not break the chain of causality. Even 
the willful lllisconduct of the actor did not absolve the district, 
because adequate supervision may have prevented the accident. 
Some of these cases seem to drift away from the concept 
of foreseeability and into the concept of proximate cause, 
Perhaps because there is relationship between these two 
concet)ts. In one sense, almost nothing is quite unforeseeable, 
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since there is a very slight mathematical chance, recognizable 
in advance, that even the most freakish accident will occur. 
Jn another, nothing is entirely foreseeable, since the exact 
details of a sequence of events never can be predicted with 
comPlete omniscience. What is meant is something between the 
two: that the consequence must be a normal, substantial part 
of the risk, which a reasonable man would recognize as fairly 
to be taken into account. But while it is comparatively easy 
to say that the aggregate of all possible consequences amount 
to a risk against which he should guard, it is a much more 
difficult thing to determine the importance of a particular 
result as a material part of that risk. 
As has been said, there must be some reasonable connection 
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages 
which the plaintiff has suffered. This connection usually is 
dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called "proximate 
cause." This is merely the limitation which the courts have 
placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of 
his conduct. As a practical matter, legal responsibility must 
be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with 
the result and of such significance that the law is justified 
in saying that they were foreseeable. It is not surprising 
that courts have not found the problem easy of solution. 
The negligence of a driver who struck and killed a school 
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bOY was adjudged as not being foreseeable on the part of the 
,cbool district. 54 The proximate cause of the injury was the 
driver, not the failure of the school to provide transportation. 
Nor was the fact that the boy was enrolled in theWt"ong school 
sufficient to show negligence. 
The court of appeals upheld the superior court's dis-
JDissal of a case where the chain of events was broken by an 
independent act.55 The plaintiff was injured by an explosion 
of chemicals which he had received from two boys who had stolen 
them from a high school supply room. The court held that if 
the defendant knew that the intervening act was likely, the 
original act may be the proximate cause. However, the stealing 
of the chemicals could not reasonably be anticipated; therefore, 
this broke the chain of events. 
If a reasonably prudent person could not foresee the 
event, th~n liability does not attach. The plaintiff sought 
to prove negligence on the district when he was struck by a 
baseball bat while playing with other children. 56 The court 
held that negligence must be proven and the school was not the 
insurer of the safety af the child. The charge must clearly 
state the facts of negligence. The appellate court affirmed 
the superior court's sustaining of a demurrer to the plaintiff's 
claim, and the supreme court refused to hear the case. 
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The question of the proximate cause cacie up on the Ziegler 
case. 57 A thirteen year •?l<l boy fell or was pushed while sitting 
on a railing above a stairwell. The bi1y died from injuries. 
Th• school authorities !mew that students would sit on this 
rail and had warned the:n of the dangers tbei.·eof. The court 
held that 1t was not necessary to foresee the si~ccific accident 
but o,1ly a general type of t:-ouble. Mor i.vas the fellow student's 
intervening act :nore than a concurring cause. The case was 
first heard in 1959 where it was alleged that the school pre-
mises were in a dangarous or defective con<lition. This action 
was dismissed but a retrial was heard on the charge of inadequate 
supervision. In the second trial the critical question con-
cet"ned the assumption of rislt instruct ion tl:at had been given 
the jury. The court held that t hie evidence indicated that the 
boy knew of the danger involved and had accepted this rislc • 
. :Jrdinary negligence may be the proximate cause of an 
accident as was held in the Lehmuth case. 58 The student body 
of a junior college had arranged a homecoming parade. A 
student employee was to pull a sound trailer behind his car. 
The driver failed to attach the safety chains as required by 
statute and the trailer broke away from the car and injured 
several pedestrians. The college '1.'aS exercising supervision 
but it failed to see the lack of saf cty chains. The superior 
court bad a.warded damages in the sum of $277, 844 .oo for 
Virgi.:1ia Lch::imth and $5, 178.00 for Marcel V. Naret. The court 
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beld that the district was liable for all damages to persons 
and property caused by ordinary negligence and this negligence 
iS not limited to acts committed on the school grounds. The 
school must reasonably supervise the student body. An eighteen 
year old is not yet mature of judgment and needs supervision. 
The failure to require the safety chain constituted direct 
negligence and was the proximate cause of the accident. 
However, the proximate cause must be under the control 
of the school district. A girl who was waiting for class to 
begin jumped up on a window ledge which was approximately three 
feet above the floor. 59 While securely seated, another girl 
came by and pulled her off, breaking her leg. In this case 
the court ruled that the proximate cause was the willful mis-
conduct of a third party. 
The fact that the coach was not present when a boy was 
hit in the eye with a handball was held not to be the proximate 
cause. 60 The game was not an inherently dangerous activity, 
nor were conditions such as to warrant stopping the game. 
The question of the adequacy or inadequacy of super-
vision is a point of fact, and its resolution will determine 
whether supervision is the proximate cause. See the infra 
section on supervision. 
Substantial evidence must be introduced before the court 
Will allow a case based upon negligence to come to trial. An 
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elelllentary child became sick at school and the officials called 
)lollle• 61 An older brother who was also home ill answered and 
.,as told to come and get his younger brother. The older boy 
came on a bicycle and while on the way home overturned and 
injured himself. The plaintiff alleged that the boy was comply-
ing with the instructions of the school and was under the control, 
care and management of the district. The court rejected this 
claim because there was no evidence to indicate that the officials 
knew of the illness nor of the means of transport at ion. It 
was not held negligent to assume that the boys would walk. Al-
though sec. 13557 holds teachers to a strict account of pupils 
for their conduct to and from school, the court said" ••• this 
section does not impose dt~ty on the teacher or the district to 
supervise the pupils on the way home."52 This section refers 
to the behavior of children, not to their safe conduct to and 
from school. The court of appeals upheld this verdict upon 
appeal. 
A superior court awarded damages of $17,000.00 to a boy 
for the loss of an eye when struck by a piece of metal in a 
shop. 63 The count charged the district with failure to provide 
a safe place to work. The court of appeals reversed this 
finding. The court held that recovery depended upon a known 
danger, or an unknown peril which should have been known by the 
exercise of ordinary care under the same circumstances by a 
reasonably prudent person. 
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In the Underhill case the court held that the plaintiff 
~ust prove negligence and must clearly state the facts of the 
64 alleged negligence. 
Standards of care. The courts of California have ruled 
1118-0Y times on the question of what standards are to be applied. 
In general they agree that the standard is what an ordinarily 
prudent person would do under the same circumstances. Naturally, 
this is a question for the jury to decide in any one case. 
Some examples of this test are given below. 
An eleven year old boy was playing football and ran 
into a protruding bolt on a flagpole and as a result of the 
injury charged the district with failure to provide safe pro-
perty and negligence in maintaining said f lagpole.65 The 
superior court awarded damages in the sum of $250.00 for the 
minor and $179 .oo for the father. However, the court oi appeals 
reversed this decision and stated that it was not reasonable 
to build and maintain premises s.o as to preclude the possi-
bility of injury. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
had knowledge of the alleged unsafe condition and had failed 
to remedy said condition. Authorities are required to use 
only ordinary care in maintaining property. 
During the free play noon hour recess a touch football 
game between the boys o:f the seventh and the eighth grade was 
engaged in by boys ranging in weight from eighty-five to 190 
Pounds.66 One of the boys was struck in the abdomen necessi-
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tating removal of the spleen and one kidney. The superior 
court in a jury trial awarded damages in the sum of $7,500.00 
for the minor and $800.00 for the father. Upon appeal the 
supreme court reversed the decision. In determining ordinary 
care the supreme court found the following facts. In physical 
education classes the boys were instructed in playing football. 
The two coaches acted as officials. The method of grouping 
was a convenient, practical and widely used procedure. The 
exponent charts may give a wide range in any one factor. Touch 
football is not an inherently dangerous activity. The in-
structors were carefully selected, experienced and competent 
teachers. Under these facts there could be no legal basis for 
negligence. Judge Carter, dissenting, maintained that this 
was a fact finding case for a jury and their reasonable minds. 
In a case where the teacher was out of visual contact 
of his class for thirty seconds, the court ruled that this 
absence was not a violation of ordinary care.67 As a class 
ran around the corner and out onto the playground a boy was 
pushed, fell and lost two teeth. The lower court dismissed 
the charge against the teacher but awarded damages of $5,270.00 
for the minor and $195.00 for the father. The court of appeals 
held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the lack 
of supervision was the proximate cause of the injury. The 
standard of care is what a person of ordinary prudence would 
do under the same circumstances. The school is not liable for 
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the misconduct of the third party. In a dissent by Judge 
vraper it was stated that, if the teacher had been present, it 
,.yas a reasonable inference that the injury would have been 
avoided because there would have been no running. It is not 
necessary to prove that the very injury was foreseeable. 
The school district was held to be using ordinary care 
when a third grade boy lost an eye while hiding in an orna-
mental palm tree in an isolated part of the playground.68 
There was a rule prohibiting playing in this area, the plain-
tiff was familiar with this rule, and there were two teachers 
supervising 200 pupils at the time. The court of appeals re-
versed the lower court which had awarded damages of $15,000.00 
to the plaintiff. The count alleged the maintenance of danger-
oua or defective conditious. The court held that liability 
attaches only when using the public property in the ordinary 
and usual manner. The trees had been there for many years 
and no injuries had occurred. 
other specific examples of ordinary care were gleaned 
from other cases in brief. The court held that the teacher 
was negligent for not using ordinary care in permitting 
bicyclists to ride among children playing on the playground. 69 
When a girl fractured her skull doing an acrobatic stunt, the 
officials were held negligent for not using the same care as 
Persons of ordinary prudence charged with the same duty.70 In 
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a case where the tea6ber allowed students to ride home in a 
,,110t rod" and with a reckless driver, the teacher was held not 
to be using ordinary care under the known facts. 71 An act ion 
was brought by a kindergarten child alleging the maintenance of 
a dangerous and defective condition and a lack of supervision 
when the child lost his finger in a gate which was closed by 
another pupil. 72 The court said that the amount of care shown 
by the district was that of a prudent person. In a case where 
a boy was injured by mixing two explosive chemicals, custom 
was not clear as to what ordinary care was and, therefore, the 
question should be resolved by the jury.73 When the school 
officials knew that the boys were playing "blackout" and did 
not prevent or try to prevent this, the court ruled that the 
school was not exercising ordinary care under the circum-
stances. 74 
In the case of Satarino v. Sleight a seventeen year old 
boy, rushing from class to the gymnasium, had to cross a busy 
street and was struck by a car.75 The appellate court reversed 
the superior court's non suit and held that the question of 
liability was for the jury to determine. The court said that 
the school owed an amount of care to a seventeen year old be-
cause of the herd instinct and competitive spirit. The auth-
orities are responsible for the safety of children commensurate 
With their maturity. In the instant case, children had to 
cross a heavily traveled street without any safety practices, 
anJ the question of liability was for t; <:: jury • 
.Another principle that the California courts have 
followed consistently anJ :tn large numbers is that the schools 
are :10t insurers of the safety of the children or persons 
usir:; t:1e school. When a third party pulled a girl frorn a 
ledg:c causing her to break a leg, the court held that the school 
was not responsible. 76 In a similar ruling the court held the 
srll,:i0l not responsible when a boy pushed another boy down on 
the rilayground knocking out two teeth. 77 When an elementary 
school child was struck by a baseball bat and this event could 
not have been reasonably foreseen, the school was held not to 
be the insurer of the safety of the chil:J. 78 The school was 
held not responsible for the safety of a child when a piece ?f 
metal flew into the eye of the plaintiff .79 
1\ six year old boy who suffered from cerebral palsy a~1d 
congenital heart disease fell from a piece of playground equip-
&O 
ment and died. The court held that the question of super-
vision was :for the jury, but that the school is not the insurer 
of the safety of any one child. 
Dangerous or defective conditi.:in £.!._ buildinqs, grounds, 
~ ~1ropertz. Sect ion 53051 o:f tht:> California Annotated Govern-
ment Code imposes liability for the dangerous or defective 
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conditions of public property. This section is very similar 
to "The Public L1abili ty .Act" passed in 1923. As one might 
e"pect, :nuch litigation ha.s sprung from this section. 
The school was held liable under this section when a 
faulty oxygen gauge on an oxyacetylene tank exploded and put 
out the eye of a student.81 
Property must be used only in the customary and usual 
waY before liability attaches. When a boy ran into a bolt pro-
truding from a flagpole, he charged the district with a danger-
ous condition of its property. 82 The court held that it is 
impossible to preclude the possibility of injury, and that the 
plaintiff must prove knowledge and failure to remedy, a danger-
ous condition. 
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's 
decision for the plaintiff who as a P.T.A. invitee fell on a 
waxed floor and broke her leg.83 Testimony established that 
the floor was v~ry slippery. The court held that the waxed 
floor must be reasonably safe, and the degree of slipperiness 
is a fact for the jury. The knowledge of conditions when per-
formed by an employee is imputed to the employer. If danger-
ous conditions are produced by natural causes, acts of God, 
or third persons, proof of constructive lmowledge must be 
established. That is, it must be shown that the defendant knew 
of the danger and did nothing to correct it. 
The Novack case is an interesting one. 84 On Sunday a 
boy climbed over a fence to get into a locked playground, and 
While playing, a large equipment box fell on him. Action was 
lJJ 
brought under "The Public Liability Act. 11 The court of appeals 
affir111ed the lower court's judgment of non suit holding that 
the principle of ~ ipsa loquitur does not apply, and that 
there was an absence of evidence of how the accident occurred 
or of any defect in the box. 
A gate which was pushed shut 011 a pupil's fingers was 
11eld not to be a dangerous or defective instrumentality. 85 
In the Ziegler case an iron stair railing upon which 
students would occasionally sit was held not to be a dangerous 
condition despite the fact that students had been warned not 
to sit upon it. 86 
The violation of a safety regulation of the Division of 
Industrial Safety was considered negliJence on the part of the 
school district. 87 The plaintiff caught his hand in a printing 
press in the workshop of a junior high school. He charged the 
school with operatinJ; a press without the required safety 
device. The court held that the regulation applied to schools, 
and that this did not place the schools under the direction of 
the Division of Industrial Safety. 
The school was held liable for permitting a dangerous 
Condit ion to exist when it allowed eighteen trucks a week to 
cross the playground without any safety precautions. 88 An 
ornamental palm tree with sharp thorns was held not to be a 
dangerous condition.89 This tree had grown for many years in 
an isolated part of the playground, and no injuries had resulted 
ttnt i 1 the instant case. Window le di; cs which were three f cot 
above the floor anJ upon which students occasionally sat were 
not considered a dangerous condition. 90 The liability o:f U.o 
school district is not limited to the school grounds as held in 
tllc Lehmuth case.91 
Supervision. Under section 13557 of The California 
------
Annotated Education Code strict supervision is irnposed upon 
-
the pupils "for their conduct on the way to and from school, 
on the playground, or during recess." There are many factors 
to be investigated in this cause of negligence. There must 
be a duty and a failure to fulfill this duty. Other related 
elements in this section include: adequacy of care, foresee-
ability, competent personnel, rules and enforcement, after 
school hours and location of incident. 
'l'he court has held that the purpose of tbe above statute 
is to prevent injuries. 92 The court of appeals reversed the 
superior court's sustaining of a demurrer filed by the defend-
ant. A girl, while eating lunch in the classroom of an elemen-
tary school, became engaged in a scuff le and had her arm broken. 
There was neither a teacher nor an adult present. The court 
held that the mere absence of a teacher was sufficient evidence 
of negligence, and that said improper supervision imposed 
liability upon the school district. 
The supervision must conform to the standard of ordinary 
r 
I 
111 
care. When a hoy had his leg broken by another boy twisting 
ft, he alleged negligence on the part of the teacher. 93 One 
teacher was supervising 100 to 150 students. The court of 
appeals affirmed the lower court's judgment of $2,500.00 to 
the plaintiff. The trial court held that the teacher did not 
use ordinary care or prudence, and that the children were care-
1essly, negligently, improperly, and insufficiently cared for 
and watched. The district was negligent for not providing 
proper supervision although the specific accident may not be 
foreseeable. Even though willful misconduct on the part of a 
third party was the immediate cause, this did not absolve the 
district of its liability. More supervision might have prevented 
this misfortune. 
The question of adequate supervision was handled in the 
Lilienthal case.94 The court of appeals reversed the superior 
court dismissal of the case. A personal injury suit was brought 
by the plaintiff who was struck in the eye by a knife that was 
being played with by another student. The students were sitting 
outside in a semicircle reviewing a test. The teacher was in 
front of the class and testified that all the pupils were visible, 
there was no disorder and the knife was not visible until after 
the injury. The court ruled that the jury must decide whether 
the teacher knew or should have known. Did the teacher use the 
same care as a person of ordinary prudence would have used 
under the same circumstances? The jury could inf er that he 
saw the knife or if he had been using care should have seen 
the knife. 
The adequacy of supervision was questioned in the in-
volved Rodriques case.95 The court of appeals affirmed the 
superior court's judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant. A six year old boy was found lying unconscious on 
the blacktop beneath a horizontal ladder. The boy suffered 
from cerebral palsy with seizures and a congenital heart disease. 
The teacher had discussed these handicaps with the mother who 
requested that no one else be told. The plaintiff also stated 
that he could not climb on things. The court stated that the 
question of closer supervision was one for the jury. The fact 
that there was one teacher per seventy-five to one hundred 
children in a lot 75 by 110 feet was for the jury. The purpose 
of the law requiring supervision is to regulate students' con-
duct so as to prevent disorderly and dangerous practices. If 
the supervisor could not have reasonably anticipated or pre-
vented the accident, it may be immaterial if he was actually 
present. 
The determination of the adequacy of supervision was 
for the jury in a case where a group of boys were playing 
"blackout. n96 The boy was partially successful, slipped from 
his friend's grasp and hit his head and died. The basic issue 
was whether the defendant was using ordinary care. The court 
of appeals affirmed the verdict for the defendant although 
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it questioned this finding. 
The teacher was held negligent for permitting boys to 
ride their bicycles among the children playing at recess time.97 
The appellate court affirmed the superior court's judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages in the sum of 
$1,500.00. The teacher who was less than fiftyfeet away had 
known of this practice for several months. The court ruled 
that there was sufficient evidence showing negligence on the 
part of the teacher. Again, the test was whether a person of 
ordinary prudence under the same circumstances would do this. 
What is ordinary care is determined by the instant case. 
The court held that the lack of supervision was not the 
proximate cause when a class went around the corner out of 
the view of the teacher for thirty seconds.98 
The school district must reasonably supervise the 
student body even though the activity may take place off the 
school premises.99 The establishment of a rule and the super-
vision thereof was deemed sufficient. 100 The school is re-
quired to exercise reasonable supervision.101 The fact that 
matching of the boys involved in a touch football game was 
done and the game had been supervised by two trained and 
competent coaches was sufficient to disallow the charge of 
negligence. 102 
One of the questions presented in the Ziegler case was 
the negligent supervision. 103 The plaintiff, a thirteen year 
r M4 old boy, was killed when he fell from an iron railing into a 
stairwell. The facts were not clear as to whether the boy was 
pushed by another student or merely jump~d backward. The school 
authorities had warned the students about sitting on this rail. 
The jury found that the school was not guilty of negligent super-
vision of this activity. The issue in the second appeal d~alt 
with the assumption of risk that the boy had taken by sitting 
on the rail. There was some evidence that the boy knew of the 
dangers involved. 
Procedural matters. In a state where the machinery of 
bringing an action based upon tort liability of the school 
district was well established, one of the areas of frequent 
litigation was the interpretation of the procedures to be 
followed. Under procedures come such things as the filing 
deadline, improper notice, sufficiency of notice, content of 
the notice, and knowledge of the claim. 
Until 1959 the statutes provided that a claim must be 
filed within ninety days after the occurrence of the event. In 
1959 the deadline was raised to one hundred days. However, 
certain exceptions to this deadline were established. 
In general the California courts had strictly adhered 
to the deadline of ninety days. A seventeen year old boy was 
injured in a wrestling accident on October 12, 1956. 104 As a 
result of the injury he was unable to file until November 5, 
r 
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1956, but did not file until January 11, 1957. This filing 
.,as accomplished sixty-seven days after the disability ended 
and ninety-one days after the injury. The court of appeals 
sustained the demurrer of the defendant. The court ruled that 
the suit was not timely filed nor did the fact of his minority 
make a difference. His disability ended in time for the suit 
to be timely filed. 
In another suit the claim was denied because of the late 
filing. The plaintiff brought a personal injury suit against 
the district for an accident which ~ccurred May 5, 1937. 105 
The claim was filed January 27, 1938. The court of appeals 
affirmed the superior court's decision to sustain the demurrer 
without leave to amend. The court said that the statute must 
be strictly construed, and unless it is in conformity with the 
requirements no action can be had. The supreme court in a 
hearing stated "that it is not necessary to strictly construe 
the rule but a liberal construction is valid and should be with 
a view to effect its objects and to promote justice."106 The 
object of the court seems to be to allow each case to be treated 
individually as to the timeliness of bringing the action, based 
on the facts, rather than to allow an injustice to take place 
because of a technicality. 
When a boy ran his motor scooter into a barricade, placed 
in the street for driver education, and filed his claim five 
months after the accident, the claim was denied. 107 The filing 
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date and other mandatory requirements were essential, and the 
pJ.a.intiff must have fulfilled these in order to file a verified 
claim even though he was a minor. 108 
Despite the fact that the board knew of a claim, this 
did not negate the need for a verified claim. A minor boy was 
injured in a recreation program conducted by the board of 
education. 109 The court of appeals affirmed the superior 
court's rejection of the suit. The board of education and 
the adjuster of the insurance company investigated the claim 
but did not tell the mother of the need to file a claim. The 
court hel<l that this was not an excuse for a late claim. The 
defendants were not stopped from taking advantage of the failure 
to file a claim. 
Abatement and/or diminishment ~liability. The legis-
lature and the judicial system of California have been very 
liberal in allowing relief to injured parties. Dogmatic de-
fenses to the charge of negligence are not available. This is 
not to say that the filing of a suit is an automatic indictment 
of the school district. Several possibilities exist as avenues 
to the abatement and/or diminishment of the tort liability. 
As stated above and with ample documentation the school 
is not the insurer of the safety of a child or person. This 
means that actual negligence on the part of the school must be 
the proximate cause of the injury. 
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The establishment and reasonable enforcement of adequate, 
proper, and reasonable rules and regulations will serve as an 
effective defense to the charge of negligence arising from 
inadequate supervision. When there was an enforced rule pre-
venting playing in an isolated part of the playground, the 
school was held not liable when a boy lost his eye on a sharp 
branch of a tree. 110 
Notice of the dangerous or defective condition of the 
building, grounds, or premises must be given. Natural causes, 
acts of God, thinipersons, and pure accidents are not fore-
seeable.111 
Contributory negligence is a defense many times used 
by the school as a defendant in a liability suit. In general, 
the courts are critical of this defense particularly when the 
plaintiff is a minor. The courts seem to feel that a school 
age child bas not the maturity to be fully aware of his actions 
and their consequences. 
A boy with a weak leg slipped and broke his leg on a 
ramp connecting two parts of the scboo1.112 The boy and the 
authorities knew of the condition of the ramp. The court of 
appeals reversed the superior court's non suit decision be-
cause of contributory negligence. The court of appeals held 
that inadvertent acts such as momentary forgetfulness did not 
constitute contributory negligence. The jury must decide if 
forgetfulness or abstraction was the proximate cause of the 
ace idcnt. J:'orgetf ulness must show a lack vf care on the part 
of the plaintiff. A sixteen year old is bc1und only to tl1at 
duty of care which a normal child of this age would sustaiu in 
similar circu.nstances. Contributory negligence is dependent 
upon the age and capacity of the actor. In a like ruling when 
a seventeen year old boy ran into the siJe o! a car as he was 
going from class to class, tbe court ruled that a certain 
arr1ount of cart: was aecessary on the part of the plaintiff, but 
not the same degree as an aJult. 113 In comparison, wrien an 
e lcven year old boy ran :i.nt o a flagpole, the court ruled that 
t:;c boy knew of the pole and had contributed to the accident. 114 
o~:c of the early cases in California was a case where a boy lost 
ti.:.ree fingers in a saw. 115 The plaintiff charged negligence and 
the district counter-charg~d contributory negligence. The 
court ruled that the district was negligent and should have 
taken every precaution agai11st known dangers. 
Another defense occasionally used is the assumption of 
risk. doctrine. A personal injury suit was brought against 
the school district when the plaintiff was struck in the eye 
by a tennis bali. 116 The class was composed of members of the 
varsity tennis team. One day the coach needed the time to 
prepare for a tournament and told the class that there woula 
be no supervised activity that day. Som.e of the boys started 
playing handball, and others were hitting tennis balls back 
and :forth. When the bell rang, the plaintiff jumped into the 
flight of the ball. The court of appeals upheld the superior 
court's judgment of non suit. The court ruled that neither 
bandball nor tennis were inherently dangerous, and that the 
plaintiff was aware of the risk and was willing to assume it. 
Jn the Zieeler case the court ruled that the plaintiff had 
some knowledge of the danger of sitting on an iron railing from 
which he fell to his death.117 The giving of such instruction 
about assumption of risk was held not to be in error and that 
the jury needed this information for its deliberation. 
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CHAPl'ER VII 
MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN MINNESOTA, OREGON, AND WASHINGTON 
In these three states there was an early movement toward 
tbe modification of immunity of the school district. However, 
for one reason or another a retrograde movement has taken i:lace, 
and these states now strictly control, if not completely elim-
inate the liability of the school district for tort liability. 
Ergo, the amount of primary source material was limi te~. 
A. MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN MINNESOTA 
Minnesota was one of the first states to pass an express 
statute allowing an action to be brought against a school distric 
for injuries to the rights of a plaintiff. Despite this, Minn-
esota has, by judicial interpretations, moved completely away 
from this position, and today the school districts in Minne-
sota enjoy governmental immunity. 
Historical development. As far back as 1851 Minnesota 
had a statute which allowed an action to be brought against 
the school district for an injury to the rights of the plain-
tiff. By interpretation the courts have, in fact, annulled 
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tbiS statute. One of the first and leading cases in the state 
_.8 heard in 1892. In this case the interpretation was such 
that the doctrine of immunity was not altered. In 1935 legis-
iation was enacted which authorized the purchase of liability 
insurance to cover negligence of employees in operating a motor 
vehicle and which permitted the payment of such insurance from 
public funds. In a case heard in 1952 the court upheld the 
immunity doctrine although the statute permitted the purchase 
of liability insurance in a limited area by the school district. 
Minnesota statutes. The original statute passed in 1851 
reads as follows: 
An action may be brought against them (any school 
district) in their official capacity, either upon a 
contract made by such off icera in their official 
capacity,and within the scope of their authority, or 
from an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, arising 
from some act or omission of such officers of the 
district .1 
The statute as it stands at the present is essentially the 
same in wording and intent. It is as follows: 
An action may be brought against any school district 
either upon a contract made with the district or its 
board, in its official capacity and within the scope 
of its authority, or for any inju~7 to the rights of 
the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such 
board, whether the members of the board making the 
contract, or guilty of the act 2or omission complained of, be still in office or not. 
Section 471.42, enacted in 1935, authorized the school 
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district to carry insurance against the liability of its 
employees for bodily injuries, death, or property damage by 
reason of negligent operation of a motor vehicle.3 A following 
section gave the governing bodies permission to pay the above 
premium, but expressly stated that this did not impose a 
liability upon the municipality.4 
The opinions of the attorney general of Minnesota 
succinctly and precisely summarized the attitude toward modi-
fication. The school district was not liable for the torts 
of officers, agents or employees done in a governmental capa-
city. 5 The school district was not liable for injuries to a 
pupil injured as a result of the negligent operation of a 
school bus. 6 The school district was not responsible for 
damages for personal injuries or property damage by reason of 
negligence in the operation of a snowplow on a school bus 
route. 7 
The 1963 legislature enacted Chapter 798 which, with 
limitations, essentially abrogated immunity for municipalities. 
However, the act specifically excluded school districts, until 
January 1, 1968. However, the only new action taken by the 
1965 legislature was to extend the immunity limitation for 
school districts and certain types of towns, until January 1, 
1970. It has been extended by each legislature since. 
Case law. In the precedent case of Bank v. Brainard 
School District heard in 1892, the attitude toward govern-
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roental immunity was established, and it has remained essentially 
the same today. 8 The complaint alleged that the defendant 
negligently left two tree stumps, three inches high and two 
inches apart, sticking up in the playground. The minor plain-
tiff tripped over these stumps, breaking a leg which later 
was amputated. The suit asked $20,000.00 in damages. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal 
of the suit. Ruling upon this case the court said that the 
statutes applied to contracts and did not allow liability for 
negligence. The rights of the plaintiff referred to in the 
statute were property rights. Although schools may sue and 
be sued, this does not change immunity. The schools are quasi 
municipal corporations, organized for educational purposes. 
In another case where a ten year old boy was run over by 
a school bus on the school grounds, the school was held not 
liable for the negligent operation of the school bus.9 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's sus-
taining of the defendant's demurrer. The court said that the 
school was a quasi governmental agency, performing a public 
function and was not liable. The court rejected the plaintiff 'a 
contention stating that it must follow stare decisis. The 
court noted that the legislature has acquiesced in the face 
of the Bank v. Brainerd ruling for thirty-five years • 
............... 
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A personal injury suit was brought by a plaintiff who 
bad lost the sight of one eye and severely damaged the other. 10 
He alleged that the defendant's officers and agents had neg-
ligently used unslaked lime to line a football field. Again 
the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court which 
bad sustained a demurrer to dismiss. The court repeated that 
school districts are governmental agencies performing a public 
function. The statute did not authorize suit for personal 
injuries due to negligence. Regardless of whether the term 
is nuisance or negligence, it is not actionable. There is no 
difference between mandatory and permissive governmental 
functions. Nor did the fact that a small charge was made impose 
liability. 
A more recent case was heard in 1952. The plaintiff 
was injured in a collision with a school bus. 11 The plaintiff 
contended that the school district carried liability insurance 
and that this was a waiver of immunity. The federal court 
held that the operation of a school bus was a governmental 
function and that municipal corporations were immune. Although 
the statute allowed the purchase of insurance, the fact that 
the school district was the insured did not allow suit against 
the school district. 
B. MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN OREGON 
Oregon was also one of the first states to pass a statute 
r 
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allowing an action against the school district :for injuries 
to the rights of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding, the courts 
of oregon have interpreted this statute so as to permit the 
doctrine of immunity to continue. 
Historical development. As far back as the year 1862, 
oregon has had a statute which imposed liability for negligence 
upon governmental agencies. It was not until 1914 that this law 
was tested in the courts. In this ruling and subsequent rulings, 
the courts have nullified this statute. In 1929 the court made 
one exception and allowed a judgment against a school district. 
However, within two months the court had reversed its thinking 
and was again applying the doctrine of immunity. In 1961 a 
minor deviation was noted. The liability of the district was 
allowed to the extent of the liability insurance carried by 
the district. 
Oregon statutes. Only four relevant statutes were noted 
in this section. Section 30.320 reads: 
An action or suit may be maintained against any of 
the public corporations in this state mentioned in 
section 30.310 in its corporate character, and within 
the scope of its authority, or for an injury to the 
rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or comm-
ission of such public corporation •••• ul2 
The other public corporations mentioned are "incorporated cities, 
school districts, or other public corporations of like charac-
ter •• ul3 Section ~32.180 authorized the purchase of • • 
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11a.bili ty insurance to cover the negligence of the district 
or its officers and agents.14 This legislation was permissive 
tn nature. If the district did not elect to purchase insurance, 
this was not to be construed as negligence on the part of the 
school district. 
In 1967, the oregon legislature passed a "Tort Actions 
Against Public Bodies" abrogation of immunity law, effective 
July 1, 1968. 15 This act also set up claim procedures and 
established limits of $25,000.00 for property damage, $50,000.00 
per individual for bodily injury, and $300,000.00 maximum per 
occurrence. The law also provided for the proration of the 
awards if the total claims exceed $300,000.00. 
Case law. The oregon courts have interpreted these 
statutory provisions'as the restatement of the common law 
rule that a school district is liable for negligence only when 
performing a private function. And then the courts ruled that 
the school only performs public functions. 
The first case construing section 30.320 was heard in 
1914. 16 In this case the court stated that the board of edu-
cation cannot commit a tort, and if they do they are acting 
ultra vires. The Wiest case was the precedent case and has 
been followed consistently with one exception. 
In the case of Lupke v. School District the plaintiff 
brought a personal injury suit against the district.17 The 
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plaintiff had been employed to paint a flagpole and fell when 
the pole collapsed. The court ruled that the act of painting 
was a ministerial function, and the school district was held 
liable. A short time later the same court held that there was 
no sound basis for such a distinction and overruled the Lupke 
decision. 
The district was charged with negligence when a pneumatic 
water tank recently installed exploded and killed a nineteen 
year old boy. 18 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court's dismissal of the complaint. The court ruled that the 
district was nelgigent in not installing a safety device on 
the tan~, but the tank which was used for school purposes was 
aiding a governmental function. The court appeared to favor 
the maintenance of a suit as prescribed by statute but were 
committed to stare decisis. The school acts wholly as a 
governmental agency performing those duties imposed by statute. 
The school was held to be a quasi corporation performing nothing 
but governmental functions; hence, immunity still prevailed. 
A similar ruling was handed down by the Oregon Supreme 
Court in 1943. A boy fell on a wooden sidewalk and ran a nail 
into his knee injuring it permanently. 19 The appeal was filed 
from circuit court which had dismissed the complaint. The 
suit alleged negligence on the part of the district for its 
failure to maintain the sidewalk in a safe condition. The 
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demurrer admitted the truth of the allegation but pleaded 
irnmunity. The court stated that a "school never performs 
anything except governmental functions since a school district 
can act pursuant only to statutory authority, express or implied, 
through its board of directors, and in so doing it is exer-
cising a governmental function only."20 An interesting comment 
was made: 
It may be that the common law of immunity is harsh 
and unjust in requiring the individual alone to suffer 
the wrong in the instant case, and that society in 
keeping with the modern trend, should afford relie~1 but that is a legislative and not a judicial question. 
The legislature, if it so desires, has the power to make the 
suggested change. 
A 1961 case perhaps points the way toward a relaxation 
of the immunity doctrine as it has been interpreted in the 
past. 22 A high school football player was hurt and this in-
jury resulted in paraplegia. The suit was brought when the 
plaintiff reached maturity. The school had a liability in-
surance policy in effect at the time. The plaintiff alleged 
that his injuries were due to the fact that as a 140 pound 
freshman he was matched against bigger and superior players. 
The lower court had dismissed the claim which was then appealed 
to the supreme court. The defendants in the suit were the 
district, the superintendent, principal, and individual board 
members were dropped. The court ruled that the coach had 
failed to exercise reasonable care, and the district may be 
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liable for the acts of its servants. The court held that the 
statute permitting the purchase of insurance was an expression 
of a legislative policy not to abandon the immunity doctrine 
but to permit some relief at least to the extent of the insurance 
coverage. The court re-emphasized that the school district is 
still immune from suit and disagreed with the Molitor case 
heard in Illinois. 
C. MODIFICATION AS FOUND IN WASHINGTON 
Washington passed its first abrogation statute in 1869. 
This statute read much the same as the statutes of Minnesota 
and Oregon. Unlike the other two states the courts of Wash-
ington did not interfere, but the legislature severely restricte 
the application of liability in a subsequent enactment. 
Historical development. The state of Washington was 
the second state in the United States to pass express legis-
lation allowing liability suits for negligence to be brought 
against a school district. The statute allowing recovery was 
not tested until 1907 in the Redfield case. 23 In this case 
the court ruled that the school was liable for negligence 
under the statute. Following this precedent and the history 
of litigation as found in other states, many cases were filed 
against school districts. The schools became concerned at the 
number of suits and the size of the damages being awarded. In 
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1917 an act was introduced into the state assembly which would 
have exonerated the school district from all liability, but 
this bill did not pass. A compromise form passed which limited 
liability to actions other than those arising from "any park, 
playground, or field house, athletic apparatus or appliance, 
or manual training equipment."24 Since that time the court have 
interpreted the law in Washington as meaning that a liability 
suit for other than the mentioned exceptions may be maintained 
against a school district. 
Washington statutes. The original statute passed in 
1869 read as follows: 
An action may be maintained against a county, or 
other of the public corporations mentioned or described 
in the preceding section (includes school districts) 
either upon a contract ma.de by such county or other 
public corporation in its corporate character, and with-
in the scope of its authority, for an injury to the 
rights of the plaintiff arising from some a~~ or omission 
of such county or other public corporation. 
The restrictive statute passed in 1917 is given below: 
No action shall be brought or maintained against 
any school district or its officers for any noncon-
tractual acts or omissions of such district, its agents, 
officers, or employees, relating to any park, playground, 
or field house, athletic apparatus or appliance, or 
manual training equipment, whether situated in or about 
any schoolhouse or elsewhere o~~d, operated or main-
tained by such school district. 
There followed nearly a half century of litigation 
about the definition of "athletic apparatus or appliance" and 
the other "immune facilities" mentioned in the act. In 1961 
the state legislature enacted Chapter 136,l which reads as 
follows: 
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The State of Washington, whether acting in its 
governmental or proprietary capacity, hereby consents 
to the maintaining of a suit or action against it for 
damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the sa~' 
extent as if it were a private person or corporation. 
This did not answer the question and more cases followed. The 
legislature, meeting in 1967, then amended its civil pro-
cedure laws to include a section on actions against political 
subdivisions, municipal corporations and quasi-municipal corp-
orations. 28 Thus ended the saga of the "athletic apparatus 
and appliance." 
Case law. The modification of immunity in Washington 
--
presented an interesting phenomenon. The pattern of liability 
has swung from a liberal approach to an attempted complete 
restriction and finally ~as settled near the center of the 
continuum. 
The Redfield case was the first case to hold the district 
liable for negligence. 29 The plaintiff was badly burned when 
a bucket of scalding hot water fell on her. The three gallon 
bucket was kept on top of a heating register. The count 
alleged that the defendant and its agents, servants, teachers, 
and employees had carelessly and negligently left this bucket 
in a dangerous manner. The question was whether the district 
was liable for the negligent acts or omissions of its employees 
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in the performance of their duties. The Washington Supreme 
court reversed the superior court which had sustained a demurrer 
to the complaint. The court ruled that an action could be 
maintained and that the statute was designed to remove immunity 
and make the district responsible for an omission of duty. 
In 1915 the court held that the intent of the legis-
lature was to abolish immunity.30 A six year old girl fell 
from a horizontal exercise ladder suspended seven feet above 
a concrete floor. The plaintiff broke her arm and received 
damages of $500.00 in a lower court decision. There were no 
mats under the ladder, and the children had been warned not to 
play on the ladder. The court held that the statute abrogated 
common law immunity for negligence in the performance of govern-
mental duties. The question of leaving the ladder accessible 
to children and the question of contributory negligence were 
f 
properly submitted to the jury. 
The district was held liable and the law of 1917 was 
held not retroactive in the Hold case.31 The plaintiff, a 
nine year old girl, fell from a slide and fractured her skull. 
The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's 
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The injury occurred 
March 31, 1916 and judgment was rendered January 12, 1917. 
The act in question was passed in March of 1917. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court hearing the appeal in 1918 held the act not 
retroactive. 
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The language of the act of 1917 was defined in the 
stovall case.32 The plaintiff was injured while playing on a 
---iarge water tank which had been removed from the basement of 
the school and left on the playground. The Washington Supreme 
court affirmed the superior court's jury decision for the plain-
tiff. The court held that the terminology of the act of 1917 
was rather ambigucus. The court ruled that this act exonerated 
only athletic apparatus or appliances used in connection with 
any park, playground, or field house. Since this was not the 
case, the district was liable. 
An apparent inconsistency was seen in the Morris case.33 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the lower cour'!: 's de-
cision dismissing the personal injury suit. A football player 
had injured his back and spine. Three weeks later the coach 
let him play again and the boy was reinjured. As a result of 
the injury he developed a tubercular condition. The dicta 
discussed the liability of the school district as found in 
stare decisis but did not mention the law of 1917. The district 
was held liable for the negligence of the coach. Judge Holcomb, 
dissenting, said, "I am not willing to concur in the majority 
opinion, at least until the effect of R.C.W. sec. 28.58.030 
is determined, and it is not discussed therein.•~4 The dis-
senting judge was afraid of the far-reaching effects of this 
decision. 
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A football was held not to be an athletic apparatus or 
appliance in the Briscoe case.35 An eleven year old boy 
fractured his elbow while playing "keep away" using a football 
during recess. The plaintiff alleged neg;ligence on the part of 
the district for inadequate supervision. The district had 
knowledge of the roughness of the game. Rules of the school 
prohibited football, but the school had furnished a football. 
The lower court had directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. 
The Washington Supreme Court reversed this decision and ordered 
a new trial. The court ruled that the statute had reference 
to more or less permanently located equipment, not something as 
mobile as a football. When the act of 1917 was passed, there 
were a great number of cases pending which involved playgrounds. 
Accordingly, it was the intent of the legislature to restrict 
this liability. 
In a rape case the school district was held liable for 
negligence and lack of supervision.36 The plaintiff, a twelve 
I 
year old girl, sought to recover $25,000.00 in damages from the 
school. During the noon hour recess, several boys carried the 
plaintiff into a dark room near the gymnasium, and two of them 
forcibly raped her. There was a teacher appointed to supervise 
the noon hour recess, but he had absented himself. The court 
held that the school may be sued under R.C.W. sec. 4.08.120. 
The usual rules of negligence must be followed. It was 
apparent that a duty was owed to the child, but there was some 
r 171 question as to the foreseeability of the rape. The questions 
were whether the actual harm came from a general field of 
danger such as the dark room and the lack of supervision. The 
allegation presented a question for the jury which was so 
ordered in a split decision. Judge Olson, dissenting, could 
not subscribe to the fact that the school could have foreseen 
such an eventuality. 
The district was held liable for an accident which 
occurred after school and under the sponsorship of a community 
group.37 Judy Kidwell, a nine year old girl, was permanently 
injured when an upright piano fell on her. The girl was 
attending a Campfire Girls meeting under the supervision of 
an adult. The piano was a top-heavy instrument. Another child 
placed himself between the piano and wall and pushed the piano 
over on the plaintiff. The superior court had awarded damages 
of $23,372.45 to the plaintiff, and the school appealed the 
case. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the decision, 
stating that the school had a duty to use reasonable care, the 
event was foreseeable, and the child was an invitee to whom 
the school owed a duty. 
When a student was injured many miles from school follow-
ing a club initiation, the school was held not liable.38 The 
accident happened at 2:00 A.M. Sunday, and there was evidence 
that the driver had been drinking. The Washington Supreme 
Court affirmed the superior court's sustaining of the demurrer. 
The court stated that the district was not liable for torts 
arising ultra vires, and the complaint was demurrable if 
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"the degree of proximity between the breach of duty com.plained 
of and the events in the causal chain resulting in the injuries 
sustained is so remote that it can be said, as a matter of law, 
that the breach of duty was not a proximate cause of the in-
jury ... 39 There was no liability unless the act of negligence 
was the proximate cause, but the above act was so distant and 
remote that the assumed protective custody was with the parents 
and home. 
The district was held liable when a boy was killed in an 
initiation ceremony conducted on the school grounds during the 
school day. 40 The superior court had dismissed the complaint 
which alleged that the initiation ceremony of the high school 
lettermen society was under the auspices and supervision of the 
school district's agents, servants, and employees. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court reversed this decision and later denied 
a rehearing. The court said that the statute abrogating 
immunity made the district liable on the same basis as a 
corporation or individual with the exceptions as noted. A 
dissenting judge wanted to know what was within the scope and 
authority of the school. 
In a 1964 case the court abrogated immunity for muni-
cipalities. 41 However, in 1966, the courts held that the 
statute waiving its immunity from tort liability "was not 
I 
173 
repugnant to or inconsistent with the statutory immunity afforded 
tne schools by the 1917 statute. u42 
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CHAPTER VIII 
LIABILITY IN TUE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
Until 1959 school districts in the State of Illinois 
enjoyed immunity from tort liability. It was during this year 
that the leading Molitor case was heard by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Illinois. This decision reversed the status 
quo held in 1111.nois for over fifty years. In this chapter 
the historical development of liability in Illinois will be 
studied along with the relevant statutes and the case law. 
In a short period of time the concept of immunity in the State 
of Illinois has undergone a series of developmental changes. 
In short, it has traversed the continuum from immunity to non-
immunity. 
A. UISTOUICAL DEVELOPMENT 
As was stated in an earlier chapter the doctrine of 
"the king could do no wrong" was f irat applied to a subdivision 
of the state in Russell v. ~~Dover, 2 Term Rep. 671, 100 
Eng. Rep. 359 in the year 1788. In Illinois this doctrine was 
first applied to towns and counties in the case of Town of 
--
Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 in the year 1870. The leading 
case of Kinnare v. City ~Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 
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beard in 1898 applied the rule of immunity to school districts. 
The court reasoned that the school district, as a governmental 
agent of the state, was like the state in its immunity. 
Since that decision other cases have given various 
reasons for the continuation of the immunity doctrine. The 
charitable trust doctrine immunizing private schools was given 
expression in the case of Parks v. Northwestern University, 
218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991 tried in 1905. From this case 
charitable and non-profit educational institutions have enjoyed 
the same immunity as governmental agencies in the state. The 
doctrine of respondeat superior did not apply to charitable 
institutions even though they may be private corporations. 
In another case the similar protection of public funds was 
given as a reason for immunity.~ 
As the schools and other agencies began to purchase lia-
bility insurance in greater amounts, the argument for the pro-
tection of public funds began to lose its urgency. Also, the 
social conscience of the people began to realize some of the 
hardships exacted by the immunity ruling. In 1947 the purchase 
of liability insurance by a charitable religious institution 
removed immunity. 2 In this case the court inferred that the 
purchase of insurance constituted a waiver of immunity. 
In the leading case of Moore vs. Moyle, immunity was 
removed to the extent of the insurance carried.3 The suit 
alleged the negligences of a private institution, Bradley 
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tJniversity. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff 
fell from a trapeze on May 2, 1940 while preparing for a circus 
in a physical education class. Bradley University was fully 
insured. The Supreme Court overruled the lower courts which 
had dismissed the case. The court ruled that the trusts were 
not impaired or diminished by the judgment. The decision 
seemed to impose liability if insured. However, the decision 
did not really create 2 liability; tt only fixed the manner 
of collection. That is, once liability is held, the judg-
ment can only be collected from insurance proceeds. The law 
is not static; it must conform to changing conditions. The 
law needs humanitarian principles, for there is no justifi-
cation for absolute immunity if the trusts are protected. This 
decision has been criticized as being liberal because it per-
mits the wrongdoer to determine his own liability. 
The remova 1 of immunity to the extent of the insurance 
was first applied to the public schools in 1952 in the Thomas 
v. Broadlands case.4 The appellate court reversed the Circuit 
Court of Champaign County which had dismissed the complaint. 
The plaintiff had lost an eye while playing on the playground. 
The complaint alleged negligence on the part of the defendant's 
agents. After discoursing on the history of immunity, the 
court held that the only justifiable reason for immunity was 
to protect public funds. There was no justification if the 
funds were protected. If the funds were protected by insurance, 
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the rationale for immunity was removed. Although there was 
no statute allowing the purchase of insurance by a school 
district which would result in a waiver of immunity, this lack 
of express statutory authorization did not make any difference. 
John L. Franklin writing in the University of Illinois Law 
Forum said: 
In this case the law in Illinois was interpreted 
to remove all tort immunity from the school and to 
substitute one of collection only so that it was held 
to be unnecessary to aver that insurance existed, the 
resultant judgment being held to be collectible only 
from insurance proceeds.5 ~ 
Although this case was not tested by the Supreme Court, it 
was followed by a district court of the United States in the 
Tracy v. Davis case, 6 as required by Federal law. 
In 1953 the legislature had enacted a law permitting 
the purchchase of liability insurance to protect against any 
loss or liability upon the district and its employees resulting 
from neg.L1gent or wrongful acts on the part of the officials 
or employees of the district.7 The insurance companies were 
required to waive the defense of immunity. 
, 
The district court of the United States held that 
immunity existed because of the dissipation of public funds, 
but this was not a defense against a tort action if the payments 
were limited t.o other than public funds. 8 "An individual 
injured by the tortious act of quasi-municipal corporation or 
a charitable institution should not individually suffer his 
r 
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ioss where there is a source of funds other than public funds, 
or trust funds, from which the judgment may be paid. u9 The 
court cited rulings in Tennessee with approval. The school 
district's motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity was 
denied. 
In the State of Illinois, school districts are subject 
to liability under Workmen's Compensation Acts. The Court of 
claims Act passed in 1945 made the state liable for torts up 
to $7,500.00. Cities and villages ~ay be liable for the neg-
ligent operation of fire vehicles. Municipal corporations 
have been liable for proprietary functions. Illinois school 
districts may purchase liability insurance for their school 
buses with a rider waiving the immunity defense. If a school 
had such a policy, the injured person may collect; however, if 
the school was uuinsured the party could not collect. In the 
above examples it can be seen that there was some dissatis-
faction with the immunity doctrine, both on the part of the 
legislature and the courts. 
On May 22, 1959 the Supreme Court rendered a decision 
which opened another chapter in the field of tort liability. 
In the Molitor decision the court held that school districts 
were liable for the torts caused by the negligence of their 
agents and employees.lo 
The General Assembly reacted quickly to this new and 
somewhat alarming decision of the court. Two months later on 
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July 22, 1959 an act was approved which pertained to this 
subject. 11 This statute was essentially one of limitations. 
oeadlines were established, notice of claims procedurew was 
set, and a limit of $10,000.00 recovery was instituted. In a 
series of decisions, 12 the Illinois Supreme Court completely 
emasculated this statute, declaring its main provisions special 
legislation and so unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it has not 
yet been repealed. Because of the confusion in this area, 
the legislature in 1965 passed a comprehensive13 law designed 
to deal with this subject. This law, called the Local Govern-
mental and Governmental Employees Tort Immun:t.ty Act, affects 
the application of sec. 821. 
B. RELEVANT STATUTES 
The most pertinent statute in Illinois was the act 
passed in 1959 relating to the tort liability of school districts 
Section 821 provided that "public schools in the exercise of 
purely governmental functions'' should be protected from 
extreme loss of their funds. The loss should be distributed 
among the public at large rather than upon one individual. 
This act also applied to nonprofit private schools. The 
reference to purely governmental functions was not too clear, 
as this distinction was uncommon in Illinois. Section 822 
dealt with limitations of actions. It stated that an action 
must be "commenced within one year from the date that the injury 
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lf&.S received or the cause of action accrued." In Illinois the 
general statute of limitations sets two years as the period to 
file for a personal injury suit. The general statute did not 
apply against a minor until he reached majority. Apparently, 
this act applies to all persons regardless of age. A different 
view will be given later by another authority. Section 823 
discussed the notice of injury. A written statement must be 
filed within six months of the injury. The notice must be 
filed with the school board attorney or the secretary of tlie 
board and shall state the particulars of the action. Section 
824 stated that the failure to file as given above shall be 
cause for dismissal. The amount of damages for each cause of 
action shall not exceed $10,000.00 as set forth in section 825. 
This act only mentioned injuries; nothing was said about death. 
The Wrongful Death Act has a maximum recovery of $30,000.00. 
The procedure for filing under the Wrongful Death Act did not 
require a notice. Perhaps the answer was in the phrase "except 
as is otherwise provided by L:tw .. " 
The public policy provision found in section 821 covered 
losses arising from negligence but apparently ruled out inten-
tional torts. The legislature also gave the court freedom to 
restrict this area. In section 830 the act provided that 
nothing "shall be deemed to authorize the bringing of any 
action against any school district or non-profit school, nor 
the entry of a judgment in any such act ion." 
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It was interesting to note that the legislature had 
granted immunity to other quaso municipal corporations such as 
counties, forest preserves, park districts, and the Chicago 
park District recently. One may wonder why the legislature 
acted in such divergent ways. Schools were different fro~ the 
others in that they were compulsory and that minors were the 
chief participants. 
Friedman discussed this act as follows: 
It has no application in situations wherein a 
death may occur. In a death action, under the law of 
the State of Illinois at the present time, the wrongful 
death act limites the amount of recovery to $30,000.00. 
It should be further pointed out that the notice require-
ments and the requirement that suit be filed within one 
year period cannot be effective against a minor. Cer-
tainly a person under a legal disability may commence 
his suit without meeting the requirement of bringing the 
action within one year. The person under legal disa-
bility may wait until he reaches his majority and at 
that time meet the requirements of l~e Statute for 
notice and time to file his action. 
Prior to this time the legislature had enacted a law in 
1953 which permitted the purchase of liability insurance. 15 This 
insurance was to protect against any loss or liability on the 
school district and its employees resulting from any wrongful 
or negligent acts on the part of the district's officials or 
employees. Since 1963, school districts with a population of 
500,000 or more {i.e., the Chicago Board of Education) have 
been required to purchase liability insurance, but have no 
indemnity obligation, nor do they have to include in the policy 
a "waiver of immunity" clause. All other boards of education 
are required to indemnify their employees, but are not re-
quired to purchase insurance in order to do so. 16 
But, sec. 9-103 of the Tort Immunity Act of 1965 pro-
vides that "every policy for insurance coverage issued to a 
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1ocal public entity Rhall contain a waiver of the defenses and 
immunities provided in the act." Since this section was enacted 
after the insurance provisions of the school code, and since 
school districts do not have any "defenses and immunities" other 
than those contained in the Tort Immunity Act, this section has 
re-instated the waiver of immunity requirement omitted in the 
school insurance statutes. 
Since the abolition of liability announced in Molitor 
applied to all units of local government, the Local Government 
and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act of 1965 contains 
comprehensive rules governing liability, limitations on lia-
bility, and procedure applicable to tort actions against all 
units of local government. However, this study is only interest-
ed in how this act relates to school districts. An analysis 
of this act in relation to court interpretations of cases 
dealing with schools would be useful. But one must be careful 
here since only about a dozen reported cases exist interpreting 
this act, and many of these have nothing to do with school 
districts. 
The salient points of this act, as it relates to this 
study are the following: 
' 1. 
2. 
3. 
Article VIII creates a one-year statute of li~itations 
and a six-month notice provision. But while the failure 
to serve notice within six months of th! injury is a 
complete bar to the action, sec. 8-103! 7 this notice 
provision is not applicable to minors. 8 
Articles III through VI create new immunities or codify 
pre-existing common-law immunities in certain specific 
situations, such as, except as otherwise provided by the 
act, neither a local public entity nor its employee is 
liable for failure to supervise an activity on, or the 
use of, any public property. i school class is an 
activity on "public property". 9 
Article II, sec. 2-301, speci:fically provides that it 
does not affect the duty of ••• school boards to insure 
and indeDlllify their employees. The waiver of immunity 
requirement was omitted in the insurance statutes of the 
School Code, but sec. 2-301 and sec. 9-103 of the Tort 
Immunity Act have re-instated it. This means that all 
insurance purchased by public entities must contain a 
waiver of immunity clause; and that virtually all of 
the statutory immunities are waived. 
C. CASE LAW 
As was noted in the beginning of the chapter the Kinnare 
case set the precedent of immunity of the school district in 
the State of Illinois. Within a short time other cases ampli-
f ied this ruling and the doctrine of immunity was firmly 
established. It was in 1947 that the first crack in the wall 
appeared. In Wendt v. Servite Fathers, a charitable religious 
institution, the purchase of insurance was held to constitute 
a waiver of immunity. 20 In the case of Moore v. Moyle insurance 
by a private non-profit educational institution was held to 
be a waiver of immunity. 21 The facts of this case were given 
earlier in this chapter. In essence this ruling held that, if 
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tbe trust funds were protected by insurance, there was no 
reason for the immunity of Bradley University. The difficulty 
•ith this decision was that it allowed the wrongdoer to deter-
mine his own liability. 
In the year 1952 the effect of carrying liability in-
22 
8 urance was tested in the Thomas v. Broadlands case. This 
was the first case that directly tested the effect of liability 
insurance upon the immunity of the public school quasi muni-
cipal corporation. Again, the facts of this case were presented 
at the initial part of this chapter. The court stated some of 
the reasons for immunity as nolens volens, governmental functions, 
and the protection of funds. McQuillen was quoted, "The reason, 
as often expressed, is one of public policy, to protect public 
funds and public property."23 The court held in this case 
that, if the public funds were protected by insurance, the justi-
fication for immunity was removed. This ruling was interpreted 
to mean that indemnification could only come from insurance 
proceeds. As in the case of Moore v. Moyle, this ruling allowed 
the school to determine its own liability. This case was heard 
at the appellate level and was not carried to the Supreme Court 
of Illinois. 
In a United States district court a similar ruling was 
made. 24 In this case the plaintiff was injured in a school bus 
accident. The court stated that the reason for immunity was 
the protection of public funds. An individual need not stand 
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tbe loss if there was another source which would not dissipate 
the public funds. The defendant's motion for dismissal on the 
grotmds of immunity was denied. 
On May 22 , 1959 the Supreme Court of Illinois handed 
down the decision in the Molitor v. Kaneland case. 25 In this 
historic and precedent case the highest court in the state 
established that the district could be held liable in tort for 
negligence. Eighteen school age children were injured March 10, 
1958 when a school bus operated by an agent of the defendant 
hit a culvert and burned in Sugar Grove Township, Kane County. 
Because of the fact that the decision did not say anything about 
the retroactivity of this ruling, much apprehension was created 
among school people. In a rehearing held in December, 1959, 
the court ruled that this decision, with the exception of Thomas 
Molitor, applied only to future occurrences. In a later 
decision the court held that all the students included in this 
particular bus accident may have the immunity of the school 
district abolished. 26 In the original complaint the district 
was charged with negligence through its agent and servant, the 
bus driver. As a result of the accident, the plaintiff, Thomas 
Molitor, received permanent injuries and sought damages of 
$56,000.00. The record showed that the defendant carried lia-
bility insurance with limits of $20,000.00 for each person and 
$100,000.00 for each accident. However, in the complaint this 
was purposely omitted. 'lbe court considered many of the tradi-
r 
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tional and historical reasons for immunity. The court con-
eluded: 
We are of the opinion that none of the reasons ad-
vanced in support of school district immunity have any 
true validity today. Further, we believe that abolition 
of such immunity may tend to decrease the frequency of 
school bus accidents by coupling the power of trans-
porting pupils with the responsibility of exercising 
care in the selection and supervision of the drivers. 
We conclude that the rule of school district tort 
immunity is unjust, unsupported by any valid reason, 
and has no rightful place in modern day society. 
For the reasons herein expressed, we accordingly 
hold that school districts are liable in tort for the 
negligence of their agents and employees and a1~7prior decisions to the contrary are hereby overruled. 
Several cases have been heard in courts of record con-
cerning the effective date of the Molitor opinion. In the case 
of Terry v. Mount Zion School District ~· 3 the plaintiff was 
injured while doing gymnastic stunts on March 3, 1959. 28 The 
final opinion of the Supreme Court was given December 16, 1959 
which stated that the ruling applied only to cases arising out 
of future occurrences. Two other cases dealt with injuries 
which happened before December 16, 1959. 30 In both cases the 
court stressed the application of the Molitor ruling as of 
December 16, 1959. 
In the case of Price v. York the court held that no new 
31 
rules of negligence had been created by the Molitor ruling. 
The school district operated a school bus which picked up the 
decedent, an eight year old child. 'Ibe route was such that the 
' 
190 
child had to cross a state highway in order to board the bus. 
If the bus had been routed on a rural road which ran in front 
of the decedent's house, it would have obviated the need to 
cross the highway. The plaintiff charged the district with 
negligence in not using the rural road thereby giving rise to 
the proximate cause. The case was appealed to the appellate 
court from the Circuit Court, Coles County. The court stated 
that in order to claim negligence there must be a duty, a 
failure to perform the duty, and injury resulting therefrom. 
The court held that the district did not owe a duty to the 
child to protect her while walking from her home to the point 
of pick up. Nor was there a duty imposed upon the district to 
reroute the bus so that no child would need to cross the high-
way. It is apparent from this decision that negligence still 
must be proven before a liability attaches to the school district. 
In the Cook County Court, the Chicago Board of Education 
was held not guilty in the first court test of the act making 
32 the board liable up to $10,000.00. The plaintiff sought 
damages of $2,000.00 for a stab wound which occurred while he 
was attending Bowen High School. 
In two cases the distinction between governmental and 
proprietary functions was attempted. In the Garrison case 
an action was brought against the school board and others when 
33 
a "prop" cannon exploded during a theatrical performance. 
Damages were asked in the total of $465,ooo.oo. The appellate 
' 
court affirmed the Circuit Court, Cook County, decision to 
dismiss the complaint against the school district. Leave to 
appeal was denied May 24, 1962. The court ruled that since 
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the accident happened November 22, 1958, prior to the Molitor 
ruling, immunity held. There was no real distinction between 
governmental and proprietary functions even if a small fee was 
charged. The act of 1959 did not create a liability; it limited 
the amount of damages. In another case action was brought 
against the Chicago Board of Education for injuries sustained 
by an adult patron at a football game. 34 The plaintiff was 
injured as a result of the fall at a football stadium. The 
motion to strike and dismiss was sustained by the Circuit Court, 
Cook County. In affirming, the appellate court held that "the 
difference between governmental and proprietary functions is 
not applicable to school districts •••• "35 A petition for leave 
to appeal was denied by the Supreme Court in September, 1962. 36 
In many respects Illinois presented a rather classic 
picture of the modification of the tort immunity of the quasi 
municipal co~poration, the school. From the traditional 
immunity the school district had moved gradually through a 
series of developmental stages to the point where the district 
can be held liable. 
At the time of writing the school district in the state 
of Illinois is liable for actions based upon tort. The Molitor 
decision, which reversed over sixty years of immunity, removed 
lJ 2 
the judicial barrier to liability. Legislation was passed 
shortly thereafter whicli limited liability if the courts found 
the school district negligent. Dut subsequent litigation 
1;ioJif ied this leg is lat ion. First, the six ~on th provision was 
invalidatect. 37 Then, the $10,000.00 limitation on damages 
recoverable from school districts was held unconstitutioua1,3S 
and the $10,000.00 limit applicable to non-profit private 
schools was ruled unconstitutional also.39 
While school districts are not liable for injuries 
arising out of the operation of a school safety patroi, 40 the 
question of supervision was dealt with when a suit was brought 
on behalf of aq eight year old girl who was severely injured when 
she was kicked in the head uy 2. fellow pupil during class.41 
It was alleged that the teacher had permitted the room to be-
come unreasonably disorderly, and had failed to supervise her 
class properly. The court held that the suit was properly 
dismissed, since sec. 3-108 (a) made the public entity immune 
from liability for failure to supervise an activity on any 
"public property." The court said that a school class is an 
"activity u on "public property" and so cove.red by the Tort 
Immunity Act of 1965. 
Two other statutes were also used by this court. First, 
the School Code, sec. 24-24, imposes a duty on the teacher to 
maintain order in a classroom, and places tbe teacher in loco 
parent is. This prevents liability in the absence of willful 
r 
:.1isconduct, since this is the li:nit of parental lia.bil:tty. 
A 1so, this is true under sec. 2-202 of the Tort Immunity Act. 
so it would seem that in this case, the court used the very 
statute which imposes on the teacher the duty to maintain order, 
as a shield to protect the school from liability. 
The same court used similar reasoning in a case where 
plaintiff sought to recover for injuries received in a basket-
ball game where he was struck by one of the opposing players.42 
It would seem that one of the most important problems which will 
have to be faced by the Illinois reviewing courts is the re-
lationship between the special statutory immu~ities and lia-
bilities and the Tort Immunity Act itself. 
While the tlleory of sovereign immunity in the State of 
Illinois has been shattered, and school districts may be held 
liable, the law is still in its infancy. The liability-creating 
Molitor decision is barely fourteen years old, and the Tort 
Immunity Act is only seven years old. Less than a dozen re-
ported cases exist interpreting this act. Many more will be 
necessary before its boundaries are charted. 
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CHAPTER IX 
SUUMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMKARY 
The concept of the sovereign immunity of governmental 
agencies was first promulgated in the year 1788 in the case of 
Russell v. Men of Devon. Shortly thereafter, this doctrine was 
-----
incorporated into American jurisprudence. school districts are 
involuntary agencies created and controlled by the state. As 
such they have traditionally shared the immunity concept. For 
such reasons as "the king could do no wrong," loss of public 
funds, stare decisis, ultra vires, nolens volens, and public 
relations, school districts in the United States have been 
immune from tort liability for negligence. Since the latter 
half of the last century, a number of states have embarked 
upon a movement away from the traditional immunity. 
Although school districts are considered agencies of the 
state, it was necessary to define this relationship very care-
fully. Generally speaking, the courts have classified school 
districts as quasi corporations or quasi municipal corporations. 
A municipal corporation proper is a city or town incorporated 
primarily for purposes of local government, therefore they must 
be grant~J considerable powers of a legislative and regulatory 
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nature. A quasi corporation, on the other hand, is purely a 
political or civil division of the state; it is created as an 
instrumentality of the state in order to facilitate the ad-
ministration of government. As involuntary agencies, school 
districts are not full corporations in the eyes of the law, 
but have a limited being. 
The legal meaning of the word tort was difficult to 
state. In its simplest form it is a civil wrong perpetrated 
upon another, exclusive of contract. It is not a crime but an 
action for which the courts may allow the injured party to 
seek recovery. 
Although there were other grounds for liability in tort, 
this investigation was concerned with the area of negligence 
resulting in a liability. Negligence was defined as conduct 
which did not measure up to the "reasonable man" criteria 
established by law for the protection of others. There are 
four components prerequisite to an action based upon negligence. 
These essentials are: (1) a legal duty to conform to a 
certain standard, (2) a failure to conform to this standard, 
(3) a close causal connection between the conduct and the re-
sulting injury, and (4) an actual loss or damage. The question 
of what was improper conduct was related to what a prudent 
person would do under similar circumstances. What a prudent 
person could foresee and do or not do was a question of fact 
for the jury. 
, _________________ ___, 
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It was a prime purpose of this dissertation to analyze 
the means and the rationale of the movement toward relaxation 
of the immunity principle. The source of this movement comes 
from either judicial or legislative authority. The greatest 
abrogations of immunity have been in the fields of school 
transportation and workmen's compensation. These two areas 
have received much attention from the judicial and legis-
lative authorities. Workmen's compensation as a separate field 
was not a part of this study. Personal injuries to pupils 
provided the major source of litigation in cases charging the 
school district with negligence. 
California, Illinois, and New York were the leading 
states in the modification of school district immunity for 
tort liability based upon a charge of negligence. Other means 
of recovery, usually quite limited and specialized, may be 
found in other states and in other jurisdictions. The leading 
states were analyzed and reported separately with the specific 
means of recovery treated individually. 
The state of New York, while not the first state to 
move toward abrogation, was a leader in the field of modi-
fication. Liability has been imposed upon the school district 
in New York by judicial authority. Certain statutes such as 
"save harmless" acts, a court of claims act, and a comprehensive 
education section have contributed toward the abrogation. It 
was in 1907 that the first case was heard in New York which 
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held the school district liable for negligence. In 1910 a 
comprehensive act was passed which furthered the movement. In 
the Herman case, tried in 1922, the court said that the school 
was liable for negligence of the board of education. These 
rulings held that the school district was liable for .!.!!. torts, 
but not for those of its employees and agents. The statutes 
provided a section which outlined the procedure for filing a 
claim based upon tort. A ninety~y deadline was established 
in order to limit the number of suits. 
The New York courts have clearly indicated that all of 
the essential elements of a negligence claim mu~t be present. 
The school was not the insurer of the welfare of a child and was 
bound to use only ordinary car. There existed a duty to main-
tain buildings, grounds and equipment in a reasonably safe 
condition, and the failure to do so was negligence. New York 
statutes imposed a duty upon the district to supervise its 
students. The failure to do so had been held actionable 
negligence. The adequacy of the supervision was a relative 
question and was usually a point of fact to be determined by 
a jury. 
Procedural matters have caused much litigation in the 
state of New York. The deadline of filing a claim within 
ninety days after the incident has been extended frequently by 
the courts, if the rights of the defendant were not prejudiced. 
The purpose of the procedural statute was to prevent stale and 
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fraudulent claims. 
Under permissive statute, school districts in New York 
may carry liability insurance or act as self-insurers. The 
manner of insurance has had little effect upon the tort lia-
bility of the school district in New York. 
California, a comparative late comer to the field of 
modification, was the first state to pass express statutes for 
the purpose of abrogation. California has maintained such a 
position up to the present. California and New York vied for 
the number of suits brought against the school district. 
The first California statute,passed in 1923, made the 
district liable for the dangerous condition of buildings, 
grounds, and property. Also in 1923, an act was passed which 
1nade the district liable for injuries to pupils caused by the 
negligence of officers or employees of the school. In the motor 
vehicle section, the school district was made liable for the 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Under such acts the 
liability of a school district in California was very similar to 
that of a private corporation. The deadline for filing a claim, 
based upon a tort, in California was set in 1959 as one hundred 
days. Prior to that time it had been ninety days. Certain 
exceptions have been made by the court if the claimant was a 
minor or incapacitated in some manner. The other parts of a 
claim were also contained in this statute. 
The general approach of the courts of California may be 
f~~-----------------·---
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described as favoring a complete abolishment of tbe immunity 
doctrine. As in New York, the California courts have held that 
all the elements of a negligence claim must be found before a 
case can be heard. A reasonably prudent person must be able 
to foresee the event before negligence can be proven. The 
proximate cause of the injury must be under the control of the 
district. Only ordinary care was necessary, as the school was 
not tbe insurer of the safety of the children. A statute im-
posed the duty of supervision upon the teachers and the district. 
Again the question of the adequacy of the supervision was 
relative to the time, place, and circumstances of the incident 
and was a point of fact to be determined by the jury. Under 
the prior statute which provided a ninety day deadline for 
filing a claim, the courts strictly constructed this require-
ment. Under the recent statute a more liberal construction was 
possible. 
School districts in the State of California were required 
to carry liability insurance. Cities, over 500,000, may act 
as self-insurers. 
In the three states of Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington 
an early movement toward modification was noted. However, for 
one reason or another this movement bas been controlled or 
eliminated. 
Minnesota in 1851 passed an act which allowed an action 
to be brought against the school district for an injury to the 
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rights of a plaintiff. But in a case heard in 1892 the ~inne­
sota Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean property 
rights, and from that day on, the school districts in Minne-
sota were immune from vicarious tort liability in negligence. 
Oregon has followed a similar path. In the statute 
authorizing suits, the courts have interpreted the authorization 
to mean property rights. A minor deviation from the precedent 
was seen in 1961. In the Vendrell case the district was held 
liable to the extent of the liability insurance policy. 
Washington enacted its first abrogation statute in 1869. 
Following a rash of cases, the legislature in 1917 passed an 
act which permitted liability but excluded actions stemming 
from playgrounds, gymnasiums, athletics or industrial arts. 
Since this enactment tbe courts of Washington have allowed suits 
against the school districts for injuries occurring in ways 
other than the statutory exclusions. 
Illinois was the latest state to hold the school district 
liable for tort. Since 1898 school districts in Illinois have 
been immune. However, in 1959 the Molitor case reversed this 
ruling and held that the immunity of school districts was 
waived to the extent of any liability insurance. Immediately 
following the Molitor decision th~ legislature enacted a bill 
which related to the damages collectible under a claim of 
negligence. The act established a deadline of six months for 
filing a claim, and the action must be commenced within one 
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year. This was followed by a patchwork of liabilities, 
i•r:n.mi ties, and procedural rules, which did not help clear up 
the picture. In 1935, a joint committee of the Illinois State 
and Chicago Bar Association met to study the recently enacted 
California Tort Claims Act of 19G3 and to adapt its provision 
for use in Illinois. Tho General Assembly of 1965, enacted 
the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity 
Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 35 sec. 1-101 through 10-101). 
'l'wo fundamental features of the act are: First, its 
provisions are applicable to all units of local government, 
including school districts. Second, the rule of the Molitor 
case is still the law of Illinois, except as modified by the 
Tort Immunity Act or some other statute. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the Molitor 
decision applied only to cases arising after December 16, 1959. 
Despite the furor of this decision, the court has ruled that 
no new basis for negligence had been created, and that it 
was still necessary to show the essential elements of a neg-
ligence claim. 
In certain states and in certain specific and restricted 
areas, the school district may be held liable in tort for 
negligence. While the school may be held liable for this 
specific charge, the general concept of immunity still prevails. 
One of these areas was the so-called "safe place" 
statutes. Two states, Colorado and Wisconsin, had enacted 
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c:tatutes which impose a liability upon the school district to 
.., 
build and maintain its buildings and/or equipment so as to 
render them safe for general use. Generally, the courts in-
terpreted these statutes very strictly and recovery was limited. 
Four states, (Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and 
Wyoming) had passed "save harmless" legislation. These acts 
which cause the board of education to assume the liability of 
school employees acting within the scope of their duties may 
or may not make the board of education liable in tort for 
negligence. Connecticut courts have interpreted this statute 
as one of the indemnification from loss, not liability. In 
other words, a judgment must first be secured against the 
employee. In New Jersey, the court has said that this act did 
not create a liability upon the part of the district, and the 
school district was held immune from suit. The statute of 
Wyoming contained within itself a statement to the effect that 
no new liability had been created. 
In a few jurisdictions, the courts have attempted to 
classify the functions of the school as either governmental or 
proprietary. If the function was held to be proprietary, lia-
bility may attach. Such a distinction is hard to make; there-
fore, it is infrequently done. Pennsylvania and Arizona have 
made this distinction recently. The Illinois Supreme Court 
as recently as 1962 would not attempt this artificial distinction 
In general, this attempt to circumvent the immunity principle 
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nas had little effect. 
Many school districts car:cy liability insurance with 
or without statutory authorization. The carrying of insurance 
would seem to void one of the reasons for immunity, the ~::ro­
tection of public funds. The bulk of the states did not allow 
recovery even if the district was fully insured; however, 
several states have departed from this concept. Kentucky and 
Tenneseee have so done. In 1961 the Oregon Supreme Court per-
mitted recovery against a school district for the amount 
covered in the pol:i.cy. While immunity st ill prevails in these 
states, some of the hardships were eased. 
In brief a recapitulation of the status of tort lia-
bility of school districts in the United States disclosed 
that there was a slight movement away from the traditional 
immunity. Three states, California, Illinois, and New York, 
have been the leaders in the complete abrogation of immunity. 
other states have developed specialized laws for granting 
recovery in limited area. Kentucky, Tennessee, and Oregon 
allow recovery to the amount of liability insurance carried. 
School districts in the State of Washington were liable except 
for injuries occurring in certain specified locations. A few 
states attempted the division of the school's functions into 
governmental or proprietary categories. 
f-~-------------------, 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
In the conclusions of this study, the salient points 
have answered the questions posed at the beginning of the 
investigation. The conclusions are intended for students of 
educational administration, be they board members, super-
intendents, or principals. It does not take much foresight to 
see that school districts and tort liability cases will be a 
fertile field for an ever· increasing amount of litigation and 
statutory concern. 
The immunity doctrine originated in times which were 
very dissimilar to the time today. It was based originally on 
the divine rights of kings and that "the king could do no 
wrong." How this reason applied to the United States is a 
mystery of American jurisprudence. From the concept of "the 
king could do no wrong" the sovereign immunity of the state 
and of the school district grew like Topsy. Many reasons are 
given but the most cogent are the protection of the public 
funds and the loss of public confidence. At the time of writing 
the vast majority of the states extend the protection of 
immunity to school districts for tort liability. 
W!dle a majority of the school districts are immune, 
a number of states have moved toward nonimmunity. In attempting 
to understand the rationale of the courts and legislation, the 
authorities felt that it was better for the public to bear a 
'----------------------------, 
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burden which would easily overwhelm an individual. Many 
authorities have referred to the social injustices of the 
1mmunity ruling. Immunity has survived as a historical anach-
ronism and is not suitable for the current sociological sorld 
in which we live. This movement is symptomatic of the trend 
away from "classical liberalism." 
As was noted in the summary, California, Illinois, and 
New York are the leading states in the abrogation of immunity. 
By various means, in a number of other states, the school 
district may be held liable in tort. 
In a number of decisions, the courts noted that there 
were no express statutes enacted by the legislature permitting 
liability; therefore, the court, although it was dissatisfied 
with immunity, felt that it did not have the power to modify. 
Other courts noting the same role of the legislature, have 
proceeded to modify on judicial authority. New York and Ill-
inois are examples of such modification. In the realm of 
municipal corporations, Michigan and Wisconsin have also so 
changed. In some cases it appeared that neither authority 
wished to take the initiative and responsibility for the abro-
gation of immunity. 
In the bulk of the states the purchase of liability 
insurance has had little effect upon the liability of the school 
district for torts. However, in Kentucky, Oregon, and Tennessee 
the courts have allowed recovery to the extent of the limits 
r 
of the insurance policy carried by the school district. The 
purchase of liability insurance by a school in a state where 
the school is immune from suit is a questionable practice. 
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In all three of the leading states, the legislatures 
have enacted statutes which attempt to limit the liability of 
the school district. Generally, these statutes set the dead-
lines for filing a claim, designated the proper form of notice, 
and the person to whom the notice must be celivered. New York 
courts have interpreted the requirements very strictly; how-
ever, recent legislation has been ena::ted which authorizes a 
more liberal approach. 
The trend of nonimmunity appears to be increasing. The 
three leading states have abrogated immunity within the 
century. New York in 1906, California in 1923, and Illinois 
in 1959, three of the more influential states, have moved 
towa~n liability of the school district. other states have 
occupied an interim position which permitted recovery in 
specific areas. Ia the field of municipal corporations, recent 
decisions have been rendered which held these agencies liable. 
It is the opinion of this writer that the trend toward the 
modification of immunity will continue and grow in strength. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This writer believes that school districts and their 
personnel will become the target for ever increasing amounts 
r -~------------------------------------~ 
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of litigation for tort liability in negligence. In the re-
commendations the emphasis will be on the development of guide 
lines which will protect, limit, or mitigate the charges against 
the defendant. Two types are made. 
The first type of recommendation is legal in nature. 
Each administrator should know the statutes and case law of his 
state. The state's attorney or the legal advisor of the state 
department of education should be consulted for a particular 
case. Regardless, the advice of local counsel is essential. 
Many schools retain an attorney for legal advice. The legal 
experts will know what constitutes negligence as well as the 
bars to recovery. All legal questions should be referred to 
qualified attorneys at the earliest possible moment. 
Justice as seen in the various cases and statutes points 
toward the responsibility of the public toward an individual. 
Contemporary social justice, as expressed in such ways as 
social security and workmen's compensation, demands a more just 
and equitable solution than an individual's assumption of the 
loss. All rights and obligations are conditioned by our society. 
This research shows that some of the legal community is accept-
ing the view that it may be better for the public to undertake 
this responsibility. 
In order to promote justice in the field of school 
district liability and to prevent the hardships inherent in 
the traditional immunity doctrine, this writer recommends that 
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the immunity of the school district for tort liability be 
abolished by legislative enactment. Because of the fact that 
the legislative branch is directly responsible to the people 
and less bound by precedent, it is clear to the writer that the 
legislature is the logical body to take the initiative. 
In examining the legislation of California, Illinois, 
and New York and the judicial construction thereof, certain 
recommendations can be made in the manner of drafting new 
statutes. Of paramount importance is the need to write laws 
so as to protect the individual and also protect the school 
from fraudulent and stale claims. The statutes should clearly 
state the procedure of filing a claim. A reasonably flexible 
deadline for tiling should be allowed for minors and persons 
incapacitated, if the school district is not prejudiced by such 
a late claim. Limit to recovery does not seem to have the 
flexibility desirable for the diverse needs of the injured 
plaintiffs. It would seem to the writer that this discriminates 
against children since they are the principal plaintiffs in 
these cases. If the damages are more than the amount of the 
limit fixed by law, the plaintiff must stand the loss. 
In view of the fact that government in its many and 
varied forms has pervaded our daily lives in so many ways, it 
is the recommendation of this writer that a separate agency be 
established to hear the tort claims of all governmental agencies 
below the state level. Each state could establish an agency, 
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perhaps similar to a court of claims or special commission to 
adjudicate these claims. Such an agency would have the advantage 
of specializing in tort liability claims, thereby insuring a 
fairer and more equitable settlement of claims. Many civil 
courts are already overloaded with pending personal injury 
suits, and this would alleviate this condition to some extent. 
Since this agency would not be a court in the usual sense, 
cases could be disposed of more readily. By hearing all the 
cases related to governmental bodies, a balance and perspective 
could be maintained which is virtually impossible under the 
present situation. 
Cases which are brought to the bar are expensive both 
in time and money. In addition they cast a bad light on the 
school and on the reputation of the staff and administration. 
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of tort 
liability suits brought against the school district. If the 
debilitating effects of such litigation are to be controlled, 
it is essential that all concerned become cognizant of this 
field of law. 
The second type of recommendation relates to activities 
at the operational level which the administration may utilize 
to control, protect, or mitigate its tort liability. 
If the school district may be held liable, the prudent 
administrator will see that the operating funds of the school 
are protected in some manner. Most school districts will elect 
r -~-----------------------------------------· 
to carry a ,general liability insurance policy of suitable 
limits. In other cases, particularly in large cities, the 
school district may act as its own self-insurer. 
/; 13 
The past history of tort liability indicates that school 
districts did not become bankrupt under the burden of paying 
liability claims. In fact, various references have stated 
that the percentage of money disbursed for personal injury 
claims was a small part of the total budget. Some states 
expressly provide authority for the payment of such claims. The 
cost of claims or insurance premiums is an integral part of 
the total cost of the educational system and should be so 
considered. 
As was previously 8tated, the school is not the insurer 
of tho safety of a child, and it is not reasonable to expect 
that no accidents will happen. Before the school district can 
be held liable for negligence, the defendant must be guilty of 
negligence. Certainly the school district has a duty to use 
care in safeguarding the well-being of the students. Various 
aspects of school activities present more danger of injury 
than others. It is recommended that the administration be 
especially aware of the dangers involved in the following: 
transportation, buildings and grounds, physical activities, 
vocational training, science laboratories, school patrols, 
and driver education. 
The administration should be alert for all unsafe 
activities and conditions. A yearly safety inspection by the 
safety engineers of the liability insurance company is a 
recommended procedure. Periodic inspections by the fire pre-
vention department will be of value. Frequent inspections by 
the building principal and the head custodian will detect 
dangerous conditions before catastrophe strH:es. 
When an unsafe or dangerous condition is discovered, 
aaximum effort should be made to correct this as soon as possi-
ble. If the condition is critical, evacuation and the closing 
of school would be indicated. The maintenance of buildings, 
grounds, and equipment in a dangerous or defective condition 
is a condition which can be remedied more readily than some 
other conditions. 
Schools have a duty to adequately supervise their 
students. Of course, what is adequate supervision is a rela-
tive question, depending upon the time, place, and circumstances 
of the event. But perhaps some general bench marks are in order. 
Such rules and regulations as are necessary for the conduct 
of the school should be made known, and the administration 
should ascertain whether the rules are being carried out. If 
a dangerous instrumentality or activity is involved, a higher 
degree of care would be indicated. A teacher should have the 
class under control, but it is not a proof of negligence to be 
away from the class for a short length of time. 
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Many accidents occur while children are playing on the 
playground. The question of the adequacy of the playground 
supervision has been the source of much litigation. Again, it 
is stated that the school is not the insurer of the safety of 
its students, and it is reasonable to expect that accidents 
will occur even if the supervision is adequate. The teacher 
should be in control of the situation so that if a dangerous 
condition develops it may be curbed. It would be recommended 
that the supervisor be in such a position so as to maintain 
visual contact with the students being supervised. It is not 
reasonable to expect one teacher to supervise great numbers of 
students. In several cases one teacher per 100 to 150 students 
was held to be a reasonable situation. However, the number 
will depend upon the location and the type of student involved. 
If an accident or injury occurs there are certain steps 
that may be taken to protect the district. The provision of 
proper first aid may prevent more serious damage. All staff 
members should be instructed in first-aid procedures. If there 
is no emergency the teacher should wait for medically trained 
personnel. Each school should have on display, in a prominent 
location, the procedures to be followed in handling various 
injuries. 
Complete records of the incident should be completed by 
the personnel involved in the case. All pertinent facts should 
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be recorded as soon as possible. Regular channels for reporting 
serious injuries should be established so that a centralized 
and responsible person is notified. Generally, this person would 
contact the insurance company, the attorney, and report this 
activity to the superintendent of schools. 
If the above recommendations are implemented, the school 
districts need not fear the awesome specter of tort liability. 
~facto, the school with this increased liability will find 
"necessity's sharp pinch" a stimulus toward providing the 
safest conditions ordinarily possible. 
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GLOSSARY 
GLOSSARY 
Accident - An unforeseen event, occurring without the will or 
design of the person whose mere act causes it; an unexpected, 
unusual, or undesigned occurrence; the effect of an unknown 
cause, or the cause being known, by the unprecedented consequence 
of it; a casualty. In its proper use the term excludes neglig-
ence; that is, an accident is au event which occurs without the 
fault, carelessness, or want of proper circumspection of the 
person affected or wnich could not have been avoided by the 
use of that kind and degree of care necessary to the exigency 
and in t h('I' circumstancett in which he was placed. 
J\j liteil - For the suit; for the purpose• of the suit; peud-
lii'g the suit. A guardian ad litem is a guardian appointed to 
prosecute or defend a suit--On behalf of a party incapacitated 
by infancy or otherwise. 
Agent - One who represents and acts for another under the 
contract or relation of agency. 
Assumption of risk - A term or condition in a contract of 
employment, either express or implied from the circumstances 
of the employment, by which the employee agrees that dangers 
of injury ordinarily or obviously incident to the discharge of 
his duty in the particular employment shall be at his own 
risk. 
Attractive nuisance - A doctrine which holds a property owner 
liable, when he knowingly leaves a dangerous instrumentality, 
which he may be charged with knowing is of a character to 
attract children, exposed in a place liable to be frequented 
by children, and as a result, a child who did not realize the 
danger, is injured. 
Case law - The aggregate of. reported cases as forming a body 
of jurisprudence, or the law of a particular subject as 
evidenced or formed by the adjudged cases, in distinction to 
statutes and other sources of law. 
239 
240 
Certiorari - The name of a writ issued by a superior court 
directing an inferior court to send up to the former some 
pending proceeding, or all the record and proceedings in a 
cause before the verdict, with its certificate to the correct-
ness and completeness of the record, for review or trial; or 
it may serve to bring up the record of a case already terminated 
below, if the inferior court is not one of record, or in cases 
where the procedure is not according to the course of the 
common law. 
Common law - As distinguished from the Roman law, the modern 
civil law, the canon law, and other systems, the common law is 
that body of law and juristic theory which was originated, 
developed, and formulated and is administered in England, 
and has obtained among most of the states and peoples of 
Anglo-Saxon stock. 
As distinguished from law created by the enactment o! 
legislatures, the common law comprises the body of those 
principles and rules of action, relating to the goverr;Jlent 
and security of persons and property, which derive their 
autho1·ity solely from usages aud customs of immemorial anti-
quity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts re-
cognizing, affirming. and enforcing such usages and customs; 
and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law 
of England. 
As concerns its force and authority in the United States, 
the ptrase designates that portion of the common law of England 
{including such acts of Parliament as were applicable) which 
had been adopted and was in force here at the time of the 
Revolution. This, so far it has not since been expressly 
abrogated, is recognized ae an organic part of the juris-
prui:tenc0 of nost of the United States. 
In a wider sense than any of the foregoing, the ~'com:.non 
law" may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic 
theory, and ancient custom of any state or nation which is of 
general and universal application, thus marking off special 
o~ local rules or customs. 
Condition precedent - A condition precedent is one which is to 
be performed before some right dependent thereon accrues, or 
some act dependent thereon is performed. 
Contt•act - A protnissory agreement between two or more persons 
that creates, modifies, or destroys a legal relation. 
Contributory negligence - Contributory negligence, when set 
up as a defense to any action for injuries alleged to have 
been caused by the defendant's negligence, means any want of 
or~inary care on the part of the person injured, (or on the 
part of another whose negligence is imputable to him,) which 
combined and concurred with the defendant's negligence, and 
contributed to the injury as a proximate cause thereof, and 
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as an element without which the injury would not have occurred. 
Ccrporation - An artificial person or legal entity created by 
or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation, 
composed, in some rare instances, of a single person and his 
successors, being the incumbents of a particular office, but 
ordinarily consisting of an association of numerous individuals, 
who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, 
which is regarded in law as having a personality and existence 
distinct from that of its several members, and which is, by 
the same authority, vested with the capacity ~f continuous 
succession, irrespective of changes in membership, either in 
perpetuity or for a limited term of years, and of acting as 
a unit or single individual in matters relating to the comm.on 
purpose of the association, within the scope of the powers and 
authorities conferred upon such bodies by law. 
Crime - A positive or negative act in violation of penal law; 
an offense against the State. Crimes are those wrongs which 
the government notices as injurious to the public, and pun-
ishes in what is called a "criminal proceeding," in its own 
name. 
Damagv - Loss, injury, or deterioration, caused by the negli-
gence, design, or accident of one person to another, in respect 
of the latter's person or property. 
Damages - a pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be 
recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, 
detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property, or 
rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of 
another. 
Defendant - The person defending or denying; tile party against 
whom relief or recovery is sought in an action or suit. 
Dictum - See "obiter dictum." 
Employee - One who works for an employer; a person working 
for salary or wages. 
Employer - One who ~mploys the services of others; one for 
whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries. 
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Estop - To stop, bar, or to impede; to prevent; to preclude. 
Imputed negligence - Negligence which is not directly attri-
butable to the person himself, but which is the negligence of 
a person who is in privity with him, and with whose fault he 
is chargeable. 
Independent contractor - One who, exercising an independent 
employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his 
own methods and without being subject to the control of his 
employer except as to the result of the work. 
It is very generally held that the right of control as 
·::o the mode of doing the work constructed for is the principal 
consideration in determining whether one employed is an 
"independent contractor" or servant. If the employee is 
merely subject to the control or direction of the employer as 
to the result to be obtained, he is an independent contractor; 
if he is subject to the control of the employer as to the 
means to be employed, he is not an independent contractor. 
Infant - A person within age, not of age, or not of full age; 
a person under the age of twenty-one years; a minor. 
Injury - Any wrong or damage done to another, either in his 
person, rights, reputation, or property. 
Invitees - One who is at a place upon the invitation of another. 
Last clear chance - In the law of negligence, this terms denotes 
the doctrine or rule that, notwithstanding the negligence of 
a plaintiff, if, at the time the injury was done, it might have 
been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care on the part of 
the defendant, the defendant will be liable for the failure 
to exercise such care.. The doctrine cannot iJt' invoked by a 
plaintiff unless he himself by his own negligence has proxi-
mately brought about the situation which put upon defendant 
an extraordinary duty which otherwise would not have rested 
on him. In many jurisdictions the rule is that for a person 
to be brought within the "last clear chance" doctrine, the 
evidence must tend to show that, while his negligence may have 
contributed toward getting him in the position of danger, all 
negligence on his part had ceased for a sufficient time prior 
to the accident to have enabled the defendant, after he knew 
of his situation or peril, to have avoided the accident. In 
some jurisdictions, however, the "last clear chance" rule 
applies, although the plaintiff negligently exposes himself 
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to peril, and although his negligences continues until the 
accident happens, if the defendant, with knowledge of his 
danger and reason to suppose that he may not save himself, may 
avoid the injury by exercise of ordinary care, and fails to do 
so. 
Legal liability - A liability which courts of justice recognize 
and enforce as between parties litigant. 
Liable - Bound or obliged in law or equity; responsible; 
chargeable; answerable; compelled to make satisfaction, com-
pensation, or restitution. 
Liability - The state of being bound or obliged in law or 
justice to do, pay, or make good something. 
Licensee - A person who is neither a paaeenger, servant, or 
trespasser, and dces not stand in any contractual relation 
with the owner of the premises, and who is permitted to go 
therein for his own interest, convenience, or gratification. 
Malfeasance - The wrongful or unjust doing of some act which 
the doer has no right to perform, or which he has stipulated 
by contract not to do. 
Master - One having authority; one who rules, directs, in-
structs, or superintends; a head or chief; an employer. 
Misf eance - The improper performance of some act which a man 
may lawfully do. 
Negligence - The omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily 
regulate human affairs, would do, or the doing of something 
which a reasonable and prudent man would not do. 
Nolens volens - Whether willing or not; consenting or not. 
Nonf eaeance - The neglect or failure of a person to do some 
act which he ought to do. The term is not generally used to 
denote a breach of contract, but rather the failure to perform 
a duty towards the public whereby some individual sustains 
special damage •••• 
Non obatante veredicto - Notwithstanding the verdict. A 
Judgment entered by order of court for the plai~tifi, al-
though there has been a verdict for the defendant, is so 
called. 
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Nuisance - That class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, 
unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person of his own property, 
either real or personal, or from his own improper, indecent, 
or unlawful personal conduct, working an obstruction or an 
injury to the right of another or of the public, and the 
producing material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or 
hurt. 
Anything which is injurio~s to health, or is indecent or 
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment 
of life or property, which unlawfully obstructs the free 
passage or use, in the customary manner, of any lake or river, 
bay, stream, canal, or basin, or other public park, square, 
street, or highway is a nuisance. 
Nunc pro tune.- A phrase used to express that a thing done at 
one time which ought to have been performed at another. 
Obiter dictum - A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a 
judge, in his decision upon a cause, ''by the way," that is, 
incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the 
question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved 
in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of 
illustration, or analogy or argument. 
Officer - The incumbent in an office; one who is lawfully in-
vested with an office. An "officer" is one who is invested 
with some portions of the functions of the government to be 
exercised for the public benefit. 
Per curiam - By the court. A phrase used in the reports to 
Cl'iStinguish an opinion of the whole court from an opinion 
written by any one judge. 
Plaintiff - A person who brings an action; the party who 
complains or sues in a personal act ion and is so named on 
the record. 
·~ tanto - For so much ; for as much as may be ; as far as it 
goes. 
Proximate cause - That which, in a natural and continuous 
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, pro-
duces the injury, and without which the result would not 
have occurred. That which is nearest in the order of res-
ponsible causation. 
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Quasi corporations - organizations resembling corporations; 
municipal societies or similar bodies which, though not true 
corporations in all respects, are yet recognized by statutes 
or immemorial usage, as persons or aggregate corporations, 
with precise duties which may be enforced, and privileges 
which may be maintained, bu suits at law. They may be con-
sidered quasi corporations, with limited powers, co-extensive 
with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage, but 
restrained from a general use of the authority which belongs 
to those metaphysical persons by the common law. 
Quasi municipal corporations - Bodies politic and corporate, 
created for the sole purpose of performing one or more muni• 
cipal functions. Public corporations organized for govern-
mental purposes and having for most purposes the status and 
powers of municipal corporations •••• but not municipal 
corporations proper, such as cities and incorporated towns. 
Remote cause - In the law of negligence, a "remote" cause of 
an accident or injury may be one which sets in motion another 
cause, called the "proximate" cause. The "remote cause" is 
the one the existence of which does not necessarily imply the 
existence of the effect. Remote cause is also defined as a 
cause operating mediately through other causes to produce 
effect. 
Res ipsa loquitur - The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable 
presumption that defendant was negligent, which arises upon 
proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's 
exclusive control, and that the accident was one which or-
dinarily does not happen in absence of negligence. 
Res judicata - A matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted 
\iPOn or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. 
Respondeat superior - Let the master answer. This maxim means 
that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts 
of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent. 
School board - A board of municipal officers charged with the 
administration of the affairs of the public schools. They are 
commonly organized under the general laws of the state, and 
fall within the class of q;,.iasi corporations, sometimes 
coterminus with a county or borough, but not necessarily so. 
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School district - A public and quasi municipal corporation, 
organized by legislative authority or direction, comprising a 
defined territory, for tlle erection, maintenance, government, 
and support of the public schools within its territory in 
accordance with and in subordination to the general school 
laws of the state, invested, for these purposes only, with 
powers of local self-government and generally of local taxation, 
and administered by a board of officers, usually elected by 
the voters of the district, who are variously styled ·~chool 
directors, " or "trustees," "commissioners," or "supervisors" 
of schools. 
Servant - A person in the emrcloy of another and subject to 
his control as to what work shall be done and the means by 
which it shall be accomplished. 
Stare decisis - To stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; 
to maintain Iormer adjudications. Doctrine of stare decisis 
rests upon the principle that law by which men are governed 
should be fixed, definite, and lmown, and that, when the law 
is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to 
construe it, such declaration, in the absence of palpable 
mistake or error is itself evidence of the law until changed 
by competent authority. 
State - A body politic, or society of men, united together for 
the purpose of promoting for their mutual safety and advantage, 
by the joint efforts of their combined strength. A political 
community organized under a distinct government reco~nized 
and confirmed by its citizens and subjects as a supreme power. 
Subrogation - The Substitution of one thing for another, or of 
one person into the place of another with respect to rights, 
claims, or securities. 
Tort - A tort is a legal wrong committed upon the person or 
property of another independent of contract. It lllay be either 
( 1) a direct invasion of some legal right of the individual; 
(2) the infraction of some public duty by which special da1ange 
accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private 
obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual. 
In the former case, no special damage is necessary to entitle 
the party to recover. In the two latter cases, such damage 
is necessary. 
Tort-feasor - A wrong-doer; one who commits or is guilty of 
a tort. 
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Trespass - An unlawful act committed with violence, actual or 
implied, causing injury to the person, property, or relative 
rights of another; an injury or misfeasance to the person, 
property, or rights of another, done with force and violence, 
either actual or implied in law. 
In the strictest sense, an entry on another's ground, 
without a lawful authority, and doing some damage, however 
inconsiderable, to his real property. 
Trespasser - One who has committed trespass; one who unlaw-
fully enters upon another's land, or unlawfully and forcibly 
takes another's personal property. The term is generally used 
in a limited sense to designate one who goes upon the premises 
of another without invitation, express or implied, and does 
so out of curiosity, and for his own purposes or convenience, 
and not in the performance of any duty to the owner. 
Ultra vires - A term used to express the action of a corporation 
which is beyond the powers conferred upon it by its charter, 
or the statutes under which it was instituted. 
Vested rights - Rights which have so completely and definitely 
accrued to or settled in a person that they are not subject 
to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private 
person, and which it is right and equitable that the govern-
ment should recognize and protect, as being lawful in them-
selves, and settled according to the then current rules of 
law, and of which the individual could not be deprived ar-
bitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly 
be deprived otherwise than by the established methods of pro-
cedure and for the public welfare. 
Vis major - A greater or superior force, an irrestible force. 
il"Toss by vis major is one that results immediately from a 
natural cause without the intervention of man and could not 
have been prevented by the exercise of prudence, diligence and 
care. 
Volenti non fit injuria - He who consents cannot receive an 
inJury. ---- ---
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